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THESIS ABSTRACT 
Initial public offerings (IPOs) are the mechanism by which private firms raise 
initial public equity and obtain listing on a stock exchange. The role and 
importance of IPOs has changed over time and they now represent a significant 
portion of market activity. IPOs present challenges for both researchers and 
academics given their problems in valuation and pricing, information asymmetry 
and information quality. Prior research has concentrated on analysis of individual 
IPOs, or at least aggregated statistics thereof. In this thesis, the aggregate market 
for IPOs is examined. The focus of the thesis is mainly empirical, consisting of a 
number of related studies that examine the time -series and cross -sectional 
behaviour of volume and pricing measures of aggregate IPO activity, 
concentrating on the Australian and US markets. 
The early chapters demonstrate strong time -series features in the two markets 
which can be captured by regime -switching models. The results indicate that IPO 
markets exhibit characteristics consistent with momentum and "hot" periods. 
Moreover, there are signals contained in the relationship between volume and 
pricing measures such that under- pricing leads volume. Various reasons are 
advanced for this finding, mainly surrounding institutional requirements. The 
thesis then examines the influence of economic and financial conditions on the 
IPO market. Consistent with a number of hypotheses, the findings reveal that the 
business cycle, stock market conditions, investor sentiment and volatility exhibit a 
significant influence over IPO activity. These results contain messages and 
implications for intending issuers, investors and market regulators. Finally, a 
cross -market study is undertaken in which the relationship between the Australian 
and US markets is analysed with the results confirming the relative dominance of 
the US market. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Introduction 
Initial public offerings (or IPOs) are security issues, typically in the form 
of equity, that are offered to investors through a listing on the stock exchange. An 
WO is generally the first effort by a firm to raise capital in a public equity market. 
Publicly traded stocks offer greater liquidity, which allows the firm to generate 
funds on more favorable terms than where privately owned. 
Over the period 1960 -1996, there were 2,271 IPOs issued in the Australian 
equity market which translates to an average of about 7 new floats per month. In 
comparison, there were around 11,000 new issues in the US market over the same 
period which translates to an average of about 25 IPOs per month. Government 
policy decisions over the last decade have fuelled further interest through the 
process of privatisation. For instance, Australia has followed the lead of the 
Thatcher government in the UK in the 1980s and pursued floats of public 
institutions such as the Commonwealth Bank, Qantas and Telstra. Further, the de- 
mutualisation of several large entities, such as AMP and the Australian Stock 
Exchange itself, have done much to attract small investors to the stock market 
through IPO subscriptions. 
While IPOs have been a common feature of stock markets for many years, 
over the last decade or so they have also attracted research interest. Research into 
IPOs has generally fallen into three main categories. First, the issue of short-run 
1 
performance has been subject to widespread research. This work has generally 
found that there is a frequent incidence of large initial returns in IPO stocks 
generated over the first few days of listing, that is, IPOs tend to be underpriced 
(e.g. Finn and Higham 1988; Ritter 1984a; How et al. 1995; Ibbotson et al. 1994; 
Lee et al. 1996a and 1996b; Loughran et al. 1994). Generally, the average first day 
stag profit has been somewhere around 10 -30 %, although the exact amount varies 
across markets and sample periods. Nevertheless, the consistent result of 
underpricing has been documented in most developed and many emerging 
markets. For instance, two studies report the average IPO initial return between 
12% and 29% in Australia and these figures are quite close to 15.8% reported in 
the USA (e.g. Ibbotson et aI. 1994).1 A number of papers have proposed 
theoretical models to explain the WO price behaviour with mixed results.2 These 
models typically rely upon information asymmetries (e.g. Baron 1982; Rock 
1986), or market imperfections generally created through information problems 
(e.g. Mauer and Senbet 1992; Muscarella and Vetsuypens 1989a and 1989b). 
Second, a group of papers have examined the long -run performance of 
IPOs. Generally, the tracking of price performance over a number of years 
following listing has shown that IPOs tend to underperform established 
benchmarks (e.g. Aggarwal et al. 1993; Ritter 1991).3 
A third category of research has examined the characteristics associated 
with the issue itself, such as the role of underwriters and investment banks (e.g. 
Affleck- Graves and Miller 1989; Carter and Manaster 1990; Carter et al. 1998), 
the impact of auditor choice (e.g. Beatty 1989; Feltham et al. 1991; Firth and 
See Finn and Higham (1988), How et al. (1995) and Lee et al. (1996a). 
2 For example, Baron (1982), Rock (1986), and Welch (1989,1992). 
3 The return on a market index is normally used as a benchmark. 
2 
Smith 1992) and the disclosure of prior information (e.g. Chaney and Lewis 1998; 
Firth 1997; Kim and Ritter 1999). 
There has also been some attempt to examine the IPO market in aggregate. 
These latter studies have presented evidence that cycles appear to exist in both the 
volume and the average initial returns of IPOs. These cycles give rise to the 
concept of `hot' and 'cold' markets with a 'hot issue' market characterised by an 
unusually high volume of new offerings, severe underpricing and frequent 
oversubscription of offerings (Ritter 1998; Helwege and Liang 1996a). However, 
the behaviour of the aggregate IPO market has generally only been covered briefly 
in the context of other issues. 
1.2 Cycles in the IPO Market 
`Hot' issues were first defined by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) as IPOs that 
are extremely underpriced, while a hot issue market is a market with a 
considerable number of extremely underpriced issues. Identification of hot issue 
markets would therefore focus on the number of extremely underpriced IPOs, but 
any definition of `extreme underpricing' would be arbitrary and is time -dependent, 
so researchers have instead examined average monthly underpricing of IPOs as 
well as the monthly volume of new issues, when investigating hot issue markets 
(Ritter 1984b; Ibbotson et al. 1994; Ritter 1998). An operational definition of a hot 
issue market is a market with an unusually high volume of new offerings, severe 
under -pricing and frequent over -subscription of offerings (Ritter 1998; Helwege 
and Liang 1996a). 
3 
In an efficient market and in the absence of market imperfections, the 
timing of equity financing decisions should not matter since an IPO should be 
fairly priced (Brealey and Myers 1991). The consequent implication is 
straightforward. That is, IPOs should occur randomly across time and hot and cold 
issue IPO markets should not exist. However, empirical evidence contradicts this 
theory, in that cycles are observed in both TO underpricing and volume (e.g. 
Choe et al. 1993; Ibbotson and Jaffe 1975; Helwege and Liang 1996a; James and 
Kieschnick 1997; Loughran et al. 1994; Ritter 1984b, 1998). There are a few 
arguments as to why the TO market may run hot and cold. 
By applying Rock's (1986) model, Ritter (1984b) suggests a changing risk 
composition hypothesis and argues that if high risk IPOs represent an unusually 
large proportion of offerings in some specific periods, high average TO under- 
pricing should be observed in these periods. 
A second explanation of hot issue periods concerns positive feedback 
strategies where investors assume positive correlation in initial WO returns such 
that initial returns are likely to be bid up if other recent issues have risen in price. 
The argument is linked to similar arguments of investor sentiment used to explain 
apparent patterns in the stock market. That is, markets gain momentum through 
fads and shifts in investor sentiment. However, the hypothesis of a positive 
feedback strategy does not explain how hot markets commence in the first 
instance. Of note, to some extent these arguments are inconsistent with standard 
theory because they rely on some degree of investor irrationality and/or market 
inefficiency. 
Previous studies have not attempted to clearly identify structural breaks that 
separate different regimes in the IPO market. Hence, the questions of how frequent 
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the hot issue markets are, dating when they occur, and identifying the features 
associated with these markets, remain unanswered. Although there have been 
some attempts to explain the existence of hot issue IPO markets, the explanations 
have generally not proved to be satisfactory in fully accounting for the observed 
market behaviour. Moreover, existing explanations focus on specific 
characteristics that are either demand or supply -side driven and generally ignore 
more comprehensive and multivariate approaches. Further, there exists no in -depth 
analysis of the interdependence among national IPO markets. Loughran et al. 
(1994) document evidence of the short-run and long -run performance of IPOs in 
fifteen countries but does not further examine the interrelationship between these 
countries. In this thesis, I seek to provide some insights into these questions. 
1.3 Motivation 
An important distinguishing feature of the market for initial public offerings 
is the tendency of the market to undergo periods of concentrated activity whereby 
the number of new issues coming to the market and the extent of IPO underpricing 
both appear to substantially increase. These `hot issue' periods attract enormous 
investor interest and media attention because of their perceived potential for short 
term trading profits. However, much less academic attention has been directed 
towards examining the cyclical nature of hot and cold IPO markets, with the 
literature instead focusing on theoretical and cross -sectional explanations of IPO 
underpricing and long mn underperformance. This thesis explores the hot issue 
market question using the US and Australian 1PO data and is empirically based. 
This is in part motivated by the lack of previous work in this area. 
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Second, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) first documented that the degree of IPO 
underpricing is cyclical and concentrated in particular periods (1960 -1961 and 
1968 -1969) in the US market. Ritter (1984b) shows that there was also a hot issue 
market in 1980 in the USA using the data for the period 1977 -1982. A weakness in 
the above studies is that they use a relatively short time period in the analysis. Any 
potential hot issue periods after 1982 still remain unexplored. In this thesis, a 
relatively long time period for both Australian and US IPO markets (compared 
with the existing literature) is used to ascertain the existence of hot issue IPO 
markets in both Australia and the USA, explore the persistence of the hot issue 
WO markets, and further detect hot issue periods which might exist.4 
Third, IPO activity has traditionally been viewed in terms of three 
measures - a volume measure such as the number of WO issues, a pricing measure 
such as the average level of underpricing, and a value measure such as the total 
value of new issues. This study examines the three traditional measures of WO 
activity as well as a newly- developed fourth measure, the total value of 
underpricing, which captures the economic importance of IPO underpricing. These 
measures, taken together, indicate how many IPOs occurred in a month and 
whether the IPOs that occurred during the month were important from a value 
perspective. Contrary to previous studies where the question of hot and cold WO 
markets is explored using only one or two WO activity measures, all these four 
measures are examined in this thesis. This sheds further lights on questions such as 
whether hot issue periods are homogeneous in each measure and whether there is a 
lead -lag relationship between the measures. 
4 The data used in the thesis covers the period from I976 to 1998. 
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Fourth, Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) first documented that the degree of IPO 
underpricing is cyclical and concentrated in particular periods in the USA. Ritter 
(1984b), using US data for the period 1960 -1982, shows that there was also a hot 
issue market in 1980. The hot issue periods observed in the above two studies are 
based on descriptive analysis, typically from a visual inspection of the data series. 
Subsequent studies have generally also used graphical or visual analysis to 
describe hot and cold periods and have not attempted to clearly identify structural 
breaks that separate different regimes (e.g. Ibbotson et al. 1994; Loughran et al. 
1994). Without clear identification of hot periods, it is difficult to construct further 
tests that attempt to explain the existence of such periods. In this thesis, I identify 
the hot and cold IPO periods using a more appropriate statistical method, the 
Markov regime switching technique, as well as other turning points identification 
methods, such as visual analysis and the Bry and Boschan method. In particular, 
the application of Markov regime- switching to IPO data provides a multi- 
dimensional characterization of IPO cycles in terms of active versus inactive 
market volume, and hot versus cold underpricing. 
Fifth, there have been some prior attempts to explain the existence of hot 
issue IPO markets. However, these explanations have generally not proved to be 
satisfactory in fully accounting for the observed market behaviour. In addition, 
existing explanations generally focus on specific characteristics that are either 
demand or supply -side driven. In this thesis, hypotheses are developed with 
consideration to economic and stock market variables based on both supply and 
demand considerations. These hypotheses are tested using a time -series sample of 
US new issues. 
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Sixth, although there exists some existing research in the area of hot issue 
IPO markets, it mainly focuses on the US market. Research on other international 
IPO markets is still scant. There may be an interrelationship between the US and 
other international IPO markets. This thesis fills this gap by exploring the hot and 
cold issue periods in Australian IPO activity and the financial linkage between the 
US and Australian TO markets. 
1.4 Objectives and Contribution 
This thesis has five objectives and contributions. First, it employs a long 
run IPO data series and develops four IPO activity measures. The first volume 
measure, the number of IPOs per month (NOIPO), expressed as a percentage of 
the total number of IPOs in the data set, is consistent with previous work (e.g. 
Ibbotson et al. 1994; Loughran et al. 1994). The second volume measure, the 
inflation -adjusted gross value of IPO proceeds per month (GP), is also expressed 
as a percentage of total proceeds in the entire data set and is also consistent with 
the literature (Rees 1997). An IPO underpricing measure used in this thesis, value - 
weighted underpricing (VWUP), improves upon previous measures of 
underpricing by weighting each issue's contribution to monthly underpricing 
according to the relative size of the issue within the month. This avoids the 
problem whereby traditional arithmetic average measures of underpricing are 
subject to too much influence from small `penny' stocks (e.g. Ibbotson and Ritter 
1995). The second measure of IPO underpricing, the value of underpricing (VUP), 
measures the total value of underpricing in a particular month divided by total 
value of underpricing in the entire sample (expressed as a percentage), thereby 
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indicating whether underpricing in a particular month is economically important. 
These measures provide a better description of IPO activity. 
Second, this thesis formally documents the existence of hot issue periods in 
the USA and Australia using a regime- switching model as well as visual analysis 
and a dating algorithm developed by Bry and Boschan (1971). This contribution 
has several advantages. First, it identifies in a quantitative manner hot and cold 
IPO periods in the USA and Australian markets. While there is general acceptance 
in the literature that such periods exist, there have previously been no formal 
attempts to quantify these periodic episodes. In so doing, existing knowledge is 
enhanced. Second, using a Markov regime switching model in addition to visual 
analysis and the turning points identification method, the thesis provides an 
objective determination of the dates of hot and cold issue periods. Again, this 
represents the first attempt in the literature to do so. Objective dating and 
characterization of hot and cold markets can be important for the development and 
empirical testing of models of IPO cycles. Third, there is evidence on the 
relationship between IPO underpricing and volume where underpricing leads the 
IPO volume by up to six months. The documentation of this feature provides new 
insights to researchers seeking explanations of IPO cycles and to market 
participants who are either seeking to bring new issues to the market or looking to 
invest in IPOs. 
Third, Ritter (1984b) suggests a changing risk composition hypothesis to 
explain the 1980 hot issue market. He argues that if high risk IPOs represent an 
unusually large proportion of offerings in some specific periods, high average IPO 
underpricing should be observed in these periods. Ritter suggests that the hot 
period in 1980 was characterised by a large number of small, natural resource 
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issues and that only these issues appeared excessively underpriced during the 
period. Since the Australian stock market consists of a relative Iarge proportion of 
resource sector stocks compared to other markets, it provides an opportunity for an 
examination of the difference in behaviour between industrial and resource sector 
IPOs. Hence, the analysis of the Australian WO activity involves separate 
consideration of the industrial and resource sectors of the market. This sheds 
additional light on the behaviour and nature of the industrial and resource sector 
IPOs. 
Fourth, this thesis analyses the relationship between IPO activity measures 
and various economic and stock market variables, thereby exploring the 
underlying cause for the time series variation in the IPO activity. Ibbotson et al. 
(1975) and Ibbotson et al. (1994) show the substantial fluctuations in the IPO 
activity, but these studies do not provide evidence as to the cause of this variation. 
This thesis extends previous work by employing US JIPO data and investigating 
the extent to which both efficient and inefficient market forces can explain the 
observed fluctuation in the IPO activity. This helps to provide an understanding of 
the market for corporate control, the reaction of stock market and its relationship 
to managerial performance. 
Fifth, this thesis examines the interrelationship between the US and 
Australian TIPO markets. Knowledge of the international linkage between national 
WO markets is important. First, an analysis of the interrelationship between 
international IPO activities will add our knowledge on the issue of international 
diversification. Second, financial managers of private companies are interested in 
worldwide IPO activity since it influences capital flows. Third, an understanding 
of financial linkages has implications for policy coordination and regulation. 
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However, analysis of the interdependence among national IPO markets is 
currently underdeveloped. This thesis fills this gap. 
In summary, the latter four tasks represent an important extension on 
existing research. This thesis offers new insights into the workings and behaviour 
of the IPO market. The insights gained in this study point to the influence of 
financial characteristics on the US and Australian IPO markets, the influence of 
economic and stock market variables on the hot issue periods and, more generally, 
the interrelationship between the Australian and US IPO markets. Further, the 
results have important implications for institutional and retail investors who are 
interested in IPO behavior during different stages of the cycle. For instance, 
financial managers need to know how long favourable cyclical conditions for new 
issues persist because of the relatively long lead times required for an unseasoned 
issue. Characteristics of IPO cycles should also be of interest to regulators if they 
impinge on the efficiency and operation of capital markets. 
The following section describes the structure of this thesis. A summary for 
each chapter is provided and the major findings and implications are highlighted. 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
Chapter two provides a review of the theoretical explanations and empirical 
evidence regarding IPO underpricing. The phenomenon of IPO underpricing is 
evident in nearly every market, although the degree of underpricing varies across 
countries. While a number of arguments have been developed to explain IPO 
underpricing, it appears that no single hypothesis has received overwhelming 
empirical support. Several unsolved issues exist which are discussed. 
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A detailed discussion of the definition of hot issue markets and the 
empirical evidence and theoretical explanations concerning cycles in IPO activity 
is presented in Chapter three. It is recognised that existing explanations mainly 
concentrate on supply -side influences of IPOs and appear to be unsatisfactory in 
fully accounting for the cyclical behaviour of the market. Several economic 
variables are suggested to be important in explaining the variation in IPO activity 
which forms an important motivation for the study conducted in Chapter eight. 
Chapter four discusses the data used in the empirical tests in the 
subsequent chapters. It reports the data sources and collection methods for the US 
and Australian IPO samples. The empirical issues are discussed and assessed. 
Based on descriptive analysis for both the US and Australian IPO samples, the 
average monthly initial return in Australia tends to be higher and more volatile in 
comparison to the US sample. With smaller sizes and greater underpricing, 
resource sector IPOs represent a relatively large proportion-of total IPO issuance 
in Australia over the period. This feature of the Australian IPO market motivates 
the separate consideration of industrial and resource sector IPOs in Chapters five 
and seven. 
Construction of various IPO activity measures is described in Chapter five. 
While two of the measures concern IPO volume, the other two measures concern 
IPO underpricing. Of note, there appears to be a correlation in the corresponding 
volume measures between Australia and the USA. In addition, the underpricing 
series appears to lead the volume series in both markets. These graphical findings 
motivate a further examination of the interrelationship between the US and 
Australian IPO activities in Chapter nine and the relationship between the IPO 
activity measures in Chapters six and seven. 
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Chapter six focuses on identification of hot and cold IPO periods in the 
USA. Several research techniques are used, such as visual analysis, the Bry and 
Boschan method, and a Markov regime switching model. A number of regime 
switches between hot and cold issue periods are documented across all IPO 
activity measures. Hot periods are generally characterised by a higher mean and 
volatility as well as a longer duration when compared to cold periods. Moreover, 
hot issue periods appear to be related to the general business and stock market 
conditions. A lead -lag relationship between the measures is identified where IPO 
underpricing leads WO volume by up to six months. Overall, the results yield new 
insights into the IPO market that pave the way for a richer understanding. 
The existence of hot and cold issue periods in Australia is documented in 
Chapter seven. The results suggest the dominance of industrial sector IPOs in 
Australian new issue market in terms of both number and value of issues. 
Consistent with the US results, the leading effect of WO underpricing on IPO 
volume is documented, especially for industrial sector IPOs. Finally, resource 
sector IPOs are found to exhibit a substantial influence on the pricing measures of 
IPO activity. This latter result has implications for further work. 
Hypotheses concerning the underlying causes of cycles in the IPO activity 
with consideration of economic and stock market variables are developed in 
Chapter eight. Applying both OLS and probit analyses on the US sample, the 
results support the developed hypotheses. While all economic and stock market 
variables exhibit roles on the underlying causes of cycles in IPO volume, cycles in 
IPO underpricing are mainly explained by changes in the stock market and 
business cycle conditions. There is a similarity between OLS and probit results 
which confirms the accuracy of the hot and cold issue periods identified earlier. 
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The interrelationship between the US and Australian IPO markets is 
examined in Chapter nine. Incorporating the stock market conditions of both 
markets in Vector Autoregressive analysis, the results reveal the relative 
dominance of the US market where the frequency of US IPOs leads the frequency 
of Australian IPOs. In contrast to the finding of strong persistence in all US 
measures of IPO activity, the feature of persistence is only evident in the number 
of IPOs in Australia. It appears that Australian IPO underpricing is unpredictable. 
Chapter ten provides a summary of the thesis and suggests extensions and 
directions for future research. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
THE PHENOMENON OF IPO UNDERPRICING 
2.1 Introduction 
Over the period 1960 -1992, there were more than 11,000 IPOs issued in the 
USA equity markets (see Ibbotson et al. 1994) and about 3,000 IPOs in the Australian 
equity market (Annual Reports of Australian Stock Exchange, 1960 -1997). In the 
large majority of IPOs, the first -day trading price is greater than the prospectus or 
issue price. This phenomenon is known as underpricing and is generally measured as 
the closing price of stock on the first trading day divided by the offer price minus 
unity. IPO underpricing is an empirical phenomenon common to nearly every stock 
market, both in developed and emerging countries (e.g. Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 
1996). A number of theories concerning WO underpricing have been developed. 
However, the empirical results of these theories are mixed. 
A review of theoretical explanations and empirical evidence regarding IPO 
underpricing is presented in this chapter. Section two presents empirical evidence 
related to IPO underpricing in international markets. In Section three, the theoretical 
explanations related to WO underpricing are reviewed and are classified into four 
categories: information asymmetry, investors, the market and institutional framework, 
and financial intermediaries. Section four concludes the chapter. 
5 This figure includes all exchanges in the USA. 
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2.2 Empirical Evidence of IPO Underpricing 
Considerable research has been conducted in the area of WO underpricing. 
The first study to report the phenomenon of IPO underpricing was Reilly and Hatfield 
(1969). They find an average one -week return of 9% for 53 US IPOs between 1963 
and 1965. Neuberger and Hammond (1974) report an average initial return of 17.1% 
in the first week's trading for 816 IPOs between 1965 and 1969 in the USA. Ibbotson 
et al. (1988) document an average initial return of 16.4% in the USA for the period of 
1960 and 1987. In addition, various studies using US data observe that smaller sized 
offerings are more underpriced than larger offerings (e.g. Davis and Yeomans 1976; 
Ritter 1987). 
Similar results have been reported in Australia. For instance, Finn and Higham 
(1988) document an average initial return in excess of the stock market return of 
29.2% for Australian industrial and commercial IPOs between 1966 and 1978. Lee et 
al. (1996a) report an average IPO underpricing of 16.41% using Australian industrial 
IPO data from 1976 to 1989. In a study of Australian mining sector IPOs during the 
period 1979 to 1990, How (1996) reports that the average initial return of mining 
IPOs is 107.12 %, which is much higher than that for their industrial companies. 
In addition to the finding of underpricing in Australia and the USA, IPO 
underpricing has also been reported in other markets. Loughran et al. (1994) present 
evidence on short-run underpricing in fifteen countries though the degree of 
underpricing varies. They attempt to explain the differences in the national findings 
and suggest that the differences are partly due to the differences in regulations, 
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contract mechanisms and characteristics of the companies going public. In the next 
sub -section, further international evidence on WO underpricing is discussed. 
2.2.1 International Evidence on IPO Underpricing 
The phenomenon of WO underpricing is evident in many markets. For 
instance, Jog and Riding (1987) examine IPOs that went public in Canada between 
1971 and 1983 and report that the average degree of underpricing ranges from 9.0% 
to 11.5% in the first three days from issuance. For 147 IPOs made in Hong Kong 
during 1986 and 1992, Kang (1995) documents the average and median underpricing 
as 15.6% and 6.6 %, respectively. 
Table 2.1 provides international evidence on underpricing across a number of 
countries. The average first -day initial return is positive in every country. The simple 
average initial return across all countries is 63.7 %.6 While the lowest underpricing is 
4.2% in France, the highest underpricing is 948.6% in the Chinese A -class shares. 
From Table 2.1, it appears that average initial returns are generally lower for 
developed capital markets than for emerging capital markets. The average initial 
return for emerging markets is 111.6% which is much higher than the average initial 
return of 19.0% for developed markets. While the range of average initial return for 
developed markets is between 4.2% and 39.0 %, the range of average initial return for 
emerging markets is between 16.3% and 948.6 %. 
6 This figure is distorted by very large underpricing of Chinese A -class shares. Excluding the Chinese 
A -class shares gives the simple average initial return across all the listed countries of 32.09 %. 
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Table 2.1: International Evidence of IPO Underpricing 
Country Data Period Average Initial Return 
( %) 
Source 
Developed Markets: 
Australia 76 -89 11.9 Lee et al. (1996a) 
Belgium 84 -90 10.1 Rogiers et al. (1993) 
Canada 71 -92 5.4 Jog and Srivastava (1995) 
Finland 84 -92 9.6 Keloharju (1993) 
France 83 -92 4.2 Husson et al. (1989); Leleux et al. (1993) 
Germany 78 -92 10.9 Ljungqvist (1993) 
Italy 85 -91 27.1 Cherubini and Ratti (1992) 
Japan 70 -91 32.5 Jenkinson (1990); Hebner et al. (1993) 
Netherlands 82 -91 7.2 Wessels (1989) 
New Zealand 79 -87 28.8 Vos and Cheung (1992) 
Spain 85 -90 35.0 Rahnema et al. (1992) 
Sweden 70 -91 39.0 Rydqvist (1993) 
Switzerland 83 -89 35.8 Kunz and Aggarwal (1994) 
U.K. 59 -90 12.0 Dimson (1979); Levis (1993) 
United States 90 -92 15.3 Ibbotson et al. (1994) 
Average 19.0 
Emerging Markets: 
Brazil 79 -90 78.5 Aggarwal et al. (1993) 
China A 86 -96 948.6 Su and Fleisher (1999) 
China B 86 -96 37.1 Su and Fleisher (1999) 
Chile 82 -90 16.3 Aggarwal et al. (1993) 
Greece 87 -91 48.5 Kazantzis and Levis (1994) 
Hong Kong 80 -90 17.6 Dawson (1987a) 
India 92 -93 35.3 Krishnamurti and Kumar (1994) 
Korea 80 -90 78.1 Kim et al. (1993) 
Malaysia 80 -91 80.3 Isa (1993) 
Mexico 87 -90 33.0 Aggarwal et al. (1993) 
Portugal 86 -87 54.4 Alpalhao (1992) 
Singapore 73 -92 31.4 Lee et al. (1996b) 
Taiwan 71 -90 45.0 Chen (1992) 
Thailand 88 -89 58.1 Wethyavivorn et al. (1991) 
Average 111.6 
Overall 63.7 
Average 
Note: 
1. Table 2.1 is based on Loughran et al. (1994). 
2. The classification between developed and emerging markets follows the financial indicator section 
in The Economist. 
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The literature suggests two major reasons to explain why IPOs of emerging 
markets are, on average, more underpriced than IPOs of developed markets. The first 
reason is associated with bureaucratic meddling in emerging markets (Jenkinson and 
Ljungqvist 1996). For instance, before 1988, Korean IPOs had to be priced at their 
book values, while offer prices for Taiwanese IPOs were priced using a formula based 
on the price -earnings ratio prior to 1993. The second reason relates to political 
interference in the emerging markets where offer prices of IPOs are sometimes set to 
favour the wealthy and influential. For example, generous allocations of heavily 
underpriced IPOs have allegedly found their way into the hands of politicians in 
Malaysia (Jenkinson and Ljungqvist 1996, p. 25). 
Research also identifies some distinct financial characteristics related to IPO 
underpricing. Understanding these characteristics is important since it helps to explain 
the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. These characteristics are discussed in the next 
sub -section. 
2.2.2 Financial Characteristics of IPO Underpricing 
2.2.2.1 Price Effect 
In an examination of 649 US IPOs between 1975 and 1982, Chalk and Peavy 
(1987) categorise IPOs by offer price and compare underpricing between the groups. 
They find that IPOs priced at US$1.00 or less show an average underpricing of 
There are five price categories in their study: $0.01 -1.00, $1.01 -2.00, $2.01 -5.00, $5.01 -10.00 and 
over $10.00. 
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56.43% which is almost 5 times higher than the underpricing for the price group 
showing the next highest underpricing (11.95 %). 
More recently, Ibbotson et aI. (1994) report that for 2,439 IPOs over 1975- 
1984 in the USA, the average initial return is 42.8% for IPOs with an offer price less 
than US$3.00, whereas the average initial return is only 8.6% for IPOs with an offer 
price of US$3.00 or more. Similar results are also reported in Chalk and Peavy 
(1987). 
2.2.2.2 Issue Size 
Ritter (1991) studies long run performance of 1,526 US IPOs for the period of 
1975 -1984. He documents a tendency for smaller offers (measured by issue size) to 
have the highest adjusted initial returns and the worst aftermarket performance.8 He 
argues that this can be explained by the issuers' success in timing the issues and 
overvaluation by investors. 
In a study of IPOs between 1984 and 1988 in the USA, Michaely and Shaw 
(1994) show that issue size plays an important role in explaining the degree of IPO 
underpricing. They observe a negative relationship between WO underpricing and 
issue size. While the average initial return is 14.72% for the smallest size group, the 
average initial return is only 5.21% for the largest size group. 
Using US data, Ibbotson et al. (1994) also confirm that smaller offerings are 
more underpriced, on average, than larger offerings. 
$ The adjusted initial return is calculated using the initial return of an IPO on the first trading day minus 
the return on a matching company at that specific day. 
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2.2.2.3 Finn Size 
Using UK data from 1965 to 1971, Davis and Yeomans (1976) test the 
influence of firm size on WO underpricing. They find that the firms with net assets of 
less than £250,000 record average underpricing of 24.9 %, which is about three times 
higher than the average underpricing for firms with net assets exceeding £1,000,000. 
2.2.2.4 Age of the Firm 
The age of the firm refers to the number of years since its incorporation. Ritter 
(1991) studies long run performance of US IPOs and introduces the age of the firm as 
a proxy for ex -ante risk, arguing that less established firms are likely to have more 
uncertain prospects than more established firms. The results of Ritter (1991) show 
that IPOs with worse long run performances (i.e. lower cumulative abnormal returns) 
have lower median ages and exhibit higher underpricing, while IPOs with better long 
run performances (i.e. higher cumulative abnormal returns) have higher median ages 
and lower underpricing. Ritter interprets these results as evidence of over -optimism 
where investors are irrationally over optimistic about the future potential of IPOs. 
2.2.2.5 Ownership Structure 
Leland and Pyle (1977) suggest a positive relationship between fractional 
ownership and firm value. They argue that fractional shares retained by issuers play 
an important role in determining firm value and can be used by issuers to signal 
information to the public. 
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Downes and Heinkel (1982) link the retention of ownership argument to IPO 
underpricing. They argue that an issuer who retains a high fraction of ownership 
foregoes the benefits of portfolio diversification. Therefore, high retention of 
ownership is a proxy for the owner's expectation of aftermarket return available to the 
IPO investors. Downes and Heinkel (1982) provide empirical support for their 
argument. 
In a study of the Australian new issue market over the period of 1979 to 1989, 
How and Low (1993) find a positive relationship between firm value and fractional 
ownership. 
2.2.2.6 Industry Effects 
Using US data for the period January 1983 through December 1987, Alli et al. 
(1994) analyse underpricing by separating the IPOs into two groups - financial 
institutions and non -financial institutions. Their result shows that IPOs of financial 
institutions are significantly less underpriced than non -financial institutions (5.28% 
vs. 9.00 %). 
Ritter (1984b) shows that a hot issue market existed in 1980 in the USA. He 
argues that this hot issue market arose from natural resource issues since only natural 
resource issues appeared excessively underpriced during this period. For non -natural 
resource issues, an average initial return of 21.0% is observed in the 1980 hot issue 
period compared to an average initial return of 110.9% during the same period for 
natural resource issues.9 
9 This feature is also discussed in detail in Chapter three of this thesis. 
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2.2.2.7 Subsequent Issues 
The literature concerning subsequent equity issues appears to be inconsistent. 
For example, Jegadeesh et al. (1993) examine firm -commitment IPOs from 1980 
through 1986 in the USA. Their results show that the IPOs with greater underpricing 
are more likely to issue seasoned offerings within three years of the WO and, on 
average, make larger seasoned offerings. Michaely and Shaw (1994) show an 
opposing result using US data between 1984 and 1988. They show that firms that 
experience a high degree of WO underpricing tend to return to the seasoned offering 
market less frequently. In a study of US IPOs during 1980 -1983, James (1992) 
documents that the average WO underpricing for firms that do not make subsequent 
offers is not statistically different to the average WO underpricing for firms that make 
subsequent offers. 
2.2.3 Summary 
Empirical evidence suggests that underpricing of common stock IPOs is an 
empirical regularity that exists in nearly every market, although the degree of 
underpricing varies across countries. A number of financial characteristics related to 
IPO underpricing have also been observed and appear to play a role in explaining IPO 
underpricing. A number of theories have attempted to explain this anomaly by 
focusing on factors, such as, underwriter reputation, information asymmetry between 
investors and companies, signalling hypothesis and so on. These explanations are 
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reviewed in the next section together with the potential weaknesses related to these 
hypotheses. 
2.3 Reasons for IPO Underpricing 
The underpricing of IPOs has attracted much research in the Iast two decades 
and some models have been developed to explain this phenomenon. Ibbotson (1975) 
offers basic insight into the existence of IPO underpricing: 
"...either the offering price is set too low or the investors systematically 
overvalue new issues at the end of the first month seasoning." (p. 262) 
Alternatively, Miller (1977) argues that the offer prices of IPOs are set to be 
consistent with underlying economic values of issuing companies. The large excess 
returns on IPOs are due to speculative behaviour of investors, especially those 
investors who cannot obtain allocations of oversubscribed issues at the offer prices. 
The above suggests that explanations of WO underpricing can be grouped in 
three ways. First, offer prices of IPOs may be set too low by issuers. For instance, IPO 
underpricing acts as a signal of quality of the firm (e.g. Allen and Faulhaber 1989), 
Second, investors may be over -optimistic about IPOs. This may be explained by the 
existence of information asymmetry between issuers, underwriters and investors and 
may be also due to the difficulty in pricing an WO, since WO trading history is 
generally not available, or limited, especially for small issues. Third, offer prices of 
IPOs may be set correctly but the large initial returns on IPOs are due to speculative 
appetites of investors. 
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In the past, most explanations have focused on the first category and implicitly 
assumed an efficient market in which investors apply rational strategies. However, 
the capital market exhibits at least some degree of irrationality and inefficiency. For 
instance, there is evidence that investors are willing to overpay at the time of the IPO 
(e.g. Ritter 1991; Loughran and Ritter 1995). 
In the next sub -section, I show that the existing explanations focus on various 
aspects of the relations between investors, issuers and the investment bankers 
responsible for the issues. 
2.3.1 Hypotheses Related to Information Asymmetry 
Information asymmetry refers to the fact that one or more parties can access 
information about a specific company that is not available to others. Since the issuer 
and underwriters have more information about the company than outsiders do, this 
suggests that the problem of information asymmetry may exist in the IPO market. The 
theory of information asymmetry has been applied widely to explain IPO 
underpricing. For instance, Baron (1982) develops a theoretical model to explain the 
existence of IPO underpricing by assuming that the investment banker is better 
informed about the capital market than the issuer. Other hypotheses, such as the 
`winner's curse' hypothesis (Rock 1986), and the signalling hypothesis (Welch 1989; 
Allen and Faulhaber 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang 1989), are also related to the concept 
of information asymmetry. 
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2.3.1.1 Asymmetric Information between Issuer and Underwriter 
Baron (1982) models underpricing based on the assumption that information 
asymmetry exists between the issuer and underwriter. In his model, Baron assumes 
that the underwriter is better informed about the capital market conditions than is the 
issuer, and the issuer cannot observe the distribution effort expended by the 
underwriter. Under such a situation, the issuer delegates the pricing decision to the 
underwriter and the underwriter takes advantage of their superior information about 
the market by underpricing the issue. This allows the underwriter to expend less 
marketing effort and ingratiate themselves with the investors. Therefore, Baron argues 
that the discount on an WO is an increasing function of uncertainty about the market 
demand of an issue faced by the issuer. The higher the uncertainty about the market 
price for the company's shares, the higher the expected underpricing. 
Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989b) test Baron's model by investigating the 
IPOs of 38 investment banks where these banks underwrite their own issues. Since 
investment banks underwrite their own issues, there is no information asymmetry 
problem. Thus, based on Baron's model, there should not be any underpricing of these 
issues. The results are inconsistent with Baron's model. Muscarella and Vetsuypens 
find that investment banks underprice themselves as much as other IPOs of similar 
size. Cheung and Krinsky (1994) also fail to support Baron's model using Canadian 
data. 
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2.3.1.2 Winner's Curse 
The best -known asymmetric information model of underpricing is developed 
by Rock (1986). This model relies on information asymmetry between informed and 
uninformed investors where informed investors have an information advantage 
relative to uninformed investors. Consequently, informed investors will only bid for 
shares when an issue is underpriced. Conversely, uninformed investors have no 
information advantage about an issue and they will bid for all new issues. As a result, 
they are more likely to receive a full allocation of an issue if the issue is overpriced 
and only a fraction of an issue if it is underpriced. Hence, uninformed investors face a 
`winner's curse': if they get all of the shares they want, it is because informed 
investors do not want these shares. As a result, firms are forced to underprice IPOs in 
order to compensate uniformed investors for this adverse selection problem since 
uninformed investors will only submit purchase orders when IPOs are sufficiently 
underpriced. A prediction of Rock's model is that the average initial return for 
uninformed investors should be equal to the risk -free rate. 
In a study by Koh and Walter (1989), the results from Singapore IPOs over the 
period 1973 -1977 support Rock's argument. They show that the initial returns for 
uninformed investors are not statistically different from the risk -free rate. Lee et al. 
(1996b) also support the winner's curse hypothesis using Singapore data for the 
period 1973 to 1992. 
There is a potential problem with the assumption of the winner's curse 
hypothesis. As indicated by Gordon and Jin (1993), there is no evidence regarding the 
existence of informed and uninformed investors. It is hard to determine why some 
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investors are better informed than others (Gordon and Jin 1993, p. 142). Keasey and 
Short (1992) also question the above assumption used in Rock (1986) and cast doubt 
on the validity of existing empirical tests which support this model. Furthermore, they 
claim that Rock's model is largely untestable. 
An alternative model is based on the `cascade hypothesis' developed by 
Welch (1992) where Iater investors rely at least in part on the purchasing decisions of 
earlier investors. It appears that some investors pay attention to the purchase decisions 
of earlier investors and place less weight on their own information, even if their own 
information is favourable. Hence, the distinction between informed and uninformed 
investors may be less important than suggested by Rock (1986). 
2.3.1.3 Signalling Hypothesis 
Three studies apply a similar signalling model to explain IPO underpricing. It 
is argued that issuers follow a two -stage financing program10 (Welch 1989; Allen and 
Faulhaber 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang 1989). They argue that underpricing is, in fact, 
an instrument adopted by issuers to reveal corporation information to investors. In 
these models, issuers are assumed to have private information concerning the quality 
of their firm and can distinguish their own firm as high- or low -value based on 
expected future operating performance. Hence, both low- and high -value firms know 
more about their true value than outsiders. ° 
1° The signalling hypothesis assumes that issuers sell a fraction of their firms through IPOs and the 
remainder through seasoned offerings. 
" High -value and Iow -value firms are distinguished by their expected future operating performance 
(e.g. profitability of their operations and their abilities in paying higher dividends). 
28 
High -value firms may choose to underprice their issues to signal to the market 
that they are high -value firms since they are confident about their future operational 
performance and expect to benefit sufficiently from higher prices later when making 
seasoned offerings. Therefore, the high -value firms have no incentive to avoid 
underpricing. Low -value firms cannot offer this tradeoff because they do not expect 
the same (relative) level of future cashflows and dividends relative to high -value 
firms. The implication is that the firms with higher IPO underpricing tend to return to 
the seasoned offering market more frequently and are more likely to exhibit strong 
future earnings performance and higher dividends. 
Welch (1989) presents evidence that the firms with higher IPO underpricing 
conduct seasoned equity issues more frequently than a random sample of US public 
firms. However, Michaely and Shaw (1994) test the signalling hypothesis using US 
data for the period of 1984 to 1988. Their results reveal that firms with higher 
underpricing return to the seasoned offering market less frequently and pay lower 
dividends compared to firms with lower initial underpricing. Other studies, including 
Garfinkel (1993), Jegadeesh et al. (1993), Jain and Kim (1994) and Jenkinson (1990), 
all find that the hypothesised relationship between initial returns and subsequent 
seasoned offerings is not present. This casts doubt on the relevance of signalling as a 
reason for WO underpricing. 
The assumption underlying the signalling hypothesis, that issuers are better 
informed about their companies than investors or underwriter, needs to be taken with 
caution. IPOs are sold to the public and the market decides the clearing price of the 
IPO. The offer prices of IPOs set by the issuers might be viewed to be over -priced by 
29 
the market if asymmetric information exists, even when the issuers have already 
intentionally priced their issues at a discount. Also, the signalling hypothesis assumes 
that issuers follow two -stage financing, that is, selling a fraction of the firm through 
the IPO and then the remainder through seasoned offerings. This might not be the 
case in reality. 
2.3.2 Hypotheses Related to Investors 
Since underpricing is likely to arise from the interaction of investor demand 
and firm supply of stock, the behavior of investors might play an important role in 
explaining the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. In this sub -section, theoretical 
models related to behavior of investors are reviewed. The cascade effect hypothesis 
developed by Welch (1992) is first introduced and is followed by Miller (1977)'s 
speculative bubble hypothesis. 
2.3.2.1 Cascade Effect 
In his model, Welch (1992) argues that the IPO market is subject to cascade 
effects. When WO shares are sold sequentially, later potential investors can learn from 
the purchasing decisions of earlier investors (Welch 1992, p. 695). An individual can 
interpret the purchase decisions made by earlier investors as an indication of 
information advantage that these investors have about the offering. The investor might 
decide not to buy if no one else wants to buy, even if he /she has favourable 
information about the offer on hand. To prevent this from happening, an issuer may 
underprice an issue to induce the first few investors to buy which in turn induces a 
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cascade effect. The implication is that later investors rely, at least in part, on the 
purchasing decisions of earlier investors and place less weight on their own 
information. 
There appears to be no empirical test of this model to date though this may be 
due to the difficulty encountered in obtaining the necessary data. 
2.3.2.2 Speculative Bubble 
Miller (1977) argues that large excess returns of IPOs can be explained by the 
speculative appetites of investors in the secondary market when they do not obtain 
allocations of oversubscribed issues in the primary market. Under this hypothesis, the 
aftermarket price of an WO will be bid up well above its intrinsic value temporarily 
due to the speculation in the aftermarket. The positive excess return should disappear 
as the bubble bursts sometime later. 
Using a sample of natural resources issues in the period 1979 -1982, Ritter 
(1984b) concludes that there is no evidence to support this hypothesis, even using 
highly speculative small IPOs. He reports that the aftermarket price movements of 
those natural resources with extreme high underpricing appear to coincide with 
movements of a national index of natural resources in the stock market. He finds no 
evidence of a `burst bubble' in the IPO activity during the period. Lee et al. (1996a), 
who study post -listing returns of Australian [POs, also reject this hypothesis. 
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2.3.3 Hypotheses related to the Market and Institutional Framework 
Two hypotheses related to the market and institutional framework are 
discussed in this sub -section. The first is the lawsuit avoidance hypothesis developed 
by Tinic (1998) who argues that WO underpricing may act as insurance against 
possible legal liability on underwriters and issuers. This is followed by the market 
incompleteness hypothesis developed by Mauer and Senbet (1992). 
2.3.3.1 Lawsuit Avoidance Hypothesis 
Disclosure requirements in many markets expose underwriters, accountants 
and issuers to considerable litigation risk where shareholders can prosecute them for 
false or mis- stated information in the prospectus. Tinic (1988) argues that IPO 
underpricing may act as insurance against possible legal liabilities of underwriter and 
issuer as well as potential damage to the reputation of underwriter. In addition to 
costly Iawsuits, issuers may face a higher cost of capital in future equity issues and 
litigation -prone investment banks may lose the confidence of their regular clients. The 
higher the offer price for an IPO, the higher the possibility that the WO is overpriced. 
Consequently, the more likely is a future lawsuit. To protect against any potential 
lawsuit, the issuer and underwriter underprice the IPO. 
Tinic (1998) examines his hypothesis using IPOs before and after the US 
Security Act of 1933 and provides empirical support for the hypothesis. He finds that 
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IPOs are more underpriced after 1933. Further, he observes that prestigious 
underwriters avoid underwriting small and speculative firms.12 
While Tinic (1988) provides empirical support for his model, Drake and 
Vetsuypens (1993) conclude that the hypothesis is not a likely explanation for the 
observed level of IPO underpricing since there is no evidence that underpricing 
reduces the probability of a lawsuit. They show that underpricing of firms that are 
subsequently sued is not significantly different from the underpricing of those firms 
that are not sued. International evidence is also not supportive. For instance, 
Keloharju (1993) rejects the hypothesis using Finnish data and Ljunqvist (1993) finds 
that there is underpricing in countries without securities lawsuits. 
2.3.3.2 Market Incompleteness Hypothesis 
Mauer and Senbet (1992) present a model where IPO pricing is modeled in 
two distinct markets, the primary market and the broader capital market (or secondary 
market). They argue that IPO underpricing is a consequence of IPOs being traded in 
two separate markets. IPOs are generally newly established firms with little or no 
operating histories and offer prices of IPOs are set in the primary market. Subsequent 
to the IPO, the shares are traded in the relatively larger and more centralised 
secondary market. Since there is some market segmentation between the primary and 
the secondary market, IPO investors demand a risk premium in the form of 
12 In the USA, the Securities Act of 1933 identifies that the parties may be subject to civil liabilities for 
false or inadequate information presented in the registration statement. However, prior to 1933, issuers 
and underwriters faced little litigation risk. 
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underpricing to compensate them for bearing diversification risk as perfect substitutes 
for IPOs in the secondary market are not generally available. 
In a test using US data over the period 1977 -1984, Mauer and Senbet (1992) 
provide supportive evidence for the hypothesis. Muscarella and Vetsuypens (1989a) 
study the IPOs of reverse leverage buyouts and find these IPOs are significantly less 
underpriced than typical ¡POs.13 
2.3.4 Hypotheses Related to Financial Intermediaries 
Underwriters play an important role in the process of IPOs since they market 
the shares for issuers. The relationship between underwriters and IPO underpricing is 
well documented in the literature. In this sub -section, five hypotheses related to 
underwriters are discussed. 
2.3.4.1 Asymmetry Payoffs to Underwriters 
A popular explanation for IPO underpricing is the asymmetric payoff to 
underwriters (Affleck- Graves and Miller 1989). This hypothesis is based on the 
regulations and procedures governing IPOs. IPOs must be issued at a fixed price. If an 
issue is fairly priced or underpriced, the underwriter will receive a fixed income. 
However, the underwriter will bear all the losses if the issue is overpriced and 
subsequently fails. Therefore, the underwriter desires to underprice the new issue in 
13 Leverage buyouts are transactions in which investors make a public firm private using borrowed 
funds. However, some companies that have been made private through leverage buyouts decide to 
reconvert to public ownership. These transactions are called `reverse leverage buyouts' (RLBO). A 
significant difference between IPOs of RLBOs and common IPOs is the availability of trading history 
as the trading history of an RLBO is generally available. 
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order to reduce the underwriting risk. In other words, underpricing acts as a tool to 
reduce the probability of an unsuccessful issue and the associated losses for the 
underwriter. 
This hypothesis does not appear to be very successful in explaining IPO 
underpricing. Chalk and Peavy (1987) argue that if IPO underpricing is driven by the 
underwriter's desire to reduce their risk exposure, IPO underpricing is only expected 
on a `firm commitment' contract. IPO underpricing should not exist for IPOs issued 
under a 'best efforts' contract since the underwriter does not need to handle unsold 
shares in the event of an unsuccessful issue. Their empirical evidence reveals that best 
efforts contracts tend to be more underpriced than firm commitment contracts. 
However, it should be noted that best efforts contracts are normally used by small 
speculative firms (Loughran et al. 1994). As these, firms are generally riskier, this 
additional risk may provide an explanation for higher underpricing on best efforts 
contracts. 
It is also worthwhile to mention that if underwriting a new issue is risky and 
costly for an underwriter, the underwriter can price this risk into the underwriting fee. 
2.3.4.2 Dynamic Information Acquisition 
Based on the assumption that both the firm and underwriter may not know the 
market valuation of the new issue precisely, Benveniste and Spindt (1989) develop a 
model in which investment bankers underprice IPOs to induce regular investors to 
reveal information during the pre -selling period. 
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In this model, a problem faced by the underwriter is the collection of 
information to help price a new issue. However, investors have no incentive to reveal 
their personal information before the issue. To induce investors to reveal truthful 
information about the issue, the underwriter must underprice the issue to compensate 
these investors for revealing their private information. An implication is that, IPOs 
whose offer prices are finally revised upward (relative to the preliminary offer prices 
contained in their initial prospectuses) will be relatively more underpriced. 
In a study of US firm commitment IPOs from 1983 to 1987, Hanley (1993) 
provides evidence to support the hypothesis of dynamic information acquisition. She 
observes that issues, where final offer prices exceed the range of offer prices in the 
preliminary prospectus, exhibit greater underpricing and the number of shares issued 
is more likely to be increased. This result suggests that underwriters prefer to 
compensate investors who truthfully reveal their private information through 
allocation of a smaller number of highly underpriced shares. 
Loughran and Ritter (1999) provide further evidence and show that IPOs with 
the final offer price below the minimum of the file price range have average first -day 
returns of only 4 %, whereas those that are priced above the maximum of the file price 
range have average first -day returns of 32% (Loughran and Ritter 1999, p. 3). 
2.3.4.3 Monopsony Power of Underwriters 
West (1965) studies the offerings of unseasoned municipal bonds in the USA 
and concludes that underwriting industry is, to a large degree, a monopsonistic 
industry in the USA. There is evidence that underwriters with good reputations 
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generally have no incentive to underwrite small, speculative and start -up firms due to 
the possibility of adverse price movements which destroy their reputation (Booth and 
Smith 1986; Ritter 1984b; Tinic 1988; Wolfe et al. 1994). This forces small firms to 
be underwritten by small regional underwriters who have greater bargaining power 
over the issuers. 
This argument is supported by evidence that IPOs of small firms exhibit 
higher underpricing relative to underpricing of large firms' IPOs. Considering the 
evidence of the US IPO market, Ritter (1984b) and Tinic (1988) claim that 
underpricing may be the result of the monopsony power of the investment bankers in 
underwriting the IPOs of small firms. 
Although the monopsony hypothesis has some success in explaining WO 
underpricing, there are some problems as indicated by Tinic (1988). First, it does not 
explain why prestigious underwriters are reluctant to underwrite some IPOs. Second, 
increased competition for new business in the underwriting industry should eliminate 
monopsony power. Also, there is evidence that not every small firm IPO is 
underpriced (Gordon and Jin 1993). Third, small firms should learn from the 
experience of previous issuers and search for investment banks who can price their 
IPOs more precisely. As a result, the magnitude of underpricing of small IPOs should 
decrease over time. This latter feature is not observed in practice. 
2.3.4.4 Reputation Effect of Underwriters 
Titman and Trueman (1986) develop a model wherein issuers have an 
incentive to signal their firm value through the quality of the investment bankers or 
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auditors selected for the IPO. However, their model does not consider the 
underpricing phenomenon. Carter and Manaster (1990) extend the work of Titman 
and Trueman (1986) by applying the model to explain IPO underpricing. They show 
that WO underpricing is quite costly to issuers and hence an issuer with low risk tends 
to employ a prestigious underwriter to convey their low risk to the market.14 
Conversely, underwriters with a good reputation will only market low risk IPOs in 
order to protect their reputation. This, in turn, reduces the uncertainty of aftermarket 
prices of IPOs and information asymmetry between informed and uninformed 
investors. Consequently, low initial returns are expected for low risk IPOs. 
There are a number of studies that support the reputation effect hypothesis 
(e.g. Balvers et al. 1988; Carter and Manaster 1990; Michaely and Shaw 1994; Carter 
et al. 1998). They all find a negative relation between underwriter reputation and IPO 
underpricing in the US market. 
A major issue in this hypothesis is how to measure the underwriter's 
reputation. There are generally three ways to measure the reputation of an 
underwriter. Carter and Manaster (1990) measure the underwriter's relative placement 
in the stock offering `tombstone' announcement as underwriter reputation.15 
Megginson and Weiss (1991) measure underwriter reputation using the relative 
market share of the underwriter. Johnson and Miller (1988) use a modified form of 
the Carter -Manaster measure and classify underwriters into four categories with 
different rates of ranking. The underwriters who fall into `bulge bracket' are defined 
as the most prestigious underwriters and a rank of 3 is assigned to them. While a rank 
14 Risk defined here is the uncertainty regarding the aftermarket price of the WO. 
15 A tombstone announcement is a listing of a pending public offering. 
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of 2 is assigned to those underwriters considered part of the `major bracket', a rank of 
1 is assigned to underwriters in the `sub -major bracket'. All other underwriters are 
assigned a rank of zero.16 In a comparative evaluation of these three measures of 
underwriter reputation, Carter et al. (1998) find that the Carter -Manaster measure is 
the most significant in the context of initial returns and long run performance of IPOs. 
2.3.4.5 Aftermarket Support 
Nearly all of the above hypotheses assume that a deliberate decision is made 
by either the issuer or the underwriter to set the offer price below the true value of an 
WO. If so, the distribution of a sample of IPO initial returns could be normally 
distributed with a positive mean. However, initial returns of IPOs typically peak 
sharply at zero and are highly skewed based on empirical evidence.17 Ruud (1993) 
challenges the existing hypotheses of WO underpricing and argues that the apparent 
underpricing may be largely due to underwriter price support in the aftermarket. She 
states that underwriters typically price IPOs at their expected market value. In the 
aftermarket trading, underwriters support those IPOs whose prices fall below the offer 
prices. When the price of an WO is actively supported in the aftermarket, the trading 
16 The `bulge bracket' is a group of investment banks that have occupied a leading role in high -quality 
securities underwriting in the year since the US Securities Act of 1933. The firms in the `Major 
bracket' generally are allotted smaller portions in the underwriting syndicates than those in the bulge 
group but still wield considerable powers in the US market. The sub -major group consists of firms that 
are considered to be contenders for membership in the major bracket. They are often allocated a major 
bracket sized share of the offering but, on average, their underwriting proportions are smaller than 
either of the groups above them (Carter et aI. 1998, p. 289). 
" This implies that initial returns of IPOs may be drawn from at least two populations rather than a 
symmetric distribution with a positive mean. 
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price is allowed to rise but is prevented from falling significantly until the IPO is fully 
subscribed 18 
A number of studies support the aftermarket hypothesis (Ruud 1993; Hanley 
et al. 1993; Schultz and Zaman 1994; Asquith et aI. 1998). For instance, Asquith et al. 
(1998) find that the cross -sectional distribution of one -day WO returns is modeled 
better as a mixture of two distributions, with one being consistent with underpricing 
and another consistent with price stabilisation. Moreover, such mixed distributions in 
IPO returns persist for up to four weeks. 
Nevertheless, there are some potential problems with this hypothesis. First, it 
is based on the assumption that new issues cannot be fully allocated and this forces 
the underwriter to stabilise the price until the issue is fully sold. This is a 
simplification and does not have to be the case in reality. Second, price stabilisation 
could impose a financial burden on the underwriter. To stabilise price may require a 
large amount of money. Is it really worthwhile for an underwriter to support the price 
of an issue in the aftermarket?19 Third, the process of price stabilisation may be true in 
the USA but this needs not to be the case in other countries, whereas IPO 
underpricing is found to be a worldwide phenomenon. 
19 Aftermarket price support of an IPO is an effort by the underwriter to bid up the aftermarket price of 
the IPO when the market price would decline without intervention. There are a number of motives for 
aftermarket support. If the aftermarket price of an IPO falls below the offer price, the underwriter 
might have a problem selling the issue since investors can buy it in the aftermarket rather than in the 
IPO. Also, such price support prevents the cascade effect of Welch (1992). Moreover, aftermarket 
support minimises legal liability (Schultz and Zaman 1994). 
19 However, the process of price stabilisation may be an agreement between an issuer and an 
underwriter and the underwriter may charge more for doing so. 
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2.4 Summary and Discussion 
A number of arguments have been put forward in an endeavor to explain WO 
underpricing. Four categories are identified based on intuitive features, being 
information asymmetry, investors, the market and institutional framework, and the 
impact of financial intermediates. A number of studies use different methodologies 
and datasets to examine these theories and the results are often inconsistent. Although 
these studies appear to have some success in explaining IPO underpricing, no single 
hypothesis has received overwhelming empirical support. In general, these hypotheses 
are not mutually exclusive and hence, any one theory may be important for some 
IPOs, but not all IPOs. 
Past studies reveal some major questions. First, as indicated in Ibbòtson and 
Ritter (1995), many of the above explanations for IPO underpricing can be critised on 
the grounds of extreme assumptions that are made or the convoluted stories involved 
(Ibbotson and Ritter 1995, p. 1001). For instance, the signalling hypothesis assumes 
that issuers follow a two -stage financing program, such that a fraction of the firm is 
sold through the IPO and the reminder through seasoned offerings. This might not 
necessarily be the case. Further, Keasey and Short (1992) evaluate Rock's model and 
show that this model rests on a number of conflicting assumptions and a form of 
analysis which is in contradiction with its core hypothesis. 
Second, some models are difficult to examine in practice. For instance, the 
cascade hypothesis, developed by Welch (1992), is difficult to test because of the 
difficulty of obtaining information on individual investors. Further, Keasey and Short 
(1992) claim that the propositions in Rock's model are Iargely untestable. 
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Third, most theoretical models assume that early IPO returns are drawn from a 
common distribution. This assumption is questionable given the evidence of the 
aftermarket price support hypothesis where a mixed distribution of the initial returns 
is supported (Asquith et al. 1998). 
Fourth, differences in evidence may be attributed to different methodologies 
and datasets that have been employed by various researchers. Carter et al. (1998), for 
example, provide a comparative evaluation of three existing measures of underwriter 
reputation in the context of initial returns and three -year performance of IPOs. They 
find that only the Carter -Manaster measure remains significant when all three 
measures are evaluated simultaneously. 
Fifth, most previous studies consider the statistical significance of the results, 
but ignore the economic significance of the results and their implications. The 
magnitude of parameter values should also be considered in the analysis. For instance, 
Jegadeesh et al. (1993) test the signalling hypothesis and provide evidence that the 
greater the level of IPO underpricing, the more likely the firm is to issue seasoned 
equity and, on average, make larger seasoned offerings. However, they also observe 
that 15.6% of the firms in the lowest underpricing group ( -6.4% on average) issue 
seasoned offerings, whereas 23.9% of the firms in the highest underpricing group 
(42.9% on average) return to the seasoned offering market. This finding leads them to 
argue that the relation between WO underpricing and subsequent seasoned offerings is 
rather weak from an economic perspective and hence question the explanatory power 
of the signalling hypothesis. 
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Finally, almost all explanations are developed based on the US institutional 
and financial framework. To date, there is still no single widely accepted and 
supported model that can successfully explain the phenomenon of IPO underpricing. 
It is likely that a combination of explanations is at work with different models 
exhibiting greater explanatory power in specific circumstances. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
THE CYCLICAL BEHAVIOUR OF THE IPO MARKET 
3.1 Introduction 
Hot issue IPO markets were first identified by Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975). 
They defined a hot issue market as a market with a considerable number of 
extremely underpriced issues. Recently, researchers have examined average 
monthly underpricing of IPOs as well as the monthly volume of new issues when 
investigating the hot issue market (e.g. Ritter 1984b; Ibbotson et al. 1994; Ritter 
1998; Helwege and Liang 1996a). An operational definition of a hot issue market 
may be characterised by an increase in firms making unseasoned issues, a high 
degree of underpricing, and frequent oversubscription of offerings (Ritter 1984b; 
Helwege and Liang 1996a). The existence of cycles in the WO activity implies 
variation in market conditions. Such variation raises important questions for 
managers as to whether and when new equity should be raised through an IPO. 
There are also issues for investors to consider relating to timing and expected 
returns. Further, there are implications that arise for regulators when considering 
the impact of regulatory decisions on market conditions. 
Recent evidence from the USA has confirmed that hot issue IPO markets 
exist with underpricing appearing to follow cycles (e.g. Ritter 1984b; HeIwege and 
Liang 1996a; James and Kieschnick 1997). Hot issue IPO markets are also evident 
in other countries. For instance, hot issue markets were observed in the UK and 
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South Korea in the late 1980s and in Germany during 1982 -1983 and 1985 -1986 
(see Ritter 1998). 
The level of the TO market activity has traditionally been viewed in terms 
of two measures. First, a pricing measure such as the average level of 
underpricing (e.g. Ibbotson and Jaffe 1975; Ritter 1984b). Second, a volume 
measure such as the number of IPO issues (e.g. Loughran and Ritter 1995). 
In this chapter, the empirical evidence concerning cycles in the WO activity 
is reviewed and explanations for the existence of these hot periods are discussed. 
3.2 Empirical Evidence 
In this section, the empirical evidence relating to cycles in the WO activity 
is classified into three categories. The first two categories concern TO 
underpricing and WO volume. The third category concerns the financial 
characteristics of IPOs in hot issue periods. 
3.2.1 Measuring IPO Activity in Terms of IPO Underpricing 
Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) were among the first to document that the degree 
of TO underpricing is cyclical and concentrated in particular periods in the US 
market. At the beginning and end of the 1960s (1959 -1961 and 1968 -1969), the 
TO markets were `hot' in the sense that significant underpricing was observed. 
For instance, the highest WO underpricing20 during the hot periods was more than 
100% in contrast to the average of 12.64% across the whole period (1960- 1970). 
20 IPO underpricing in Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) is defined as the difference between the first 
month's return on an IPO and the return on the market (S &P500) index. 
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Using data for the USA, Ritter (1984b) shows that there was also a hot issue 
market in 1980. He argues that the 1980 hot issue market arose from natural 
resource issues since only natural resource issues appeared excessively 
underpriced during this period. For non -natural resource issues, an average initial 
return of 21.0% was observed during the hot issue period of 1980 compared to a 
similar 15.8% during the `cold' issue period. However, for natural resource issues, 
a hot issue market is apparent. The average initial return of natural resources was 
110.9% during the hot issue period of 1980 compared to only 18.3% during the 
cold issue period. By applying a model developed by Rock (1986), Ritter (1984b) 
suggests a changing risk composition hypothesis to explain the 1980 hot issue 
market. He argues that if high risk IPOs represent an unusually large proportion of 
offerings in some specific periods, high average IPO underpricing should be 
observed in these periods. 
With confirmation of hot issue markets in 1960s and the beginning of the 
1980s,21 Ibbotson et al. (1994) observe the existence of hot issue markets in the 
late 1980s and at the beginning of the 1990s. The hot issue market in the late 
1980s in the USA appears to coincide with the hot issue markets in the UK and 
South Korea over the same period 22 
3.2.2 Measuring IPO Activity in Terms of IPO volume 
Ibbotson et al. (1994) describe the level of underpricing and volume in 
terms of persistent processes where current period value is a predictor of next 
period value. Specifically, they find that the current month's average IPO 
21 See Ibbotson and Jaffe (1975) and Ritter (1984b). 
22 IPO underpricing is defined as equally- weighted average initial return in Ibbotson et al. (1994), 
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underpricing is a predictor of the next month's average initial return, as shown by 
the high first -order autocorrelation of monthly average initial returns of 0.66. 
Moreover, the persistence of IPO volume from month to month is even stronger 
than observed in IPO underpricing with a first -order autocorrelation of 0.89 for 
volume. Ibbotson et al. (1994) suggest these results are somewhat related to 
periodic overoptimism by investors. 
Loughran et al. (1994) evaluate the timing on international IPO markets. 
They find that in 14 of the 15 countries studied, there is a tendency for high 
volume periods (`hot' years are measured in terms of number of IPOs) to be 
associated with lower long -run returns of IPOs. A positive relationship between 
the inflation- adjusted level of stock markets and TO volume is also reported in 
their study.z3 
Choe et al. (1993) document that the frequency of seasoned offerings rises 
in economic upturns in the US market over 1971 to 1991. They identify a positive 
relationship between equity issue volume and economic activity (as measured by 
business cycle variables). 
3.2.3 Financial Characteristics of IPOs During Hot Issue Periods 
3.2.3.1 Firm Specific Characteristics 
Quality of the Firm 
The empirical evidence concerning the quality of firms that issue equity in 
hot and cold periods is mixed. Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) find empirical 
23 Tt is interesting to note that the Australian IPO market is included in the study of Loughran et al. 
(1994) though the data is restricted to industrial sector IPOs. The correlation between IPO volume 
per year and the stock market index in Australia is 0.54. 
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support for their asymmetric information theory that issuers of seasoned equity in 
hot markets are normally higher quality firms 24 However, studies of the long -run 
performance of IPOs and seasoned offerings suggest that equity issuers are 
inferior firms in the hot market since the equities issued during hot periods 
experience significantly greater underperformance compared to equities issued 
during other periods (e.g. Ritter 1991; Loughran and Ritter 1995; Loughran et al. 
1994). 
Operating Performance of the Issuer 
Although they do not study hot and cold markets specifically, the results of 
Jain and Kini (1994) indicate that WO issuers time their offerings to coincide with 
their peak operating performance as measured by the IPO firm's operating cash 
flows. Once the shares are made public, there is evidence of sharp declines in firm 
operating performance. This finding is supported by Mikkelson et al. (1997) who 
use a longer sample period of up to 10 years after the initial listing. 
3.2.3.2 Economic Conditions 
Business Cycles 
Choe et al. (1993) develop an adverse selection model where firms choose 
between issuing debt and equity across business cycle expansions and 
contractions. They observe that, in general, firms issue stock when it is believed to 
24 In the study of Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996), the hot issue period is defined using aggregate 
equity issue volume per year and quality of firm is proxied using free cash flows, return on assets, 
cash on hand and capital expenditure for a period two years before to two years after the issue. 
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be overvalued and avoid issuing when it is believed to be undervalued. The studies 
in seasoned equity offerings by Lucas and McDonald (1990), Taggart (1977), 
Marsh (1982) and Smith (1977) provide theoretical and empirical support for the 
above argument that equity issues tend to follow periods of sustained stock price 
increases. 
Stock Market Level 
Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982) and Brealey et al. (1976) all indicate that 
equity issues tend to follow market rises in the USA. Loughran et aI. (1994) 
observe that IPO volume is positively correlated with the inflation adjusted stock 
market level in 14 out of 15 international markets. They argue that IPOs are timed 
to benefit from periods of favourable investor sentiment and overvaluation. This 
implies that rises in the stock market level are associated with IPO market activity. 
In addition, Rees (1997) provides evidence that the stock market level predicts the 
value and volume of IPOs in the UK. 
An obvious weakness in the above studies is that they only consider the 
impact of current level of the stock market on WO activity. Of note, IPO issuers 
cannot generally respond instantaneously to market conditions since there is a 3 -6 
month lead needed to undertake the various activities required to fulfil the legal 
requirements and promote the issue (Lipman 1997). Hence, there is a delay 
between the manager's decision to commence the issue and the resultant listing of 
the stock. When managers make the decision to issue an WO, they have only the 
available information set at that time and need to predict the IPO market 
conditions at the expected listing date. Hence, any study concerning the 
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relationship between equity issues and market conditions should consider leading 
market conditions. 
Stock Market Volatility 
When stock market volatility increases, the risk of failure for an equity 
offering also increases. In order to cover expected losses, underwriters must 
charge higher fees (e.g. Bae and Levy 1990; Handley 1995; Marsh 1980). This 
shift in the relative costs of equity offerings during increased stock market 
volatility decreases the incentive of firms in going public. As a result, the number 
of issues falls (Choe et al. 1993). Schwert (1989) documents that stock price 
volatility varies across the business cycle, increasing during recessions and 
decreasing during expansions. After controlling for the business cycle effect, the 
empirical results of Choe et al. (1993) provide evidence of a negative relationship 
between the frequency of seasoned issues and stock market volatility. 
Although Choe et al. (1993) provide supportive evidence on the relationship 
between the frequency of seasoned issues and stock market volatility, this 
argument appears to be somewhat weak. Since underwriting fees represent only a 
small proportion of total funds raised by companies,25 companies also consider 
other factors when making the WO decision, such as current and expected future 
economic conditions. Therefore, changes in underwriting fees are unlikely to have 
a significant impact on the MO market unless changes in underwriting fees are 
unusually large. 
25 Based on Ritter (1998), the average gross spreads of an issue represent 7.31% of total proceeds 
(including management fee, underwriting fee and selling concession). 
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Interest Rates 
The interest rate effect on the equity issue market is linked to the bond 
market. White (1974) and Taggart (1977) provide evidence that both the level and 
structure of interest rates are important determinants of debt issues. Debt is 
typically issued when interest rates are low since it attracts relatively high prices. 
Increased debt financing reflects decreased equity financing since debt financing 
can be seen as a substitute for equity financing. Therefore, a positive correlation 
between interest rates and the number of equity offerings is expected (Choe et al. 
1993). 
Further, Donaldson (1961) observes that companies tend to follow a pecking 
order of financing sources. That is, companies first consider internal finance, then 
consider external funding through borrowing and finally consider equity financing 
(also see Myers and Majluf 1984). Since decreases in interest rates lead to lower 
borrowing costs, companies may raise funds through borrowings or corporate debt 
issues, if internal finance is too costly. Hence, low interest rate regimes lead to 
fewer equity issues resulting in a decrease in the supply of IPOs. 
In their study, Choe et al. (1993) find that interest rate changes provide little 
explanatory power in explaining the frequency of seasoned equity offerings. 
Industry Related Factors 
Ritter (1984b) provides evidence that the hot market of 1980 may have been 
driven by natural resource 1POs. Ritter's finding is theoretically supported by 
Allen and Faulhaber (1989) who develop a signalling model to explain IPO 
underpricing. They argue that hot issue markets may be industry- specific. In 
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support, they note that that the 1980 hot issue market arose from natural resource 
issues associated with the exogenous shock of the 1979 OPEC oil crisis. 
The 1979 oil crisis resulted in substantial increases in prices for petroleum 
products worldwide. Investors in this situation may have been over optimistic 
about the growth potential of natural resource firms inducing high demand for this 
industry's IPOs. Issuers take the advantage of a favourable IPO climate in the 
industry to float their shares. Hence, Allen and Faulhaber (1989) argue that the 
new prospect of a highly profitable natural resource industry in the early 1980s 
may have been the impetus of the 1980 hot issue market, characterised by both 
large underpricing and large numbers of natural resource 1POs,26 
3.3 Explanations for the Existence of Cycles in IPO Activity 
The above explanations for the existence of cycles in the IPO activity are 
limited and are not fully satisfactory. As IPO activity and underpricing are likely 
to arise from the interaction of investor demand and firm supply, we now review 
explanations classified into two categories - supply and demand. 
3.3.1 Supply of IPOs 
3.3.1.1 Changes in Firm Risk 
An initial explanation of hot issue markets is developed by Ritter (1984b). 
His argument is based on the empirical finding that high -risk ]POs are relatively 
more underpriced than low -risk IPOs27 (see also Davis and Yeomans 1976; Beatty 
26 This effect may also have occurred in the late 1990s in relation to internet firms. 
27 In Ritter (1984b), the risk of an IPO is measured in terms of an information proxy, such as 
annual sales of the company. 
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and Ritter 1986; Miller and Reilly 1987) and an adverse selection model 
developed by Rock (1986). 
Rock (1986) argues that WO underpricing is merely compensation to 
investors for the costs of becoming informed.28 The greater the fundamental 
uncertainty about an issue, the greater the WO underpricing to compensate 
investors. To avoid the possible failure of IPOs, issuers have to underprice their 
issues. Koh and Walter (1989), using Singaporean WO data, provide support for 
Rock's theory. 
Of note, the uncertainty mentioned in Rock (1986) is not systematic beta - 
type risk but the uncertainty uninformed investors have regarding the aftermarket 
price of an issue (Ritter 1984b). Rock's model thus implies that riskier issuers 
must underprice more than firms that have lower risks. 
Based on the above arguments, Ritter (1984b) suggests that if high -risk 
IPOs represent an unusually large proportion of offerings in specific periods, high 
average WO underpricing should be observed in these periods leading to hot issue 
markets. However, this explanation is subject to criticism. First, as mentioned by 
Ritter (1984b), most high risk IPOs have small market capitalisations. The 
amplitude of the hot issue cycle will be reduced if we use a value -weighted 
average IPO underpricing index rather than an equally weighted index. 
Second, the changing risk composition hypothesis cannot explain industry 
effects. Based on the findings of Ritter (1984b), the US hot issue WO market of 
1980 is due to a specific industry - natural resources. Since high -risk IPOs were 
also issued in other industries during the period, the explanation of changing risk 
28 Details refer to Sub -section 2.3.1.2 of the thesis. 
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composition is not the only explanation for the observed 1980 hot issue cycle in 
the USA. 
Third, the calculation of the risk of an IPO is difficult. Since the share 
trading history of IPOs is not available by definition, proxies for risk have to be 
used. In Ritter (1984h), accounting information is used to measure ex -ante risk, 
such as annual sales of companies. However, the measure of annual sales is not 
generally viewed as an accurate measure of risk in terms of business and financial 
risk. 
3.3.1.2 Windows of Opportunity 
An explanation for cycles in IPO volume is based upon the finding of long 
run underperformance of IPOs. Ritter (1991) finds a negative relation between 
annual WO volume and the aftermarket performance of IPOs. He argues that 
issuers have some success in timing new issues to take advantage of windows of 
opportunity. Since there are periods when investors place high valuations on the 
future growth opportunities of companies,29 companies may be more likely to go 
public in these periods. This induces cycles in the volume of new issues. 
The studies of Loughran and Ritter (1995) on the long run performance of 
IPOs, and Bayless and Chaplinsky (1996) on long run performance of seasoned 
equity issues, support the argument for windows of opportunity. Moreover, Rajan 
and Servaes (1997) argue that windows of opportunity are at least partially related 
to analyst over -optimism about recent IPOs. 
29 Growth opportunities of a company can be reelected by some ratio indicators relative to other 
measures of value (e.g., price- earnings or market to hook ratios). 
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Since the literature indicates that some hot issue markets are related to 
specific industries, or caused by specific industry shocks in specific periods, 
optimistic valuation of the growth potential of companies by investors may be 
possibly concentrated in specific industries in specific periods due to the influence 
of business conditions (Ritter 1984b; Allen and Faulhaber 1989). For instance, the 
1980 hot issue market in the USA is believed to be due to 1979 OPEC oil shock. 
3.3.1.3 The Impact of Mutual Fund flows 
Based on the reports of financial analysts, Ritter (1998) argues that there 
might be a relationship between IPO volume and mutual fund flows. Mutual fund 
managers are more willing to invest in 1POs in periods when they have a net 
inflow of cash. If enough mutual fund managers are in this position, the inflow of 
mutual funds into the IPO market might lead to a rise in demand for IPOs 
inducing over -valuation. Issuers take advantage of high valuations by timing their 
issues for these periods. Conversely, net cash outflow might lead to a fall in 
demand for IPOs inducing under -valuation. Hence a lower IPO volume is 
expected for these periods. To date, there is no empirical test of this hypothesis. 
However, the idea of concentrating on the `net inflow of cash' is 
problematic. If investing in IPOs is perceived to be a better investment option than 
other current investments, mutual funds can simply liquidate their current 
positions, incur transaction costs and buy into the IPO market without relying on 
the cash inflow of their mutual funds. But this might be explained by the limit on 
the quantity of shares a mutual fund can purchase in an IPO. Further, redemption 
requests by investors impose restrictions on the mutual funds since they have to 
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maintain a certain level of cash reserves to meet redemption requests. Hence, their 
assets might not be fully invested (Chordia 1996; Chay 1996). 
3.3.2 Demand for IPOs 
3.3.2.1 Positive Feedback Strategy 
This hypothesis relies on the assumption that some investors follow positive 
feedback strategies, in which they expect a positive autocorrelation in the initial 
returns on IPOs (see Rajan and Servaes 1995). The hypothesis is quite similar to 
the cascade effect hypothesis developed by Welch (1992), who argues that later 
investors rely at least partly on the purchasing decisions of earlier investors. 
The investment decision in relation to a specific IPO is based on the success 
of other recent (or earlier) issues. With the assumption of some degree of 
homogeneity among IPOs, investors interpret successes of recent issues as an 
indication of the success of future issues. The implication is that once an issue 
goes public, these investors are willing to bid up the price if other recent issues 
have realised an increase in prices. As Ibbotson et al. (1994, p. 72) suggest 
"If enough investors follow such a strategy, they may end up causing the 
expected positive autocorrelation of initial returns in a kind of self-fulfilling 
prophecy." 
The study of Ibbotson et al. (1994) in the US market provides supportive 
evidence for this argument. They find that current month average IPO 
underpricing is a good predictor of next month's average initial return with a first - 
order autocorrelation of 0.66 and the persistence of IPO volume from month to 
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month is even stronger with a first -order autocorrelation of 0.89. Ibbotson and 
Jaffe (1975) also find that the first -order autocorrelation of market adjusted IPO 
underpricing is quite large at 0.74 and argue that hot issue markets are somewhat 
predictable. 
3.3.2.2 The Impact of Mutual Funds 
Researchers have also begun to pay attention to the recent tendency of fund 
managers to employ a passive investment strategy (e.g. Grinblatt and Titman 
1989, 1992; Goetzmann and Ibbotson 1994; Brown and Goetzmann 1995; Malkiel 
1995). Mutual fund managers have the option to take either an active or passive 
investment strategy. The passive approach is relatively easy and simple to 
implement (Boustridge and Young 1996). Since the performance of mutual fund 
managers is often judged by comparing their portfolio performance relative to the 
performance of a predetermined stock market index (Roll 1992),3° one popular 
passive strategy employed by fund managers is to replicate the benchmark index. 
This indexing strategy can avoid potential cash withdrawals. Some mutual funds 
have employed this approach in recent years (e.g. Powell, Premechandra and Shi 
1998). 
WO listings typically change the composition of the share market index.31 
On average, IPOs experience positive initial returns on the first day of trading. 
This implies that all else being equal, the stock market index would tend to rise on 
the date of an WO listing if the stock is to be included in the market index. Since 
the performance of mutual fund managers is often judged in comparison to a 
3° This predetermined index is generally a broadly based stock market index. 
31 For instance, Telecom NZ listed on the New Zealand Stock Exchange on 22 August 1991 and it 
represents more than 60% of the weight in the NZSE40 index. 
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predetermined stock market index, they are likely to underperform the market if 
they do not invest in IPOs. 
With the information advantage mutual funds have (Edwards and Zhang 
1998), they are more likely to invest in IPOs with an offer price less than the 
fundamental value, as suggested by Rock (1986). Economic upturns are generally 
associated with over -optimistic valuation by investors which results in a relative 
higher fundamental value for IPOs. Therefore, in periods of over -optimism, 
mutual funds may be heavily involved in the WO market, inducing a rise in 
demand for IPOs that leads to a hot period of underpricing. 
3.3.2.3 Interest Rates 
Another explanation for the relationship between interest rate and equity 
offerings is related to investors' demand for equity. A decrease in interest rates is 
generally associated with a fall in bond yields (Harvey 1991). Subsequently, a 
lower return on bond investments is expected. Investors who want protection 
against this possibility may transfer their funds into other higher yield 
investments, such as the stock market. In turn, this induces a rise in demand for 
IPOs. If enough investors follow this strategy, a hot issue market (in terms of IPO 
underpricing) might occur. 
In addition, the negative relation between interest rates and stock prices has 
been the subject of extensive research (e.g. Fama and Schwert 1977; Titman and 
Warga 1989). In theory, the value of a share is the sum of discounted future cash 
flows. One important component in this model is the discount rate (which is 
positively related to the interest rate). In general, a decrease in interest rates 
increases the value of shares. This in turn increases expectations about the future 
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performance of a new issue inducing higher investor demand and thereby leading 
to higher IPO underpricing. 
3.4 Summary 
A number of explanations have been advanced to explain the phenomenon 
of hot and cold new issue markets. These explanations include changing risk 
composition of IPOs, positive feedback strategy of investors, windows of 
opportunity and the impact of mutual fund flows. However, none of these appear 
to provide a full explanation. Moreover, the scant empirical evidence is sometimes 
mixed and not always supportive. Of note, previous studies have concentrated on 
supply -side explanations (or issuers). The importance of investor demand for IPOs 
is often overlooked. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
DESCRIPTION AND SOURCES OF IPO DATA 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter describes the data collection procedures and sources of the 
various IPO data sets used in this thesis. The summary statistics for each data set 
are also briefly presented. 
4.2 US IPO Data32 
4.2.1 Data Sources and Collection Method 
The data were initially collected from the Securities Data Corporation 
(SDC). SDC maintains files on all registered security issues. These files are based 
primarily on information filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in public registration statements. 
The following selection criteria were employed:33 
a) The IPO must be a common stock IPO. The issues under Rule 144A, 
Private Placements and Shelf Registrations are excluded. 
33 I would like to thank Jay Ritter, John Powell, Peter Grundy and Gurmeet Bhabra for providing 
some US IPO and share price data. 
33 Research has often concluded that Closed -end Mutual Fund and REITs are different from 
corporate assets (e.g. Peavy 1990; Wang et al. 1992; Nelling et al. 1995; Sirmans et al. 1987). 
Generally, these studies show that the Closed -end Mutual Funds and REIT stocks are overpriced 
relative to the traditional underpricing observed in common stocks. Following Ibbotson et al. 
(1994), it was decided to exclude Closed -end Mutual Funds and REITs from the sample. 
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b) Closed -end Mutual Funds and Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) are 
excluded 
c) The IPO must be issued by a US based company 
From the SDC files, a list of all USA domestic firm -commitment IPOs of 
common stock is obtained for the period of January 1970 to June 1998. The initial 
sample consists of 8,879 IPOs. 
To calculate initial returns for each IPO, the stock price at the end of the first 
day of trading for each IPO is required. The SDC files only provide the relevant 
price information for stocks over the period 1986 -1998. Thus, the price 
information for the remainder of the sample is obtained from other sources. 
For those IPOs listed between 1975 -1984, the price information for 1,646 
companies is first obtained from Ritter's 1975 -1984 IPO database.34 
Second, the price information for 2,189 companies listed between 1975- 
1996 is obtained from the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) database. 
Among them, 1,556 stocks were found to have a negative closing price on the first 
day of trading, even though the trading volume was positive. The price 
information for these stocks in the subsequent two trading weeks was checked. In 
all cases when the first -day trading price for the company was negative, prices for 
the subsequent two weeks were also negative. The trading price for a few 
companies in the subsequent three years was then examined. The results showed 
that these companies had negative prices for the first two or three years before 
becoming positive. However, the stocks had positive volumes throughout. 
34 There were a total number of 1,782 IPOs in the period 1975 -1984 (see Ritter 1997). It should be 
noted that there were some best efforts contracts included in Ritter's data whereas this thesis 
concentrates on firm commitment contracts. 
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The CRSP Stock File Guide explains this as follows: 
"PRC(I) is the closing price or the negative bid/ask average on the date 
CALDT(I). If the closing price is not available on any given trading day, the 
number in the price field has a negative sign to indicate that it is a bid/ask 
average and not an actual closing price on trading date CALDT(I). Please 
note that in this field the negative sign is a symbol and that the value of the 
bid/ask average is not negative. If neither closing price nor bid/ask average 
is available on day I, PRC(I) is set to zero." 35 
(CRSPAccess97 Stock File Users Guide, page 44, 1997, University of Chicago.) 
The procedures followed indicated that there were still 2,16436 stocks 
requiring the price information for the first day of trading with 1,556 having 
negative price information from CRSP thereby indicating no last sale price 
available. For these stocks, an implied closing price was calculated by averaging 
the bid and ask quotes. 
Third, price data were collected for all the stocks requiring price information 
(including the 1,556 stocks with implied closing prices flagged by CRSP) from 
Datastream International (DS) and Prophet Stock Price CD -ROM (PSPC). 
35 Note: PRC (1) means the price of first day of trading with PRC (. ) denotes the closing price or 
bid/ask average. CALDT (1) means the first trading date with CALDT ( . ) denotes the calendar 
date. 
36 This number (2,164) is equal to total number of the stocks in the initial sample (8,879) minus 
4,436 stocks that had relevant price information from SDC and then less 633 stocks for which the 
price information was obtained from CRSP. 
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After the third step, there were 1,715 companies that had either missing 
price information or implied closing prices at the first day of trading.37 
The procedures above revealed that it is unlikely that any price information 
could be obtained for the companies listed prior to 1974 as neither DS or PSPC 
provide any information on these companies.38 Therefore, 1,062 IPOs issued prior 
to 1974 were eliminated which left 7,817 IPOs in the final sample for the period of 
1.974 to June 1998.39 
The above procedures also revealed the existence of unit IPOs in the sample. 
A unit IPO represents a combination of securities such as common stock, debt 
preferred stock and warrants rather than common stock alone. Unit offerings are 
complex instruments that consist of a bundle of common stock offerings and other 
securities sold together as a package, typically with warrants. Unit IPOs have 
become increasingly popular in recent years. Unit IPOs are relatively smaller in 
terms of offer sizes and firm sizes. They are typically riskier and are underwritten 
by less prestigious underwriters in comparison to non -unit offerings. Moreover, 
they are Iikely to disappear more quickly (Schultz 1993; Jain 1994). 
While there exists literature on stock IPOs and their underpricing behaviour, 
research in unit IPOs remains a largely unexplored area. Schultz (1993) documents 
an empirical result of 8% higher underpricing in unit IPOs. In contrast, Jain (1994) 
shows that unit IPOs exhibit significantly less underpricing than stock IPOs. This 
37 The data set was also checked for the IPOs that had `doubtful' price information. For instance, 
the stock is referred as having doubtful price information if the initial return of stock is greater 
(less) than 20% ( -20 %) could not be confirmed. As a result, companies with doubtful price 
information are identified within the group of companies that had missing price information. 
38 Although CRSP provides price information for a proportion. of IPOs listed prior to 1974, the 
first -day trading prices obtained for these companies were negative (or implied closing price). 
39 These procedures revealed that there were still 653 stocks in the sample requiring price 
information after this step. Within this group, 300 IPOs are unit offerings (see discussion of unit 
offerings in this section). 
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evidence suggests that there may be a significant difference in underpricing (or the 
initial return) between unit and stock IPOs. Consequently, unit IPOs were 
eliminated from the sample due to the complexity and problems of valuation and 
the possible difference in the underpricing between unit and stock IPOs. 
It is also recognised that over the period 1974 -1975, almost half of IPOs (6 
out of 13) have either implied closing prices or missing price information in 
addition to the existing problem of a relatively small number of offerings during 
the period. This increases the difficulty in constructing monthly hot issue market 
indices since many months over this period would have no IPOs. One way to deal 
with this problem is to measure the hot issue market indices, such as average 
initial return, number of offerings and value of offerings, as zero for the specific 
months.40 To reduce the potential bias in the empirical tests, IPOs for the period 
1974 -1975 are excluded altogether. 
After eliminating unit IPOs and the IPOs between 1974 and 1975, the final 
sample consists of 6,632 IPOs with 250 of them having implied closing prices and 
97 possessing no price information. 
4.2.2 Descriptive Statistics of US Sample 
4.2.2.1 Full Sample 
Table 4.1 presents summary statistics for the full sample of US IPOs.41 Of 
note from Table 4.1, the number of offerings has increased sharply since 1980 and 
40 It is shown in later chapters that the hot issue periods in the TPO activity are empirically 
examined using a regime switching technique and this technique can be quite sensitive to zeroes. 
41 Table 4.1 includes all the 1POs with and without implied closing prices. 
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peaked in the 1990s with the average offer size increasing from US$9.8 million in 
1980 to US$69.1 million in 1998. The overall average offer size is US$29.6 
million, which is much higher than US$5.9 million average, in unit offerings (see 
Table 4.3). The average initial return per year ranges from 4.26% in 1984 to 
32.81% in 1978.42 This issue is further explored in sub -sections 4.2.2.4 and 
4.2.2.5. 
The average initial return for the overall sample is 13.18% including 
companies with implied closing prices and 10.19% excluding companies with 
implied closing prices. These results are quite similar to the results of Ibbotson et 
aI. (1988)43 and Ibbotson et al. (1994).44 
Table 4.2 summarises the results for all the IPOs by industry classification. 
The industry of Personal, Business and Repair Services shows the highest initial 
return of 18.24% with the Sanitation industry the least with an average initial 
return of 1.47 %. Two industries, Personal, Business and Repair Services and 
Manufacturing, capture a relatively large proportion of total TO issuance in the 
sample period (54.2% of total number of offerings). 
42 The initial returns for the companies that had implied closing prices are calculated using the 
average values of the bid and ask quotes. Excluding the IPOs that had implied closing prices, there 
were some different results in average initial returns in three of the years (1976, 1978 and 1985). 
Moreover, the difference is statistically significant at 5% level with a t- statistic of 2.17. 
4s tbbotson et al. (1988) report that for the 8,668 firms that went public during 1960 -1987 in the 
USA, the average initial return is 16.37 %. 
44 Using US data for the period 1960 to 1992, Ibbotson et aI. (1994) report an average initial return 
of 15.3% for a sample of 10,626 IPOs. 
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Table 4.1: Summarised Results for US IPOs (excluding Unit Offerings) 
Classified by Year 
No. of 
Offerings 
Average Initial Return per Year Gross Proceeds per Average Proceeds 
Year per Year 
(USS mil.) (US$ mil.) 
Including IPOs with 
implied closing prices 
Excluding IPOs 
with implied 
closing prices 
1976 37 0.15230 0.00767 260.0 7.0 
1977 24 0.07770 0.07988 137.7 5.7 
1978 34 0.32811 0.12095 209.8 6.2 
1979 58 0.12601 0.08137 377.0 6.5 
1980 120 0.26116 0.28509 1,172.7 9.8 
1981 291 0.15693 0.13473 2,765.1 9.5 
1982 97 0.10601 0.10457 1,152.3 1 1.9 
1983 574 0.10375 0.10187 11,662.0 20.3 
1984 251 0.04260 0.04236 2,770.0 11.0 
1985 270 0.10332 0.04661 5,996.4 22.2 
1986 561 0.06479 0.06133 16,658.0 29.7 
1987 400 0.07721 0.06003 12,399.0 31.0 
1988 158 0.06599 0.06846 4,663.9 29.5 
1989 135 0.09622 0.09205 4,806.9 35.6 
1990 131 0.13538 0.10785 4,122.4 31.5 
1991 302 0.12294 0.12294 14,203.0 47.0 
1992 415 0.10739 0.10739 19,747.0 47.6 
1993 525 0.12748 0.12748 26,550.0 50.6 
1994 414 0.09215 0.09215 15,180.0 36.7 
1995 462 0.21576 0.21576 23,947.0 51.8 
1996 695 0.17302 0.17302 37,600.0 54.1 
1997 471 0.14815 0.14815 26,900.0 57.1 
1998 207 0.14646 0.14646 14,303.0 69.1 
Overall 6,632 0.13178 0.10192 247,583.2 29.6 
Note: The data period is from 1974 to June 1998. The figures for 1998 are only for the first half of 
the year. 
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Table 4.2: Summarised Results for US IPOs (excluding Unit Offerings) 
Classified by Industry 
No. of 
Offerings 
% of 
Total 
IPOs 
Average Initial Return 
per Industry 
Gross Average 
Proceeds Proceeds 
per Industry per 
(US$ mil.) Industry 
(US$ mil.) 
Including IPOs 
with implied 
closing prices 
Excluding IPOs 
with implied 
closing prices 
Agriculture 33 0.50% 0.05436 0.05436 1,204.2 36.5 
Commercial Banks 113 1.70% 0.06698 0.05194 2,002.9 17.7 
Construction 73 1.10% 0.09003 0.08994 2,081.4 28.5 
Credit Institutions 57 0.86% 0.16067 0.16280 5,820.1 102.1 
Healthcare 257 3.88% 0.09000 0.09059 7,616.4 29.6 
Insurance 172 2.59% 0.06690 0.06902 17,183.4 99.9 
Investment Banks 61 0.92% 0.08219 0.07613 4,418.0 72.4 
Leisure 116 1.75% 0.14616 0.13765 3,436.8 29.6 
Manufacturing 2,422 36.52% 0.12519 0.11782 84,007.5 34.7 
Natural Resources 181 2.73% 0.16562 0.11032 9,806.3 54.2 
Other Financial 165 2.49% 0.08695 0.08367 8,117.3 49.5 
Institutions and Banks 
Other Services 85 1.28% 0.06454 0.06440 4,693.9 55.2 
Personal, Business and 1,174 17.70% 0.18240 0.18282 34,432.2 29.3 
Repair Services 
Restaurants and Hotels 212 3.20% 0.14915 0.15131 6,388.6 30.1 
Retails 406 6.12% 0.09263 0.09593 17,267.2 42.5 
Savings and Loans, 356 5.37% 0.06509 0.04825 8,206.9 23.1 
Mutual Savings Banks 
Sanitation 58 0.87% 0.01469 0.12303 2,260.1 39.0 
Telecommunication 215 3.24% 0.11661 0.11745 13,227.3 61.5 
Transportation 157 2.37% 0.07772 0.07156 7,067.1 45.0 
Wholesales 314 4.73% 0.11690 0.11439 8,341.2 26.6 
Unknown Industry 6 0.09% -0.10000 -0.10000 4.7 0.8 
Overall 6,632 100% 0.13178 0.10192 247,583.2 29.6 
1. Other Financial Institutions and Banks include mortgage bankers, mortgage securities and real 
estate, etc. 
2. Other Services include electric, oil and gas, education and social services. 
3. Telecommunication includes telephone communications, television broadcasting, radio 
broadcasting and communication services. 
4. Unknown Industry means the industry classification is not defined by SDC. 
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4.2.2.2 Unit IPOs 
Summarised results for US unit IPOs classified by both year and industry 
are reported in Tables 4.3 and 4.4, respectively. Table 4.3 shows that the average 
proceeds for unit IPOs were only US$5.9 million per offering which is small 
relative to the overall sample as reported in Table 4.1 (US$29.6 million per 
offering). The number of unit offerings peaked in the mid -1980s with high initial 
returns. Although unit offerings were still quite popular in the 1990s, the average 
initial return was much lower compared to the 1980s. Table 4.4 shows that two 
industries, Personal, Business and Repair Services and Manufacturing, dominate 
the issuing of unit IPOs (58.07 %) with 229 and 451 offerings, respectively. The 
Sanitation industry experienced the highest average initial returns (93.54 %) with 
the Credit Institutions industry the least with an average initial returns of -9.34% 
(see Table 4.4). 45 
While it does not initially seem that there is a difference in the average 
initial returns between unit and stock IPOs, tests for differences in the initial 
returns are presented in the next sub- section. 
45 The high average initial returns in the Sanitation industry appear to be dominated by a single 
company, the shares of Envírosure Management issued on 16 July 1985 with an initial return of 
650 %. When this outlier is excluded, the initial return for the industry falls to 7.95 %. 
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Table 4.3: Summarised Results for US Unit Offerings Classified by Year 
No. of 
Offerings 
Average Initial 
Return per Year 
Gross Proceeds 
per Year 
(US$ mil.) 
Average Proceeds per 
Year 
(US$ mil.) 
1976 1 -0.02778 2.8 2.8 
1977 4 0.08398 8.8 2.2 
1978 3 0.35833 5.4 1.8 
1979 3 -0.02639 11.5 3.8 
1980 23 0.28926 97.1 4.2 
1981 48 0.29346 225.4 4.7 
1982 22 0.22509 71.8 3.3 
1983 97 0.18950 386.8 4.0 
1984 90 0.13010 298.1 3.3 
1985 54 0.29872 241.6 4.5 
1986 122 0.12708 406.0 3.3 
1987 99 0.03941 452.4 4.6 
1988 51 0.14291 154.3 3.0 
1989 60 0.12207 253.3 4.2 
1990 35 0.07520 183.1 5.2 
1991 50 0.04649 343.2 6.9 
1992 61 0.03275 589.6 9.7 
1993 79 0.05435 742.5 9.4 
1994 93 0.03947 690.3 7.4 
1995 63 0.10444 453.8 7.2 
1996 71 0.10262 717.7 10.1 
1997 39 0.03686 483.7 12.4 
1998 3 0.09075 36.1 12.0 
Overall 1,171 0.12299 6,855.3 5.9 
The data period is from 1974 to June 1998. The figures for 1998 are only for the first half of the 
year. 
69 
Table 4.4: Summarised Results for US Unit Offerings Classified by Industry 
No of 
Offerings 
Average Initial 
Return per 
Industry 
Gross Proceeds 
per Industry 
(US$ mil.) 
Average Proceeds 
per Industry 
(US$ mil.) 
Agriculture 8 -0.04410 41.8 5.2 
Construction 9 -0.02811 55.3 6.1 
Credit Institutions 3 -0.09343 24.0 8.0 
Healthcare 49 0.I2614 205.3 4.2 
Insurance 9 0.04046 30.7 3.4 
Investment Banks 5 0.08125 20.5 4.1 
Leisure 57 0.07900 377.3 6.6 
Manufacturing 451 0.10487 2,670.6 5.9 
Natural Resources 22 0.27259 89.0 4.0 
Other Financial Institutions and 91 -0.04995 671.3 7.4 
Banks 
Other Services 14 0.19454 41.8 3.0 
Personal, Business and Repair 229 0.15614 1,325.7 5.8 
Services 
Restaurants and Hotels 31 0.10015 174.9 5.6 
Retails 51 0.10337 305.0 6.0 
Savings and Loans, Mutual 6 -0.08757 49.4 8.2 
Savings Banks 
Sanitation 7 0.93539 53.7 7.7 
Telecommunication 37 -0.01347 187.0 5.1 
Transportation 20 0.04626 147.3 7.4 
Wholesales 72 0.19849 384.7 5.3 
Overall 1,171 0.12299 6,855.3 5.9 
1. Other Financial Institutions and Banks include mortgage bankers, mortgage securities and real 
estate. 
2. Other Services include electric, oil and gas, education and social services. 
3. Telecommunication includes telephone communications, television broadcasting, radio 
broadcasting and communication services. 
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4.2.2.3 Unit IPO vs. Common Stock IPOs 
It has been reported that there is significant difference in the initial returns 
between unit and stock IPOs (Schultz 1993; Jain 1994). Tables 4.5 and 4.6 report 
the statistical analysis of the difference in initial returns between unit and common 
stock 1130s with Table 4.5 classified by year and Table 4.6 classified by industry. 
Table 4.5: Test of Differences in the Initial Returns between Unit and Stock 
IPOs in the USA by Year 
F- Statistic t- statistic/ Adiusted t- statistic Wilcoxon Score 
1976 N.A. - N.A. -0.56 
1977 7.69 -0.08 0.92 
1978 3.70 -0.04 0.39 
1979 316.38* 2.69* -1.69 
1980 1.63 -0.23 1.21 
1981 2.25* -0.91 -0.37 
1982 13.15* -0.87 -1.17 
1983 2.39* -2.22* 1.00 
1984 8.72* -2.04* 0.67 
1985 14.46* -1.23 -1.06 
1986 4.62* -1.52 -0.72 
1987 3.15* 1.05 -2.68* 
1988 6.13* -1.43 -0.02 
1989 6.18* -0.55 -1.10 
1990 1.03 1.03 -2.02* 
1991 2.69* 1.99 -3.76* 
1992 2.20* 2.06 * -4.32* 
1993 3.68* 1.65 -5.58* 
1994 6.04* 1.30 -4.81* 
1995 1.05 2.98* -4.10* 
1996 1.58* 1.77 -2.81* 
1997 1.81* 2.40* -2.24* 
1998 3.78 0.46 -0.34 
Total 2.72* 0.43 -4.72* 
1. * Significant at 5% level. 
2. The tests were conducted including those companies with implied closing prices when 
calculating the initial returns. 
3. N.A. denotes Not Available. 
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F- statistics test the hypothesis that the variances are equal across unit and 
stock IPOs. If unequal variances are observed, the adjusted t- statistic is used rather 
than a standard t- statistic in analysing the difference in underpricing. As the 
normal distribution assumption is likely to be violated in the data, the non - 
parametric Wilcoxon rank -sum test is also used. 
Table 4.5 compares the initial returns between unit and stock offerings by 
year. The results obtained from the parametric and non -parametric tests are 
generally similar, except for nine of the years, 1979, 1983, 1984, 1987, 1990, 
1991, 1993, 1994 and 1996. 
The results are more mixed for the difference in initial returns between unit 
and stock IPOs by industry. While the non -parametric test shows a significant 
difference in initial returns between unit and stock IPOs for most industries, the 
parametric test shows only three industries wherein significant differences in the 
initial returns between unit and stock IPOs are found (see Table 4.6). Assuming 
possible violation of the assumption of normality, the statistical results obtained 
from the non -parametric tests are more reliable. 
Both non -parametric and parametric tests are also conducted for the overall 
sample. The result obtained for the non -parametric test indicates a significant 
difference in the initial returns between unit and stock IPOs (Wilcoxon score of 
-9.72) though the result obtained for the parametric test indicates no significant 
difference (adjusted t- statistic of 0.43). 
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Table 4.6: Test of Differences in the Initial Returns between Unit and Stock 
IPOs in the USA by Industry 
F- Statistic 1- statistic/ Adjusted 
t- statistic 
Wilcoxon Score 
Agriculture 1.18 2.27* -2.33* 
Commercial Banks N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Construction 3.78* 1.12 -I.98* 
Credit Institutions 3.00 1.94 -2.28* 
Healthcare 6.00* -0.50 -2.35* 
Insurance N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Investment Banks 2.08 0.01 -1.23 
Leisure 1.32 1.49 -2.81* 
Manufacturing 1.73* 1.16 -6.06* 
Natural Resources 1.99 -0.70 0.91 
Other Financial Institutions and 1.74 3.09* -3.60* 
Banks 
Other Services 6.77* -1.11 0.42 
Personal, Business and Repair 2.74* 0.64 -5.20* 
Services 
Restaurants and Hotels 1.43 1.03 -2.11* 
Retails 5.18* -0.17 -2.64* 
Savings and Loans, Mutual 1.54 1.84 -2.40* 
Savings Banks 
Sanitation 100.53* -0.85 -1.05 
Telecommunication 1.52 3.03* -3.71* 
Transportation 3.59* 0.49 -2.06* 
Wholesales 333* -1.79 0.45 
Unknown Industry N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Total 2.72* 0.43 -9.72* 
1. * Significant at 5% level. 
2. The tests were conducted including those companies with implied closing prices when 
calculating the initial returns. 
3. N.A. denotes Not Available. 
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Of note, the unit IPOs tend to outperform (underperform) stock IPOs prior to 
1990 (after 1990). While the finding of superior performance of unit offerings 
relative to stock offerings prior to 1990 is consistent with the US evidence of 
Schultz (1993),46 the superior performance of stock offerings after 1990 is more in 
line with the findings of Jain (1994).47 The differences highlighted here between 
unit and stock IPOs support the decision to exclude unit IPOs. Research into the 
difference between unit and common stock IPOs is considered beyond the scope 
of the thesis and is left for future work. 
4.2.2.4 IPOs with Implied Closing Prices 
As discussed in Sub -section 4.2.1, there are a number of companies that had 
no available closing price at the first day of trading. The price used in calculating 
the initial return for these IPOs in the sample is set as the average value of bid and 
ask quotes at the first day of trading (termed `implied closing price'). Although the 
proportion of these companies is relatively small in the sample, the initial returns 
calculated for these companies might impact on the construction of the hot issue 
market indices. Therefore, it is necessary to examine descriptive statistics of these 
observations. 
The summarised results for IPOs with implied closing prices are reported in 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8. It appears that these IPOs have much higher initial returns and 
relatively small offer sizes when compared to the results in Tables 4.1 and 4.2 (see 
Tables 4.7 and 4.8). Extremely high initial returns are experienced in 1976, 1978 
46 The sample period used in Schultz (1993) is from 1986 -1988. 
47 The sample period used in Jain (1994) is from 1980 -1988. 
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and 1990 with average initial returns of 159.88 %, 29L76% and 129.17 %, 
respectively. For 1POs listed after 1990, there are none with an implied closing 
price. 
Table 4.7: Summarised Results for US IPOs with Implied Closing Prices 
Classified by Year 
No. of 
Offerings 
Average Initial 
Return per Year 
Gross Proceeds per 
Year 
(US$ mil.) 
Average Proceeds 
per Year 
(US$ mil.) 
1976 3 1.59880 19.4 6.5 
1977 4 0.06397 7.2 1.8 
1978 4 2.91761 2.6 0.7 
1979 12 0.20264 67.6 5.6 
1980 12 0.05176 95.0 7.9 
1981 15 0.55507 192.8 12.9 
1982 3 0.15120 41.4 13.8 
1983 6 0.13047 294.6 49.1 
1984 3 0.06279 19.6 6.5 
1985 121 0.16941 1,354.9 11.2 
1986 34 0.11652 262.1 7.7 
1987 22 0.36921 133.8 6.1 
1988 5 -0.00738 32.5 6.5 
1989 3 0.27326 9.2 3.1 
1990 3 1.29167 12.8 4.3 
Total 250 0.24690 2,745.5 10.2 
Note: The data period is from 1974 to June 1998. 
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Table 4.8: Summarised Results for US IPOs with Implied Closing Prices 
Classified by Industry 
No. of 
Offerings 
Average Initial 
Return per 
Industry 
Gross Proceeds 
per Industry 
(US$ mil.) 
Average 
Proceeds per 
Industry 
(US$ mil.) 
Commercial Banks 9 0.23239 52.7 5.9 
Construction 3 0.09201 19.2 6.4 
Credit Institutions 2 0.10324 13.4 6.7 
Healthcare 8 0.07221 131.5 16.4 
Insurance 5 -0.00240 65.5 13.1 
Investment Banks 2 0.25083 8.3 4.2 
Leisure 6 0.29640 17.0 2.8 
Manufacturing 76 0.33767 720.4 9.5 
Natural Resources 4 3.46528 3.6 0.9 
Other Financial Institutions 
and Banks 
4 0.23250 75.6 18.9 
Other Services 2 0.07014 13.7 6.9 
Personal, Business and Repair 22 0.17491 170.1 7.7 
Services 
Restaurants and Hotels 4 0.03905 11.6 2.9 
Retails 17 0.04719 305.1 17.9 
Savings and Loans, Mutual 59 0.14818 728.9 12.4 
Savings Banks 
Sanitation 4 0.47036 30.2 7.6 
Telecommunication 3 0.02912 45.0 15.0 
Transportation 6 0.23171 44.9 7.5 
Wholesales 14 0.17348 84.8 6.1 
Total 250 0.246890 2,545.5 10.2 
1. Other Financial Institutions and Banks include mortgage bankers, mortgage securities, and real 
estate. 
2. Other Services include electric, oil and gas, education and social services. 
3. Telecommunication includes telephone communications, television broadcasting, radio 
broadcasting and communication services. 
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In Table 4.8, an extremely high return of 346.53% is observed in the Natural 
Resources industry with an average offering size of only US$0.9 million. The 
Insurance industry is the only industry with a negative initial return. 
As relatively high initial returns for companies that had implied closing 
prices are observed in Tables 4.7 and 4.8, it implies that there might be a possible 
impact of these companies when constructing the monthly hot issue market 
indices. Therefore, some further analysis is conducted in the next sub -section to 
explore if this impact is likely to be significant. 
4.2.2.5 IPOs with Closing Prices vs. IPOs with Implied Closing Prices 
The above evidence hints that there might be a potential bias in the initial 
returns for these companies if the implied closing price (which is set as the 
average value of bid and ask quotes) is used to calculate the initial return. 
Therefore, a comparison analysis for companies with actual closing prices and 
companies with implied closing prices is performed and the results are reported in 
Table 4.9 by year and in Table 4.10 by industry classification. 
The overall results indicate that there is a significant difference in the 
initial returns between the companies with actual closing prices and companies 
with implied closing prices, although the difference is apparent mainly between 
1985 -1989 (see Table 4.9). 
Based on the results observed in Tables 4.9 and 4.10, there is a potential 
bias in initial returns for companies with implied closing prices and such a bias 
may have an impact when constructing monthly hot issue market indices. 
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Therefore, these companies are excluded from the construction of the monthly 
underpricing index 48 
Table 4.9: Test of Differences in Initial Returns between IPOs with Price 
Information and IPOs with Implied Closing Prices 
in the USA by Year 
F- statistic t- statistic/ Adjusted 
t- statistic 
Wilcoxon Score 
1976 916.22* -1.05 2.16* 
1977 2.01 0.16 0.10 
1978 329.6* -1.06 1.62 
1979 37.25* -0.84 -0.21 
1980 3.10* 2.18* -1.87 
1981 5.00* -1.22 1.29 
1982 1.54 -0.45 0.32 
1983 2.82* -1.13 1.75 
1984 5.70 -0.27 1.59 
1985 11.41* -3.51* 3.83* 
1986 3.52* -1.05 1.38 
1987 12.24* -3.31* 4.67* 
1988 1.14 1.26 -1.08 
1989 1.59 -2.50* 2.07* 
1990 62.56* -1.73 1.41 
1991 NA N.A. N.A. 
1992 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1993 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1994 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1995 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1996 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1997 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1998 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Total 8.14* 3.05* 2.25* 
1. * Significant at 5% level. 
2. N.A. denotes Not Available. 
48 However, the number of offerings and offer sizes of these companies are still retained in the 
construction of monthly indices of issue volume and value. 
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Table 4.10: Test of Differences in Initial Returns between IPOs with Price 
Information and IPOs with Implied Closing Prices 
in the USA by Industry 
F- statistic t- statistic/ Adjusted 
t- statistic 
Wilcoxon Score 
Agriculture N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Commercial Banks 21.93* -1.06 0.29 
Construction 154.57* -0.10 1.22 
Credit Institutions 5.43 0.37 0.00 
Healthcare 3.81 0.36 0.23 
Insurance 23.23* 5.82* 2.14* 
Investment Banks 10.69* -0.61 0.02 
Leisure 6.19* -0.67 1.00 
Manufacturing 11.32* -2.76* 2.70* 
Natural Resources 58.16* -2.03 2.74* 
Other Financial Institutions 
and Banks 
4.39* -0.74 0.51 
Other Services 1.48 -0.06 -0.03 
Personal, Business and 2.08* 0.14 0.07 
Repair Services 
Restaurants and Hotels 33.44* 4.28* -0.33 
Retails 2.91* 1.08 -0.24 
Savings and Loans, Mutual 28.88* -1.70 2.88* 
Savings Banks 
Sanitation 16.78* -1.00 0.88 
Telecommunication 10.78 0.60 -0.66 
Transportation 9.81* -1.05 1.09 
Wholesales 2.80* -0.68 -0.30 
Unknown Industry N.A. N.A. N.A. 
Total 8.14* -3.05* 2.25* 
1. * Significant at 5% level. 
2. N.A. denotes Not Available. 
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4.2.2.6 IPOs with Missing Price Information 
Although a great proportion of companies in the sample have available price 
information on the first day of trading, there are still 97 companies possessing no 
price information with 20 of them (20.6% of the companies) in 1986 (see Table 
4.11). Further, 28 of them (28.86% of the companies) are observed in the industry 
of Financial Institutions and Banks (see Table 4.12). These companies show a 
relatively small offer size. 
Although these companies are excluded in the construction of the monthly 
underpricing index due to unavailability of price information at the first day of 
trading, the number of offerings and offer sizes of the companies are still retained 
in the construction of monthly indices of issue volumes and values. 
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Table 4.11: Summarised Results for US IPOs with Missing Price Information 
Classified by Year 
No. of Offerings Gross Proceeds per Year 
(US$ mil.) 
Average Proceeds per Year 
(US$ mil.) 
1976 4 10.8 2.7 
1977 I 0.5 0.5 
1978 5 1.7 0.3 
1979 2 1.2 0.6 
1980 3 3.7 1.2 
1981 7 18.7 2.7 
1982 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1983 4 9.8 2.5 
1984 1 1.3 1.3 
1985 8 108.7 13.6 
1986 20 381.7 19.1 
1987 4 13.5 3.4 
1988 4 61.6 15.4 
1989 5 25.1 5.0 
1990 2 6.1 3.1 
1991 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1992 1 1.2 1.2 
1993 4 206.3 51.6 
1994 3 20.6 6.9 
1995 N.A. N.A. N.A. 
1996 7 57.2 8.2 
1997 8 635.8 79.5 
I998 4 124.7 31.2 
Overall 97 1,6902 17.4 
Note: 
1. The data period is from 1974 to June 1998. Therefore, the figures for 1998 are only for the first 
half of the year. 
2. N.A. denotes Not Available. 
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Table 4.12: Summarised Results for US IPOs with Missing Price Information 
Classified by Industry 
No. of 
Offerings 
Gross Proceeds 
per Industry 
(US$ mil.) 
Average Proceeds 
per Industry 
(US$ mil.) 
Agriculture 1 156.6 156.6 
Construction 2 77.1 38.6 
Financial Institutions and Banks 28 462.5 16.5 
Healthcare 2 2.4 1.2 
Leisure 4 7.0 1.8 
Manufacturing 18 201.1 11.2 
Natural Resources 2 3.0 1.5 
Personal, Business and Repair 15 164.5 11.0 
Services 
Restaurants and Hotels 4 8.8 2.2 
Retails 4 383.4 95.9 
Telecommunication 4 199.4 49.9 
Transportation 1 13.0 13.0 
Wholesales 8 8.0 1.0 
Unknown Industry 4 3.7 0.9 
Overall 97 1,690.2 17.4 
1. Financial Institutions and Banks include investment bankers, insurance, credit institutions, 
commercial banks, savings & loans, mortgage bankers, mortgage securities, and real estate. 
2. Telecommunication includes telephone communications, television broadcasting, radio 
broadcasting and communication services. 
3. Unknown industry means the industry classification is not defined by SDC. 
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4.3 Australian IPO Data49 
4.3.1 Data Sources and Collection Method 
The Australian IPO data covers all IPOs issued in Australia during the 
period January 1976 to June 1997.5° Observations were obtained from various 
sources, such as SDC, the Australian Financial Review, Annual Reports of the 
Stock Exchange of Melbourne, the Companies Department Weekly Schedules 
(CDWS) published by the Australian Stock Exchange, and the Corporate Adviser 
IPO database. Details of data sources and collection method for various periods 
are described below. 
4.3.1.1 January 1976 - December 1982 
A list of all IPOs listed between January 1976 and December 1982 is 
obtained from Annual Reports of the Stock Exchange of Melbourne (published 
between 1976 and 1983). Names of issuing companies, total amount of funds 
raised and listing dates for all Australian IPOs listed between July of the previous 
year to June of the current year are collected. Offer prices and the number of 
shares issued are hand collected from various issues of Jobson's Year Book of 
Public Companies of Australia and New Zealand and Jobson's Mining Year Book 
between 1976 and 1983. Other information, such as industry classification and the 
49 I would like to thank Frank Finn (University of Queensland), David Allen (Edith Cowan 
University), especially my supervisors, Tim Brailsford and Richard Heaney, for providing some 
Australian IPO data and information. 
50 While the US IPO data was collected in 1998, the Australian IPO data was collected in 1997. 
Therefore, Australian IPO data between July 1997 and June 1998 is not available in the analysis. 
To be consistent with the sample period for US 1130s, which enables a comparison analysis 
between the Australian and US IPO markets in a later chapter of the thesis, the Australian IPOs 
over the period 1974 -1975 are excluded. 
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Australian Stock Exchange codes is found in the Australian Stock Exchange 
Journal. The closing prices on the first day of trading for the IPOs are obtained 
from Datastream International (DS), the core database of Australian Capital 
Markets Ltd and the Australian Financial Review,51 
4.3.1.2 January 1983- December 1984 
Financial information on all new listings between January 1983 and 
December 1984 is obtained from various issues of CDWS. This weekly 
publication contains information on offer price, number of shares issued, 
underwriter, industry classification, and the Australian Stock Exchange code for 
IPOs listed during the period. The closing price on the first day of trading is 
obtained from DS, the core database of Australian Capital Markets Ltd and the 
Australian Financial Review. The amount of funds raised for each IPO is collected 
from various issues of the Annual Report of the Stock Exchange of Melbourne. 
The observations and their related financial information for the period are 
cross -checked with the relevant issues of Annual Reports obtained from the Stock 
Exchange of Melbourne and the Australian Stock Exchange Journal. 
4.3.1.3 January 1985- December 1992 
Data, in hard copy format (between 1985- 1990), and electronic format 
(between 1991 -1992) are obtained from the Corporate Advisor IPO database. This 
includes comprehensive IPO information on all new listings on the Australian 
51 Three companies have no trading prices on the first day of trading and the subsequent first 
trading month, although bid and ask quotes are available. A similar problem also exists in the US 
WO data (see discussion on Implied Closing Price in Sub -section 4.2.1). To be consistent with the 
approach for the US data, the three companies with implied closing prices (implied from the bid - 
ask spread) are excluded from the construction of the monthly underpricing index but are included 
in the number of offerings and offer sizes for monthly indices. 
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Stock Exchange for the period, such as offer price, amount of funds raised, 
industry classification, closing price for the first day of trading and offer 
description. The information is checked against CDWS, ASX Fact Books and the 
Annual Reports of Stock Exchange. Missing information for some 1POs, such as 
offer price, closing price on the first day of trading, number of shares issued and 
industry classification are completed with reference to DS, the core database of 
Australian Capital Markets Ltd, the Australian Financial Review, and the 
Australian Stock Exchange Journal. 
4.3.1.4 January 1993 -June 1997 
1PO data between January 1993 and June 1997 is collected in electronic 
format from SDC and is checked against various sources, such as ASX Fact Book, 
CDWS, ASX FinData Taxation Pack and the Annual Stock Market Summaries 
published by the Australian Stock Exchange. For observations with incomplete 
information, data are checked against DS, the core database of Australian Capital 
Markets Ltd and the Australian Financial Review. 
4.3.2 Data Collection Issues for Australian IPOs 
Three problems are found in the data collection procedure. First, some 
]POs are offered to investors at various discriminating prices. Further, cross- 
checking of IPOs observed between 1985 and June 1998 revealed that SDC and 
the Corporate Adviser IPO database tend to use the highest discriminating price of 
an IPO as the offer price if a range of IPO prices exist. The highest discriminating 
price is verified to be more closely related to trading prices on the first day of 
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trading and so in order to maintain consistency, offer prices selected for such 
companies are the highest discriminating prices.52 
Second, three IPOs have no offer prices as reported in the CDWS 53 As the 
study of hot issue IPO markets involves the construction of monthly underpricing 
index and offer price is a key component in calculating the initial return for each 
IPO and in calculation of gross proceeds for each individual IPO for Australian 
IPOs, these IPOs are removed from the sample. 
Third, there are some differences in the industry classification systems 
between Australia and the USA. For the purpose of enabling a comparative 
analysis between the two markets, we convert the Australian ASX Industry 
Classification system into US Security Industry Classification system by the 
following method. 
We first investigate industry and operating information of each Australian 
company based on the information provided in the Jobson's Year Book of Public 
Companies of Australia and New Zealand and Jobson's Mining Year Book. Each 
Australian company is then classified into an industry category under the US 
Security Industry Classification system based on their major industry activities. 
The details of converting the Australian ASX Industry Classification system into 
the US Security Industry Classification system are reported in Table 4.13. 
Obviously, some specification problems might exist. For instance, AMP Ltd is 
classified into the Insurance industry, but could also be classified into the 
Investment Banks industry. 
52 Note that this method might potentially bias against underpricing though any bias is expected to 
be small. 
53 These three companies fall in the years 1983 and 1984. 
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Table 4.13: Converting the Australian ASX Industry Classification system 
into the US Security Industry Classification System 
US Security Industry 
Classification System 
Australian ASX Industry 
Classification System 
Agriculture Agriculture, Pastoral, Fishing and Forestry. 
Commercial Banks State Banks and depository institutions. 
Construction Building Construction, Builders, Concrete, Miscellaneous 
Building, and Residential Development 
Healthcare Healthcare 
Insurance Insurance carriers and agents 
Investment Banks Equity Investment, security and commodity brokers 
Leisure Leisure and entertainment 
Manufacturing Alcohol and tobacco, electronic equipment, vintner and 
brewer, building product, can manufacturing, textile, metal 
and metal products, printing and publishing, machinery, 
chemical and plastic products, packaging, wood and 
furniture 
Natural Resources Oil and gas extraction, metal mining, coal mining and 
mineral exploration. 
Other Financial Institutions and 
Banks 
Real estate (or property) investment, other financial 
services, and miscellaneous financial services. 
Other Services Distribution services, video and records services. 
Personal, Business and Repair 
Services 
Miscellaneous industry services, other personal services, 
material supply, computer and office suppliers and 
services, industry services. 
Restaurants and Hotels Accommodation, resorts and restaurants. 
Retails Retail 
Savings and Loans, Mutual Savings 
Banks 
Building societies 
Telecommunication Telephone and television 
Transportation Transportation 
Wholesales Wholesale trade 
Note: The table is only a general structure. The conversion of industry classification for Australian 
companies is investigated individua ly based on the industry and operating information of the 
companies provided in the Jobson's Year Book Of Public Companies Of Australia and New 
Zealand and Jobson's Mining Year Book for the period. 
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4.3.3 Final Australian IPO Sample 
To ensure that only `pure' common stock IPOs are included in the sample, 
the following criteria are employed: 
a) The IPO must be a common stock IPO; issues involving debt, hybrid securities 
and derivatives are excluded 
b) The IPO must be issued by an Australian -based company 
c) Closed -end Mutual Funds, Investment Trusts and Real Estate Investment 
Trusts (REITs) are excluded due to their unique institutional set -up (see How 
and Low 1993) 
d) Stock issues with embedded convertible notes, warrants, options or other 
financial instruments are excluded54 
e) Companies formed through a Scheme of Arrangement are excluded due to the 
fact that a Scheme of Arrangement would normally result in a change of name 
and/or capital restructure of an existing listed company (How and Low 1993) 
f) Companies transferred from the Second Board to the Main Board are excluded 
due to the reason that they are not unseasoned IPOs in the true sense as their 
stock has already been publicly listed .55 
The above criteria are equivalent to those imposed on the US sample to 
ensure that the final samples for the two markets are consistent. This facilitates a 
comparison between the two markets. 
54 There is no generic term for this kind of issue in Australia though they are equivalent to `unit 
offerings' in the USA (details of unit offerings in the USA and the reasons for removing unit 
offerings are discussed in Section 4.2). 
55 The `Second Board' market was first introduced in Australia in the early 1980s due to a growing 
recognition of the need to encourage smaller and less mature companies to list their shares through 
a `Second Board' market. The listing requirements of this board were less stringent than those 
companies listed on the Main Board. The Second Board market disappeared after the introduction 
of the Stock Exchange Automated Trading System (SEATS) at the beginning of October 1990. 
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The final sample consists of 766 IPOs. The summary statistics of the 
sample are presented in the next sub -section. 
4.3.4 Descriptive Statistics 
4.3.4.1 By Year 
Summarised results for IPOs classified by year are reported in Table 4.14. 
This table shows that the average initial return per year ranges from -3.52% in 
1990 to 92.31% in 1994. The average initial return across all years is 37.09 %. The 
average initial return appears to be quite volatile across the sample period with a 
weak cyclical trend. 
The average initial return is higher than the reported average initial return 
of 11.9% in Lee et al. (1996a) and 29.2% in Finn and Higham (1988)56 who both 
use Australian Industrial WO data between 1976 -1989 and 1966 -1978, 
respectively. As their studies both focus on industrial IPOs, a cautious comparison 
needs to be made.57 Further, Lee et al. (1996a) have a sample size of 266 
Australian IPOs and Finn and Higham (1988) use 93 IPOs compared to the much 
larger sample of 766 IPOs used here. Our sample period is longer and substantially 
larger than both Finn and Higham (1988) and Lee et al. (1996a). 
55 It should be noted that the average initial return used in Finn and Higham (1988) was adjusted 
for market return. 
57 Some Australian natural resources companies show extremely high initial returns. For instance, 
the shares of Forrestania Gold company issued on 18 June 1987 reported an initial return of 
1,120%. 
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Table 4.14: Summarised Results for Australian IPOs Classified by Year 
Year No of 
Offerings 
Average Initial 
Return per Year 
Gross Proceeds 
per Year 
(A$ mil.) 
Average Proceeds 
per Year 
(A$ mil.) 
1976 9 0.6731 87.6 9.7 
1977 5 0.3379 34.0 6.8 
1978 2 0.7000 15.0 7.5 
1979 10 0.2935 56.1 5.6 
1980 21 0.8733 145.9 7.0 
1981 25 0.1637 312.6 12.5 
1982 10 0.1431 486.7 48.7 
1983 19 0.4966 73.9 3.9 
1984 39 0.1772 323.8 8.3 
1985 62 0.2684 564.4 9.1 
1986 94 0.2799 1,029.4 11.0 
1987 160 0.4092 2,520.9 15.8 
1988 21 0.6196 328.4 15.6 
1989 19 0.1723 393.2 20.7 
1990 7 -0.0352 140.0 19.9 
1991 10 0.0043 2,233.8 223.4 
1992 33 0.0708 3,265.4 99.0 
1993 62 0.2345 4,809.2 77.6 
1994 70 0.9231 5,105.2 72.9 
1995 20 0.1739 3,491.7 174.6 
1996 42 0.1874 1,584.0 37.7 
1997 26 0.5689 871.0 33.5 
Overall 766 0.3709 27,871.9 36.4 
Notes: 
1. The figures for 1997 are only for half the year. 
2. Average initial return is calculated as the return of the closing price on the first day of 
trading from the offer price averaged across IPOs. 
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The number of IPOs peaks in the mid -1980s (especially in 1986 and 1987). 
It then steps into decline with number of offerings falling gradually following the 
stock market crash of October 1987 and does not recover until 1992. 
Gross proceeds per year increase sharply from A$140.0 million in 1990 to 
A$2,233.8 million in 1991 arising from an increased offer size during the period 
as indicated in the average proceeds per year.58 
4.3.4.2 By Industry 
Table 4.15 summarises the results for all the Australian IPOs by industry.59 
An important feature in the industry distribution of new issues is the relatively 
large proportion of offerings in the Natural Resources industry. There are a total of 
244 natural resources companies in the sample (31.85% of the sample) with an 
average initial return of 46.46% and an average offer size of A$18.7 million. 
However, for the US sample, there are only 181 natural resource IPOs which 
comprise 2.7% of the full sample (see Table 4.2). Further, US natural resource 
IPOs exhibit an average initial return of 16.56% which is significantly lower than 
their Australian counterparts. 
The Savings and Loans industry in Australia shows the highest initial 
return of 147.52% with the Transportation industry having the lowest initial return 
of 6.25 %. In contrast, the US Savings and Loans industry shows an average initial 
58 The figures can he distorted by very large issues such as the Commonwealth Bank issue in 1991. 
59 Recall that the US industry classification scheme is used. 
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return of only 6.5% which is below the average initial return of the full US 
sample. 
Table 4.15: Summarised Results for Australian IPOs Classified by US 
Industry Classification 
No. of 
Offerings 
% of 
Total 
IPOs 
Average Initial 
Return per 
Industry 
Gross 
Proceeds per 
Industry 
(A$ mil.) 
Average 
Proceeds 
per Industry 
(A$ mil.) 
Agriculture 10 1.31% 0.1338 251.9 25.2 
Commercial Banks 9 1.17% 0.4260 2,286.0 254.0 
Construction 27 3.52% 0.2151 935.8 34.7 
Healthcare 8 1.04% 0.1228 345.1 43.1 
Insurance 8 1.04% 0.0856 1,909.0 238.4 
Investment Banks 27 3.52% 0.0649 742.2 27.4 
Leisure 15 1.96% 0.2261 2,035.4 135.7 
Manufacturing 190 24.80% 0.5783 4,654.3 24.5 
Natural Resources 244 31.85% 0.4646 4,572.4 18.7 
Other Financial Institutions 
and Banks 
56 7.31% 0.1842 1,375.9 23.7 
Other Services 17 2.22% 0.2661 344.5 20.3 
Personal, Business and 95 12.40% 0.2096 1,361.4 13.9 
Repair Services 
Restaurants and Hotels 8 1.04% 0.2400 41.8 8.4 
Retails 18 2.35% 0.0684 3,598.1 199.9 
Savings and Loans 5 0.65% 1.4752 44.7 8.9 
Telecommunication 11 1.44% 0.3098 886.2 80.6 
Transportation 12 1.57% 0.0625 1,970.9 164.2 
Wholesales 8 1.04% 0.3108 640.4 80.1 
Overall 766 100.00% 0.3709 27,871.9 36.4 
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4.3.5 Issues Related to Resource Sector IPOs in Australia 
Australia is recognised as a major source of natural resources and the stock 
exchange traditionally has contained a relatively large proportion of resource 
sector stocks compared to other exchanges. For instance, resource sector listings 
averaged 31% as a proportion of listed stocks over the period 1974 -93 peaking at 
41% in 1991 (see Table 4.16). 
Ritter (1984b) argues that the 1980 hot issue markets in the USA arose 
from issues for Natural Resources and suggests that Natural Resources companies 
drive hot markets when natural resources firm values are high. How (1996) also 
argues that there is a differential behaviour in the resource sector IPOs in 
comparison with industrial sector IPOs. Therefore, the contentious nature of 
industry distributions between Australia and the USA provides an excellent base 
for further examination of the possible causes of hot issue markets. More 
importantly, the influence of resource sector IPOs in the WO activity can he 
analysed using Australian data. 
Given arguments concerning the potential differential behaviour and nature 
of the resource sector (How 1996; Ritter 1984b), the analysis of cyclical behaviour 
in the Australian WO market (which appears later in this thesis) involves separate 
consideration of the industrial and resource sectors of the market. 
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Table 4.16: Distribution of Companies on the Official List of the Australian 
Stock Exchange 
Year Industrial Mining Total Listings Mining as % of 
Total Listings 
June 74 1,054 318 1,372 23.18% 
June 75 1,024 302 1,326 22.78% 
June 76 968 260 1,228 21.17% 
June 77 920 239 1,159 20.62% 
June 78 868 225 1,093 20.59% 
June 79 797 226 1,023 22.09% 
June 80 762 236 998 23.65% 
June 81 689 285 974 29.26% 
June 82 650 291 941 30.92% 
June 83 604 297 901 32.96% 
June 84 595 319 914 34.90% 
June 85 610 359 969 37.05% 
June 86 682 382 1,064 35.90% 
June 87 868 475 1,343 35.37% 
June 88 917 549 1,466 37.45% 
June 89 811 506 1,317 38.42% 
June 90 687 460 1,147 40.10% 
June 91 597 415 1,012 41.01% 
June 92 699 381 1,080 35.28% 
June 93 703 407 1,110 36.67% 
Data Source: Annual Reports of Stock Exchange of Melbourne (1974 -1988) and The 
Australian Stock Exchange yearbook 1994 (1989- 1993). 
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4.4 Sununary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, IPO data sources and collection method are reported. 
Descriptive analysis of the Australian and US IPO data is also presented. The 
analysis in this chapter suggests that the US companies with implied closing prices 
and with missing price information have relatively small offer sizes with most of 
them in the industries of Personal, Business and Repair Service and 
Manufacturing. There is a significant difference in underpricing between unit and 
stock offerings in the USA, although the results obtained from parametric tests are 
somewhat mixed. There is support for the decision to eliminate unit offerings from 
the sample. 
The Australian new issue market exhibits a relatively high initial return, on 
average, relative to the US WO market. Moreover, the average initial return per 
year appears to be quite volatile when compared to the US results. Natural 
Resources companies in Australia form a relatively large proportion of total IPO 
issuance in the sample period and this is an important feature of the Australian 
IPO market. They are characterised by relatively higher initial returns and smaller 
offer sizes compared with IPOs in other industries. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
MEASURING IPO ACTIVITY 
5.1 Introduction 
In this thesis, I focus on the aggregate IPO market to examine the cycles in 
both Australian and the US IPO activities. An aim is to examine the existence of 
cycles in the IPO activity using a long time -series and to analyse the relationships 
between various indicator variables during these periods. Therefore, measures of 
WO activity are necessary. 
In the literature, the level of WO activity has been generally examined 
through two broad measures being volume and underpricing of IPOs. Consistent 
with these traditional measures, four measures of IPO activity are developed in 
this chapter which capture both volume and underpricing aspects of the market. A 
time series of IPO issues from 1976 to June 1997 for Australia and from 1976 to 
June 1999 for the USA are constructed for analysis. The construction of these 
measures and their summary statistics are discussed in this chapter. 
5.2 Measures of IPO Activity 
A hot issue IPO market is generally characterised by an unusually high 
volume of new offerings, severe underpricing, and frequent oversubscription of 
offerings (Ritter 1998; Helwege and Liang 1996a). As noted above, the level of 
WO activity has traditionally been viewed in terms of two measures - a volume 
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measure such as the number of new issues (Loughran et al. 1994; Ritter 1984b) 
and a pricing measure such as the average level of underpricing (Ibbotson and 
Jaffe 1975; Ritter 19846). Consistent with these measures, we develop four 
variables that measure these aspects of IPO activity. Two of the variables measure 
volume while the other two measure underpricing. Each variable is measured on a 
monthly basis.6° 
5.2.1 Volume Measures 
NOIPO is measured as the number of offerings in a month divided by total 
number of IPOs over the sample period expressed as a percentage. Hence it seeks 
to measure the relative number of issues in each month. It is the simplest measure 
and is consistent with previous literature that has examined the number of IPOs 
(e.g. Ibbotson et al. 1994; Loughran et al. 1994). NOIPO is represented as:61 
where 
NOIPOt = N` *100 
Er-1 N, 
(1) 
Nt= the number of IPOs in month t; 
t = month 1,2, ..., T where T =270 for US IPOs and is 258 for Australian 
IPOs. 
GP is measured as the sum of individual issue proceeds in each month 
(adjusted for inflation) divided by total proceeds (adjusted for inflation) of all 
6° This is the shortest sampling interval to which data can be feasibly disaggregated. 
61 Since the IPO underpricing measures defined later are expressed as a percentage, NOIPO and GP 
are thus scaled by the total number of offerings and total proceeds during the period in order to 
maintain the consistency in the measures. 
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IPOs in the sample period expressed as a percentage.62 This measure is also a 
relative measure and captures the monthly variation in total size of the issues. The 
measure is expressed as: 
where 
, ( proceeds) t GP 
E , E N, ( proceeds) , (2) 
i = company 1, 2, ..., N where N is the number of IPOs in month t; 
(proceeds);,,= [(number of shares issued);,, * (inflation adjusted offer price) 
Li I. 
5.2.2 Underpricing Measures 
VWUP is a measure of underpricing weighted by the relative size of the 
offer in each month. Hence, large underpricing observed in small companies in a 
particular month will not significantly affect this measure. Measures of 
underpricing have been criticised as they can be subject to too much influence by 
'penny' stocks (Ibbotson and Ritter 1995). Indeed, the hot market of 1980 has been 
ascribed to small natural resource issues (Ritter 1984b). However our measure 
avoids this criticism by accounting for differences in firm /issue size within the 
month 63 VWUP is calculated as follows: 
52 The inflation adjustment is performed as the level of IPO activity divided by an inflation index, 
where the inflation index is measured each month using January 1976 as the base month. The US 
inflation rate data are obtained from the Federal Reserve Bank of St Louis while the Australian 
inflation rate data are obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics. 
63 A monthly index of equal weighted underpricing is also constructed. This index is highly 
correlated with the value weighted underpricing index for both Australian and US IPO data (e.g. a 
correlation of 0.895 is observed using US IPOs). 
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where 
VWUP -EN (proceeds), f x (IPO Underpricing),,, x100 (3) E) 
E., (proceeds) 
(IPO Underpricing);,, = [(closing price on first day trading) ;,, - (offer price) 
i,t] / (offer price);,, 
The other underpricing measure, VUP, is also a value -weighted measure F4 
However, this measure standardises by the total value of underpricing across the 
sample whereas VWUP standardises by size within each month. VUP represents 
the proportion of total value generated through underpricing across the sample 
realised in each month and is defined as: 
VUP = 
E (proceeds); x (IPO Underpricing);,, 
x100 (4) 
T N (proceeds) x (IPO Underpricing),,, 
5.3 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics of the IPO activity measures for both the Australian and 
US samples are reported in this section. 
5.3.I US IPOs 
5.3.1.1 Summary Statistics 
Summary statistics on the four US WO activity measures are reported in 
Table 5.1. The relative number of IPOs (NOIPO) has a mean value of 0.37% and a 
64 An inflation adjustment is also applied on VUP. 
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standard deviation of 0.30 %. The monthly NOIPO ranges from a low of zero (i.e. 
no issues) to a monthly high of 1.36 %. Similarly, the relative proportion of gross 
proceeds (GP) ranges from zero to 2.11% with a mean of 0.37% and a standard 
deviation of 0.40 %. 
Table 5.1: Summary Statistics of Measures of US IPO Activity 
1976 -June 1998 
NOIPO GP VWUP VUP 
Mean 0.370 0.370 8.667 0.370 
Standard Deviation 0.301 0.402 9.422 0.609 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -15.556 -0.206 
Maximum 1.357 2.113 70.383 4.803 
Dickey - Fuller Test Statistic -2.88* -2.87* -6.44* -3.39* 
Autocorrelation 
Lag 1 0.802* 0.728* 0.517* 0.757* 
Lag 2 0.727* 0.608* 0.370* 0.559* 
Lag 3 0.692* 0.573* 0.142* 0.543* 
Lag 4 0.662* 0.581* 0.089* 0.544* 
Lag 5 0.606* 0.575* 0.080* 0.594* 
Lag 6 0.553* 0.602* 0.133* 0.567* 
Notes: 
1. GP and VUP are adjusted for inflation. 
2. * denotes significance at 5% level. 
3. Note the means for NOIPO, GP and VUP are a proportional function over the sample period. 
The underpricing figures exhibit greater volatility, as expected. The 
average VWUP per month is 8.67 %. Hence, as expected, larger issues are less 
underpriced, as evidenced by this figure which is lower than the simple sample 
average of 10.19% (See Table 4.1 in Chapter 4). Monthly VWUP ranges from an 
underpricing of 70.38% to an overpricing of 15.56 %. The standard deviation of 
VUP is 0.61% with a range between -0.21% to 4.80 %. 
Autocorrelation tests up to 6 lags identify strong statistically significant 
correlation for all the US IPO activity measures. The first -order autocorrelation for 
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NOIPO is 0.80 and is 0.52 for VW UP. These results are quite consistent with prior 
research which has demonstrated persistence in these series (Ibbotson et al. 1994; 
Ritter 1998). For instance, Ibbotson et al. (1994) observe a first -order 
autocorrelation of 0.88 for the monthly number of new issues and 0.62 for the 
monthly equally- weighted initial return. 
5.3.1.2 Stationarity Issue 
Since a Markov regime switching technique is applied in the later chapters 
to detect hot and cold issue periods in the series, the stationarity of each series is 
an important requirement for application of the technique (Hamilton 1994). If a 
series is non -stationary, it is often necessary to transform the series into a 
stationary process (e.g. first differencing) for analysis. Generally, the stationarity 
of a series can be checked by finding out if the series contains a unit root and a 
popular test is the Dickey- Fuller test. Hence, each WO activity measure is 
examined for stationarity using the Dickey -Fuller test. 
In the sixth row of Table 5.1, test statistics from the Dickey -Fuller test for 
stationarity are presented and these results suggest that the four series are all 
stationary. 
5.3.1.3 Graphical Presentations of the Series 
Figures 5.1 to 5.4 present graphs of the four measures of IPO activity. In 
Figure 5.1, NOIPO shows a clear pattern of hot and cold periods prior to 1991 
with spikes around 1981, 1984, 1987 and around 1997. It appears that the series is 
generally in a cold issue period between 1975 -1980. The first hot issue period 
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starts around 1980 and ends in 1982. Between 1988 and 1990, the series appears to 
be in a cold period which indicates the adverse impact of the 1987 market crash. 
The NOIPO becomes more volatile after 1991 but appears to be in a hot state over 
this period. 
Figure 5.1: NOIPO during the period of 1976 and June 1998 in the USA 
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Figure 5.2 shows that the GP series follows a similar pattern to that of the 
NOIPO series, especially after 1986. Between 1976 and 1980, GP exhibits a 
relative stable pattern and appears to be in a cold state. However, the series 
becomes more volatile after 1980. Of note is the period 1980 -81 which is 
generally much smaller in magnitude than NOIPO. While GP takes into account 
the size of offering and NOIPO does not, this observation supports Ritter's (1984b) 
conjecture that this period around 1980 was driven by a relatively large number of 
small issues. 
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Figure 5.2: GP during the period of 1976 and June 1998 in the USA 
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In Figure 5.3, VWUP exhibits a relatively volatile pattern over the whole 
period and no clear hot and cold periods are easily identified. It appears that 
VWUP is generally large in magnitude prior to 1984 and becomes less volatile 
after 1985. Several negative spikes are observed, particularly in 1978 and 1986. 
Monthly VWUP are generally all positive after 1987. 
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In Figure 5.4, the pattern of VUP is more consistent with the volume 
measures than VWUP. The series exhibits some small spikes around 1983 and 
1987 and then reaches a high but relatively stable level throughout the 1990s with 
some large values around 1996. Underpricing in the period of 1980 -81 is now 
quite small in magnitude once the relative weighting over the entire sample is 
taken. Again this is consistent with that period around 1980 being driven by 
relatively small issues. As the VWUP measure weights within each month, large 
measures of underpricing are possible if there are either a few very large issues 
that are substantially underpriced or, alternatively, there are many small issues that 
are generally all underpriced. It appears that the latter phenomenon occurred in 
1980 -81. Of note, while VUP is broadly similar to the volume series, spikes in this 
series appear to lead spikes in the volume series by up to a year. 
Figure 5.4: VLP during the period of 1976 and June 1998 in the USA 
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The two underpricing series in Figures 5.3 and 5.4 reveal some interesting 
features. First, casual observation shows that neither of the underpricing series 
tracks the volume measures in Figures 5.1 and 5.2 particularly well. Hence there 
appears to be a difference in behaviour between volume and underpricing. Second, 
the two underpricing series themselves exhibit differences. Figure 5.3 plots the 
VUWP series and reveals large spikes around 1979, 1980, 1981, 1983 and 
generally a high Ievel of underpricing from around 1989 onward. The spikes 
around 1980 -81 may be surprising, but can be explained because this measure 
weights by the relative size of the issue within each month. 
5.3.2 Australian IPOs 
As stated in Chapter four, the Australian stock exchange traditionally has 
contained a relatively large proportion of resource sector stocks compared to other 
exchanges. Therefore, the Australian market provides an opportunity for an 
examination of the difference in behaviour between industrial and resource sector 
IPOs. Hence, the analysis of the cyclical behaviour in the Australian IPO market 
involves separate considerations of the industrial and resource sectors of the 
market. In addition to the measures of IPO activity for the full sample, the IPO 
activity measures are also constructed by separating industrial IPOs and resource 
sector IPOs. Summary statistics on the four measures for the full sample, industrial 
and resource sector IPOs are reported in Tables 5.2, 5.3 and 5.4, respectively. 
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5.3.2.1 Full Australian Sample 
Table 5.2 reports the summary of each measure for all Australian IPOs. 
While the proportion of the number of IPOs per month ranges from a low of zero 
to a monthly high of 3.00 %, the relative proportion of gross proceeds ranges from 
zero to 8.51 %. Standard deviations for NOIPO and GP are 0.51% and 0.87 %, 
respectively. These figures are higher than in the US market which implies that the 
volume measures in Australia are more volatile. 
With a mean value of 21.97% and a standard deviation of 50.86 %, VWUP 
ranges from an overpricing of 82.00% to an underpricing of 541.64% per month. 
VUP appears to be less volatile than VWUP as indicated by its standard deviation 
(1.17 %) and its range (- 0.43% and 9.97 %). 
Table 5.2: Summary Statistics of Australian IPO Activity 
Jan 1976 - June 1997 
NOIPO GP VWUP VUP 
Mean 0.388 0.388 21.974 0.388 
Standard Deviation 0.505 0.874 50.855 I.169 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -82.000 -0.425 
Maximum 3.003 8.507 541.636 9.969 
Dickey -Fuller Test Statistic -3.633* -5.089* -7.684* -7.620* 
Auto correlation 
Lag 1 0.760* 0.238* -0.075 0.048 
Lag 2 0.662* 0.176* -0.003 0.030 
Lag 3 0.584* 0.192* 0.055 0.028 
Lag 4 0.529* 0.246* -0.013 -0.011 
Lag5 0.481* 0.114* 0.014 0.064 
Lag 6 0.462* 0.053* 0.050 -0.011 
1. GP and VUP are adjusted for inflation. 
2. Due to insufficient information, there are two missing values in both VUP and VWUP and one 
missing value in GP. 
3. * denotes significance at 5% level. 
4. Note the means for NOIPO, GP and VUP are a proportional function over the sample period. 
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Of note, the ranges for all measures are greater in Australia than in the 
USA which suggests that the Australian IPO market is more volatile than the US 
market. In Table 5.2, test statistics from the Dickey -Fuller test suggest that all four 
series are stationary. 
By checking the autocorrelation tests for all the series, it appears that 
statistically significant correlation is only observed in the IPO volume measures. 
Compared with the US IPO volume measures, the autocorrelations in the 
Australian NOIPO are similar to that of the US, while the autocorrelations in 
Australian GP are much lower though they are statistically significant. Of note, the 
autocorrelations of both the IPO underpricing measures reveal mixed signs. For 
instance, the first, second and fourth lags of VWUP are negative while the rest of 
lags of VWUP are positive. This suggests that the behaviour of aggregate IPO 
underpricing measures in Australia differs. This may be due to the relatively large 
proportion of resource sector IPOs in Australian new issues. 
Figures 5.5 to 5.8 present graphs of the four measures of Australian IPO 
activity over the period 1976 to June 1997. In Figure 5.5, NOIPO shows a clear 
pattern of hot and cold periods in the periods around 1985 -1987 and 1993 -1995 
though other hot and cold periods cannot be clearly identified for the rest of 
period. Compared with Figure 5.1, NOIPO in Australia appears to exhibit some 
correlation with NOIPO in the USA, especially in the periods around 1985 -1987 
and 1993 -1995. 
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Figure 5.5: NOIPO during the period of 1976 and June 1997 in Australia 
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Figure 5.6 shows GP is generally small in amplitude prior to 1991 and 
becomes more volatile with some extremely large spikes after 1991. This may be 
explained by government privatisation of some Iarge public institutions during the 
period, such as the Commonwealth Bank and Qantas. Compared with Figure 5.5, 
GP shows a weak correlation in pattern to that of NOIPO. Compared with GP in 
the USA (see Figure 5.2), Australian GP shows a similar cold issue period prior to 
1980 and a similar hot issue period between 1991 and 1995 with slight deviations. 
Figure 5.6: GP during the period of 1976 and June 1997 in Australia 
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Figure 5.7 plots the VUWP series which reveals an extremely large spike 
in October 1988. While it is quite volatile prior to 1990, VWUP shows a relatively 
stable pattern with a few large spikes after 1990. This is an interesting difference 
in patterns when compared with the volume measures of NOIPO in Figure 5.5 and 
GP in Figure 5.6. 
Figure 5.7: VWUP during the period of 1976 and June 1997 in 
Australia 
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From Figure 5.8, the VUP series exhibits a relatively stable pattern except 
for some short -lived large spikes across the period. The implication is that the 
expected duration of hot issue periods in VUP is unlikely to be long. The series 
appears to be more consistent with the patterns observed in GP (although the 
amplitudes are somewhat different), especially for the period 1992 to June 1997. 
This implies a potential relationship between volume and underpricing measures 
in Australian IPO activity. 
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 Figure 5.8: VUP during the period of 1976 and June 1997 in Australia 
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Since the analysis of the cyclical behaviour in the Australian IPO market 
involves separate considerations of the industrial and resource sectors of the 
market, a brief comparison of resource and industrial sector IPOs in Australia is 
presented in Table 5.3.65 
Table 5.3: Comparison of Industrial and Resource Sector IPOs in Australia 
Average Gross Average No. of % of Total 
Initial Proceeds Proceeds Offerings IPOs 
Return (A$ mil.) (A$ mil.) 
Industrial Sector IPOs 0.2333 23,424 44 522 68.15% 
Resource Sector IPOs 0.4646 4,572 19 244 31.85% 
Overall 0.3709 27,872 36 766 100% 
There are a total of 244 new issues in the resource sector over the sample 
which represents 31.85% of all IPOs. While the average initial return for industrial 
sector IPOs is 23.33 %, the average initial return for resource sector IPOs is almost 
65 Further detail of the industry break -up of the sample can be found in Chapter 4 (see Table 4.15). 
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double with a value of 46.46 %. In relation to the average offer size, the figure is 
A$19 million for resource sector IPOs compared to a larger figure of A$44 million 
for industrial sector IPOs. The descriptive results support the earlier argument that 
there are potentially important differences between industrial and resource sector 
IPOs. Therefore, in the following sub -sections, the different features between 
resource and industrial sector IPOs are explored in more detail. 
5.3.2.2 Industrial Sector IPOs in Australia 
Table 5.4 reports the summary of each measure for industrial sector IPOs. 
The relative number of IPOs (NOIPO) ranges from a Iow of zero to a monthly 
high of 3.26 %. While the minimum value is zero, the maximum value of GP is 
10.34 %. Compared with the full sample of Australian IPOs, NOTPO in the 
industrial sector shows quite similar results while GP in the industrial sector 
appears to be more volatile as indicated by its range and standard deviation. 
The mean value of VWUP is 15.92% with a standard deviation of 34.92 %. 
While VWUP ranges from an overpricing of 66.00% to an underpricing of 
277.55 %, the range for VUP is between -0.30% to 11.03 %. Of note, VWUP 
exhibits a lower mean value (15.92 %) and standard deviation (34.92 %) compared 
to the full sample. The implication is that industrial sector IPOs exhibit lower 
underpricing than resource sector IPOs. 
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Table 5.4: Summary Statistics of IPO Activity in the Australian Industrial 
Sector 
January 1976 - June 1997 
NOIPO GP VWUP VUP 
Mean 0.388 0.389 15.916 0.391 
Standard Deviation 0.544 1.033 34.916 1.078 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -66.000 -0.295 
Maximum 3.263 10.344 277.548 11.029 
Dickey -Fuller Test Statistic -3.553* -5.265* -6.695* -6.636* 
Autocorrelation 
Lag 1 0.683* 0.216* 0.265* 0.054 
Lag 2 0.622* 0.153* 0.076* 0.057 
Lag 3 0.561* 0.154* 0.047* 0.024 
Lag4 0.514* 0.236* 0.071* 0.030 
Lag 5 0.486* 0.122* 0.052* -0.032 
Lag 6 0.502* 0.061* 0.080* 0.031 
Note: 
I. GP and VUP are adjusted for inflation. 
2. Due to insufficient information, there is one missing value in GP, two in VUP and three in 
VWUP. 
3. * denotes significance at 5% level. 
4. Note the means for NOTPO.. GP and VUP are a proportional function over the sample period. 
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Compared to the autocorrelation results obtained for the Australian full 
sample, the industrial sector IPOs now exhibit significantly positive correlations 
for VWUP in addition to NOIPO and GP. The first -order autocorrelation in 
VWUP is 0.27 and is much higher than other high -order autocorrelations which 
are generally less than 0.08. This confirms that resource sector IPOs have a 
significant influence on the full sample underpricing measures. Of note, 
autocorrelation tests exhibit no significant correlation for VUP of the industrial 
sector IPOs which is consistent with the results obtained in the full sample. 
The results of the Dickey -Fuller test are presented in the sixth row of Table 
5.4 and they suggest that all measures are stationary. 
Figures 5.9 to 5.12 present graphs of the four measures of Australian 
industrial sector IPO activity during the period 1976 to June 1997. Both volume 
measures exhibit a consistent pattern with the corresponding volume measures in 
the full sample (see Figures 5.9 and 5.10). For instance, industrial IPOs exhibit a 
peak in NOIPO between 1985 -1987 and this is consistent with the pattern in the 
NOIPO of the full sample. However, the underpricing series in Figures 5.11 and 
5.12 show little correlation with the underpricing measures in the full sample. 
Compared with the full sample, the pattern of VWUP for industrial sector 
IPOs is quite different in the 1990s. Despite some variability in the amplitudes, the 
VUP of industrial IPOs is more consistent with the full sample, especially in the 
period 1992 to June 1997. 
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Figure 5.9: NOIPO of the Australian Industrial Sector IPOs 
during the period of 1976 and June 1997 
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Figure 5.10: GP of the Australian Industrial Sector IPOs 
during the period of 1976 and June 1997 
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Figure 5.12: VUP of the Australian Industrial Sector IPOs 
during the period of 1976 and June 1997 
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5.3.2.3 Resource Sector IPOs in Australia 
Summary statistics of each measure for Australian resource sector IPOs are 
reported in Table 5.5. The VWLP measure for resource sector IPOs appears to be 
more volatile than its industrial counterpart as reflected in the standard deviation 
of VWUP. The mean value of VWUP is 13.51% which is much lower than the 
mean values of VWUP in the full sample and industrial sector IPOs. This can be 
explained by the Iower frequency of resource issues in the market. For the period 
1976 to June 1997, there were 138 weeks (out of 258 weeks) that experienced no 
natural resource new issues. In this study, the initial return is assumed to be zero if 
there are no new issues for that month. Therefore, the mean VWUP presented in 
Table 5.5 is underestimated due to the presence of a large number of zeros. By 
excluding those months with no resource issues, the average VWUP rises to 
29.53 %. This supports our argument above that resource IPOs are more 
underpriced than their industrial counterparts. Such a feature in resource sector 
IPOs may be explained by the high uncertainty involved in the value of resource 
IPOs as suggested by Ritter (19846). 
Compared with Table 5.4, which documents the industrial IPO sample, the 
ranges of the two underpricing measures are larger in the resource sector which 
suggests that resource sector IPOs are more volatile. For instance, the VWUP 
ranges from an overpricing of 82.00% to an underpricing of 700.00% in the 
resource sector while the range of VWUP is between overpricing of 66% and 
underpricing of 277.55% in the industrial sector. 
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Table 5 5 Summary Statistics of IPO Activity in the Australian Resource 
Sector 
January 1976 - June 1997 
NOIPO GP VWUP VUP 
Mean 0.388 0.388 13.513 0.388 
Standard Deviation 0.605 1.173 57.436 2.155 
Minimum 0.000 0.000 -82.000 -2.077 
Maximum 3.279 9.749 700.000 24.970 
Dickey -Fuller Test Statistic -4.407* -7.047* -7.629* -8.169* 
Autocorrelation 
Lag 1 0.576* 0.063 -0.017 0.004 
Lag 2 0.430* 0.020 0.015 -0.002 
Lag 3 0.392* 0.001 0.028 -0.005 
Lag4 0.355* 0.078 0.009 -0.030 
Lag 5 0.355* 0.081 0.092 0.045 
Lag 6 0.255* 0.013 0.010 -0.017 
Note: 
1. GP and VUP are adjusted for inflation. 
2. There were 138 weeks (out of 258 weeks) that had no new issue in the Resource Sector. In this 
study, the initial return for the month is assumed to be zero if there is no IPO for the month. By 
excluding the months that had no IPO, the mean value of VWUP is 29.53 %. 
3. * Denotes significance at 5% level. 
4. Note the means for NOIPO, GP and VUP are a proportional function over the sample period. 
The autocorrelation results for all series reveal interesting results. Only 
NOIPO exhibits significant correlations while all others are insignificant. This 
implies that apart from the number of resource IPOs, the other series appear to be 
random and unpredictable. 
Graphs of the four measures of IPO activity in resource sector IPOs are 
presented in Figures 5.13 to 5.16. Compared with the full sample and industrial 
sector TPOs, the two volume measures exhibit generally consistent patterns (see 
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Figures 5.13 and 5.14). This suggests that volume in both industrial and resource 
issues follow a general trend. However, the patterns of the two underpricing 
measures in resource sector IPOs appear to have little correlation with the patterns 
observed in either the full sample or the industrial sector. For instance, large 
spikes in VUP between 1992 -1997 for both full sample and industrial sector IPOs 
are not found in the VUP of resource sector IPOs. Also, the period between 1977- 
1978 appears to be in a hot state for both full sample and industrial IPOs while the 
period appears to be in a cold state for resource sector IPOs (see Figures 5.15 and 
5.16). 
Several implications follow. First, the volume in both the industrial and 
resource sectors appears to follow a similar general trend. This is supported by the 
visual evidence that the patterns observed in the volume measures for both 
industrial and resource sector IPOs are consistent with the full sample and also 
generally consistent with each other. Second, the degree of underpricing in 
resource sector IPOs appears to be less stable as evidenced by a lower persistence 
in spikes of VUP. Moreover, the degree of underpricing is larger in resource sector 
IPOs. 
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Figure 5.13: NOIPO of the Australian Resource Sector IPOs 
during the period of 1976 and June 1997 
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Figure 5.14: GP of the Australian Resource Sector IPOs 
during the period of 1976 and June 1997 
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Figure 5.15: VWUP of the Australian Resource Sector IPOs 
during the period of 1976 and June 1997 
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Figure 5.16: VUP of the Australian Resource Sector IPOs 
during the period of 1976 and June 1997 
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5.4 Summary 
In this chapter, the construction of four measures of IPO activity has been 
described. Summary statistics for each measure for both Australian and US IPOs 
were presented and discussed. In the USA, the two volume series appear to exhibit 
a similar pattern to each other. Although there are differences in the behaviour 
between volume and underpricing series, spikes in the underpricing series appear 
to lead spikes in the volume series by up to a year. 
The Australian market appears to be more volatile in both underpricing and 
volume across time, especially underpricing. By separately considering the 
industrial and resource sectors in Australia, underpricing in resource sector IPOs 
appears to be larger and less persistent. Consistent with the US results, the plots of 
Australian IPO activity measures suggest a potential lead -lag relationship between 
the volume and underpricing measures. 
The ranges for all measures are greater in Australia than in the USA which 
suggests that the Australian IPO market is more volatile than the US market. Also, 
there appears to be some correlation in the corresponding volume measures 
between Australia and the USA. 
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CHAPTER SIX66 
HOT AND COLD IPO MARKETS: US EVIDENCE 
6.1 Introduction 
As argued earlier in Chapter three, there is mounting evidence to support the 
existence of hot IPO markets. However, the existing evidence is generally based on 
descriptive ex -post analysis. The questions of how frequent the hot issue markets are, 
what features are associated with these markets and dating when they occur, remain to 
be answered. 
In this chapter, I focus on hot and cold IPO markets in the USA. The aim is to 
document the existence of hot and cold markets in the USA using a long time -series 
of IPO data and to examine the relationships between various IPO activity variables 
during these cycles. I identify turning points in IPO activity using both visual analysis 
and a dating algorithm developed by Bry and Boschan (1971). A regime -switching 
model is then fitted to allow for more precise identification of episodes in the market. 
In brief, the results confirm the existence of hot periods across all measures of 
IPO activity. As these measures capture different characteristics of the IPO market, I 
document that hot issue periods can be differentiated. Moreover, J examine the 
66 The material in this chapter has been condensed and edited into a paper, titled "Hot and Cold IPO 
Markets ", which has been accepted for publication in the Multinational Finance Journal. In addition to 
my supervisors, Tim Brailsford and Richard Heaney, I would like to acknowledge the comments and 
suggestions of Richard Roll, Robert Faff, John Powell, Liliana Gonzlez, Zelda Jordan, Vince Hooper, 
Mohammad Tahir and seminar participants at the Doctorate Seminar of European Financial 
Management Meeting 1999 on this chapter. Special thanks to Adrian Pagan for his constructive 
comments on research techniques. This chapter has benefited significantly from Adrian's suggestions. 
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relationship between the measures and document a strong lead in underpricing, such 
that underpricing leads the number of WO issues by around six months. 
6.2 Data 
A sample of 6,632 IPOs is drawn from all new (listed) equity issues made in the 
USA during the period of January 1976 to June 1998.67 The cyclical behaviour of the 
aggregate US WO market is examined using the four previously described measures 
of WO activity.68 These measures capture both volume and underpricing aspects of 
the market. Recall that the measures are a proportionate indicator of the number of 
IPOs ( NOTPO), gross proceeds measuring total size of the new issues (GP), a value - 
weighted underpricing measure (VWUP) and a measure of the value of underpricing 
(VUP). The summary statistics for these measures have been discussed in detail 
earlier in Chapter five. 
6.3 Research Method 
A cycle is traditionally defined in term of the peaks and troughs in the level of 
variables that measure economic activity (Burns and Mitchell 1946). In the classic 
way, the analysis of cycles involves the location of turning points by inspecting and 
interpreting graphs of aggregate data. The location of turning points can be identified 
through a visual analysis (e.g. Burns and Mitchell 1946; Adelman and Adelman 1959) 
or a dating algorithm, such as a pattern recognition technique with a sequence of 
rules. Perhaps, the best -known dating algorithm was developed by Bry and Boschan 
67 Refer to Chapter four for details. 
68 Refer to Chapter five for details. 
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(1971). The general approach involves several steps looking for turning points in a 
smoothed series. The final points are determined using an unsmoothed series and 
verifying that the turns satisfy a set of rules. 
More recently, research into cycles has moved towards quantitative measures 
involving parametric models (e.g. Hamilton 1989; Layton 1996). A recent technique 
is the Markov regime switching method proposed by Hamilton (1989). Hamilton 
applies this technique to US GNP data and the results are generally consistent with 
those published by the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER). Regime - 
switching models have also been used extensively in modelling the nonlinear structure 
of financial time series (e.g. Schaller and Van Norden 1997; Assoe 1998). 
In this chapter, our aim is to confirm the existence of cycles in the aggregate US 
IPO market. A number of steps are used to determine turning points in IPO activity. 
First, visual analysis to isolate turning points is conducted by incorporating the criteria 
used by the NBER. The advantage of locating the turning points in this way is to gain 
an understanding of the general behaviour of the series and avoid false turning points 
(i.e. if a cycle is short lived or of insufficient amplitude). Second, the visual 
judgments are then tested using a dating algorithm developed by Bry and Boschan 
(1971). The advantage of the Bry and Boschan method is that it is easily implemented 
and can be readily replicated (King and Plosser 1994). Finally, the Markov regime 
switching technique is fitted. 
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6.3.1 Visual Analysis 
The approach used to visually analyse the turning points in IPO activity follows 
that used by the NBER. The NBER is traditionally considered to be the most accurate 
source of business cycle chronology in the USA. An NBER Business Cycle Dating 
Committee dates the cycles for the US economy. Burns and Mitchell (1946) provide a 
brief description of the approach explaining how NBER locate turning points in 
economic series.ó9 The main criteria are that a phase must last at Ieast six months and 
a complete cycle should have a minimum duration of fifteen months.70 
The first step of the NBER analysis is to determine which of the fluctuations in 
the series should be recognized as cyclical. After a number of cycles have been 
detected, identification of peaks and troughs is conducted and five selection rules are 
followed: 
1) Peaks and troughs are marked at the highest and lowest points of the 
specific cycles 
2) In the case of equal values, the last point is selected as the turning point 
3) A peak (trough) cannot be followed by another peak (trough) without the 
observance of a trough (peak) 
4) A phase has a minimum duration of six months and a whole cycle has a 
minimum duration of 15 months 
5) Points that are too close to the beginning or end of the series (less than 6 
months) are eliminated. 
69 This traditional approach by the NBER on dating business cycle is still continuing today. Generally, 
the turning dates of the business cycle Are announced with a lag of up to 20 months to ensure that these 
dates are as accurate as possible. 
70 By definition, a peak phase is the transition from the end of an expansion to the start of a contraction 
and a trough phase occurs at the bottom of a recession just as the economy enters a recovery (Burns 
and Mitchell 1946). Therefore, a complete business cycle experiences periods of a peak phase and a 
trough phase. 
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When turning points are identified, the points are marked with the 
corresponding date and reported. 
6.3.2 The Bry and Boschan Method 
The NBER dating method is subject to several limitations. For instance, it has 
been critísed for lacking a statistical foundation (e.g. Stock and Watson 1998). Also, 
implementation depends on individual judgments. Importantly, the process requires 
detailed prior knowledge of economic conditions to form a judgment of turning points 
in the business cycle (King and Plosser 1994). 
Bry and Boschan (1971) overcome the problem of the traditional NBER 
method by developing an algorithm for business cycle analysis. The advantage of the 
Bry and Boschan method is that it can be easily implemented and readily replicated 
without the requirement of prior knowledge of economic conditions (King and Plosser 
1994). Since the introduction of the Bry and Boschan method, it has been used widely 
in business cycle analysis (e.g. King and Plosser 1994; Simkins 1994; Harding and 
Pagan 1999b). Using US real GNP data, King and Plosser (1994) show that the 
turning points selected by the Bry and Boschan (1971) algorithm are consistent with 
the business cycle peaks and troughs selected by the traditional NBER method.71 The 
Bry and Boschan procedure for selecting turning points in any series is described 
below:72 
1. Determination of extremes and substitution of values 
2. Determination of cycles in 12 -month moving averages (extremes replaced) 
71 For 51 indicator series examined, the Bry and Boschan method selected 94% of the turns published 
by the NBER. 
72 This is taken from Bry and Boschan (1971, p. 21). 
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(2a) Identification of points higher (or lower) than 5 months on either side 
(2b) Enforcement of alternation of turns by selecting highest of multiple 
peaks (or lowest of multiple troughs) 
3. Determination of corresponding turns in Spence curve (extremes replaced) 
(3a) Identification of highest (or lowest) value within ± 5 months of selected 
turn in 12 -month moving average 
Enforcement of minimum cycle duration of 15 months by eliminating 
lower peaks and higher troughs of short cycles 
4. Determination of corresponding turns in short-term moving average of 3 to 6 
months depending on MCD (months of cyclical dominance) 
(4a) Identification of highest (or lowest) values within ± 5 months of selected 
turn in Spence curve 
5. Determination of turning points in the unsmoothed series 
(3b) 
(Sa) 
(5b) 
(5c) 
(5d) 
(Se) 
Identification of highest (or lowest) value within ± 4 months, or MCD 
term, whichever is larger, of selected turn in short-term moving average 
Elimination of turns within 6 months of beginning and end of series 
Elimination of peaks (or troughs) at both ends of series which are lower 
(or higher) than values closer to end 
Elimination of cycles whose duration is less than IS months 
Elimination of phases whose duration is less than 5 months 
6. Statement of final turning points. 
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6.3.3 Markov Regime Switching Method 
The existence of hot and cold periods in the market implies a series of 
structural breaks in the data. Traditional statistical analysis for structural change 
includes the Chow test, Cumulated Sum of Residuals ( CUSUM) and CUSUM of 
Squares of Residuals (CUSUMVMSQ) tests. The Chow test requires prior knowledge (or 
at least a guess) of break points. If structural breaks cannot be identified ex -ante, then 
the strength of the Chow test diminishes considerably (Gujarati 1995). Such a test is 
inappropriate in our analysis since we have no theoretical basis on which to form prior 
knowledge. 
CUSUM and CUST MSQ tests are appropriate for time -series data. However 
these tests are also limited, as they cannot clearly identify turning points of structural 
change. The recursive nature of the tests requires time to recognise a regime shift once 
it has occurred (Greene 1993), especially when the shifts are large (Montgomery 
1991), 
Instead, we focus on the technique developed by Hamilton (1989). This 
technique is a Markov -hased regime- switching model for modelling time series 
subject to non -linear regime changes. In an application of the model, Hamilton reports 
estimated parameters that reproduce the characteristics of the business cycle through a 
two -state version applied to quarterly US GNP data. 
The concept behind regime- switching is to allow the parameters of a time - 
series process to take on different values which are dependent on the latent regime 
indicator (denoted as Si). The unobservable regime indicator takes on different states, 
although applications generally restrict it to just two states. The data are used to 
estimate the parameters in each state as well as the probability that the underlying 
process is in a particular state. The parameters are viewed as the outcomes of a 
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discrete -state Markov process. An important practical advantage of the regime - 
switching model is its ability to quickly identify regime shifts, using all the data up to 
a specific month to form a judgment. The model can be used in the absence of perfect 
knowledge of historical regime shifts (Layton 1996). 
More recently, regime- switching models have been used extensively in 
modelling nonlinear structures in time series data. The advantage of this approach is 
that it defines in an objective manner the hot and cold periods. Such identification is 
potentially useful in any further examination of the impact of other variables on the 
market. Schaller and Van Norden (1997) use the technique and find strong evidence 
of regime switching in US stock market returns. Assoe (1998) shows strong evidence 
of regime- switching behaviour in emerging stock market returns. Hamilton and Lin 
(1996) use the model to capture the nonlinear dynamics in the stock market and 
business cycle. Gray (1996) develops a regime- switching model with time- varying 
properties and applies it to interest rates. In this study, we also use Hamilton's 
approach to examine and date hot issue cycles in the IPO market. 
In the current context, the level of WO activity may be subject to occasional 
and discrete shifts over time such that different regimes are observed. We call these 
regimes the `hot' and `cold issue' periods. 
Regime switching in the IPO market could arise in several ways. First, 
changes in economic conditions may induce regime switches. For instance, Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989) suggest that the hot issue market in 1980 was associated with the 
1979 oil crisis. More generally, it appears logical to assume that changes in economic 
growth affect growth in the corporate sector and consequentially the propensity for 
firms to seek new equity from the market. Second, changes in investor sentiment may 
induce regime switches. Rajan and Servaes (1995) argue that an increase in investor 
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sentiment may increase the number of new issues, Further, mutual fund net cash flows 
have been used as a measure of investor sentiment (Neal and Wheatley 1998; Keim 
and Stambaugh 1986). Ritter (1998) suggests that hot issue markets might be related 
to increases in mutual fund net cash flows. Increases in net cash flows increase the 
demand for securities generally, but specifically IPOs as they represent a perceived 
extension of the investment set. Third, regime switches could be related to changes in 
stock market conditions. Loughran et aI. (1994) and Rees (1997) provide evidence of 
a positive relationship between stock market conditions and IPO activity. It is argued 
that issuers consider stock market conditions when timing their issues. 
In the context of IPO markets, two regimes can be identified, a hot period 
(state 0) and a cold period (state 1). Therefore, the regime indicator, S1, takes on the 
value of 1 when the IPO market is in cold periods and 0 when the IPO market is in hot 
periods. The probability that state 0 (1) will persist from one period to the next is 
given as q (p). The probability of moving from state O to state 1 is 1 -q, and moving 
from state 1 to state 0 is 1-p, so the regime is assumed to be unknown and is also 
independent across time. For each regime, the probability rule to govern the 
likelihood of various observations is the normal density function, with different means 
(a01 and a02) and standard deviations (a, and 62 ). Hence, in hot periods, WO activity 
measures are drawn from a distribution with a mean a01 and standard deviation, while 
in cold periods, WO activity measures are drawn from a distribution with a mean 
a02 and standard deviation cr2 . Thus, each regime is characterized by a different 
mean and standard deviation. 
Formally, let Y0 denote any measure of IPO activity, then: 
Y1 = a01(1- S,) +a02S, + {a,(1- S,) +62S,1e, (1) 
where 
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S, is a binary state variable that follows a first -order Markov Chain such that: 
Pr(S, = O[S = 0) = q 
Pr(S,= 11Sí_,= 0) =1 -q 
Pr(S, =lI5, -, = 1) = 
Pr(S, = = I) =l -p 
and e, N(0,(72). 
To obtain estimates of the parameter vector (a01 , a02, al and cr2 ), maximum 
likelihood estimation is used (Hamilton 1989). The maximum likelihood estimate of 
the two transition probabilities (1 -q and 1-p) is the fraction of time that the system is 
in one state before moving to another state. In other words, the estimated transition 
probability, 1 -q, is the number of times state 0 is followed by state 1 divided by the 
number of times the process is in state O. The benefit of using the above process in 
modeling regime switching in the IPO activity is that it allows investors to generate 
meaningful forecasts that take into account the possibility of the change from one 
regime to another. Furthermore, the transition probabilities obtained help to assess the 
duration of each regime. For instance, the expected duration of hot issue cycles can be 
obtained by calculating (1 -q) 1 and, conversely, for cold issue cycles the duration is 
calculated as (1 -p) "1. 
If peaks and troughs selected by the Bry and Boschan method fall into the hot 
and cold issue periods identified by the Markov regime switching technique, our 
dating results can be confirmed. 
Of note, the Bry and Boschan method determines peak and trough points in the 
series while our Markov regime switching method identifies hot and cold periods in 
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the series. This is a major difference between the Bry and Boschan method and the 
Markov regime switching technique. The ability to identify certain cyclical periods in 
the series rather than the points of peak and trough is an advantage of the Markov 
regime switching technique. Further, the identification of periods rather than points 
leads to more relevant analysis of the impact of adverse market conditions on WO 
activity.73 
6.4 Empirical Results 
6.4.1 Visual Analysis 
The turning points in the series identified through visual analysis are labeled 
with corresponding dates and are presented in Figures 6.1 to 6.4. The cyclical patterns 
in the series of NOIPO, GP and VUP are relatively clear. The determination of 
turning points for VWUP, however, is more troublesome. The pattern of VWUP is 
quite volatile, especially in the 1990s. Since we do not have detailed prior knowledge 
of market conditions for the period, the judgement is made based on selection rules 
and careful reading. 
In Figure 6.1, the pattern for NOIPO before May 1985 is almost flat with 
minor fluctuations. As a result, it is difficult to locate a turning point for the period. A 
trough was originally located in April 1997 followed by a peak in November 1997 
(see * symbols). However, our selection rules require a minimum duration of six 
months for a phase. Therefore, this possible point is ignored. 
73 However, the method has been criticized for its statistical properties. For instance, Harding and 
Pagan (1999b) find little evidence concerning the importance of non -linear features in analysis of 
economic cycles. 
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Figure 6.2 reports turning points for GP based on visual analysis. The pattern 
for GP is quite similar to that of NOIPO though there are slight variations in turning 
points. For instance, a peak in NOIPO is identified in October 1986 while a peak in 
GP is observed in November 1986, a trough in NOIPO is identified in September 
1992 while a trough in GP is observed in November 1992. 
The turning points for VWUP are presented in Figure 6.3. February 1976 can 
be identified as a peak but is eliminated due to insufficient historical data (see + 
symbol). From November 1982 to March 1989, there seems to be a peak in March 
1986 preceded by a trough in November 1985 (see * symbol). However, the duration 
of this phase is less than 6 months. Between March 1986 and March 1989, there 
appears to be a peak in February 1987 (see # symbol). However, the point is 
eliminated since the value for VWUP in February 1987 is less than the value of 
VWUP in March 1986. 
Figure 6.3: Visually Identified Turning Points for VWUP in the USA 
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Figure 6.4 reports turning points for VUP. It reveals that VUP is more stable 
than its underpricing counterpart, VWUP. Before 1995, the pattern in VUP is almost 
flat and the turning points identified in the period appear to have smaller magnitudes 
compared with those of VWUP in the period. An extreme peak point is observed in 
May 1996. This is due to a number of large issues during the period though associated 
underpricing is not extremely high.74 
Figure 6.4: Visually Identified Turning Points for VUP in the USA 
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Summarised results on turning points identified by visual analysis are reported 
in Table 6.1. For the volume measures, there are 6 cycles in NOIPO and 7 cycles 
identified in GP. Of note, peaks and troughs determined in NOIPO and GP are almost 
identical. This indicates a consistency in patterns between the volume measures. The 
obvious difference is a peak for GP in November 1997 while no peak exists for 
NOIPO during this period. 
The two underpricing measures show quite different results to the volume 
measures and little consistency. While 7 cycles are observed in VWUP, there are only 
74 For instance, Saks Holdings experienced underpricing of 39% with total proceeds of US$275 million 
and Associates First Capital experienced underpricing of 20% with total proceeds of US$1.7 billion. 
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5 cycles observed in VUP. Moreover, the dates observed in the underpricing measures 
are somewhat different to the dates in the volume measures. Of note, both 
underpricing measures exhibit a hot issue market at the end of 1980 though the peak 
point of December 1980 in VUP is two months later than in VWUP and is of smaller 
magnitude. This finding of a peak in 1980 is consistent with the finding of Ritter 
(1984b). 
Table 6.1: Turning Points of the US IPO Activity Based on Visual Analysis 
Peak 
Number of IPOs ( NOIPO) 
Apr 81 
Dec 83 
Oct 86 
Mar 92 
Dec 93 
Oct 96 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Jun 81 
Mar 83 
Nov 86 
Mar 92 
Jun 93 
Apr 96 
Nov 97 
Value- Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Jan 78 
Oct 80 
Nov 82 
Mar 89 
Nov 92 
Nov 95 
Sep 97 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Dec 80 
Jun 83 
Mar 87 
Jun 93 
May 97 
Trough 
Sep 82 
Feb 85 
Nov 90 
Sep 92 
Jan 95 
Oct 82 
Feb 85 
Dec 90 
Nov 92 
Aug 94 
Jan 97 
Jan 78 
Mar 79 
Apr 82 
Nov 85 
Nov 90 
Jun 94 
Jul 96 
Oct 82 
Nov 85 
Nov 88 
Aug 94 
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6.4.2 The Bry and Boschan Method 
Table 6.2 summarises the turning points selected by the algorithm of the Bry 
and Boschan method. As can be seen from the table, the two volume measures, 
NOIPO and GP, exhibit similar turning dates to each other. Both series show the 
existence of seven cycles over the sample period and the dates of the peaks coincide 
with slight deviations up to two months, except for the year 1993. The finding of 
similarity in the turning dates between the volume measures is consistent with the 
earlier results based on visual analysis. 
In contrast, the two underpricing measures give different results to each other. 
Although both series exhibit five cycles, the dates of the peaks are somewhat 
different, except for October 1980 and May 1996. The dates of the peaks in VUP 
display some consistency with those dates identified in the two volume measures and 
the peaks in VUP appear to lead the peaks in the two volume measures. For instance, 
a peak in VUP in October 1980 is followed by a peak in NOIPO in April 1981, a peak 
in VUP in June 1983 is followed by a peak in NOIPO in December 1983, and a peak 
in June 1986 in VWUP and is followed by a peak in NOIPO in October 1986. Hence, 
it appears that VUP leads NOIPO by several months. This implies a potential lead and 
lag relationship between the underpricing and volume measures. 
Compared with the results of visual analysis, the peaks and troughs identified 
are reasonably consistent, but there are some anomalies. For instance, a peak for 
NOIPO in April 1990 identified by the Bry and Boschan method is not picked up in 
the visual analysis. This appears to be related to high volatility around this period. 
Also, visual analysis determines a peak for VWUP in March 1989 but the Bry and 
Boschan method does not. This might be due to the detrending process used in the 
Bry and Boschan process which smooths the magnitude of this point. 
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Table 6.2: Turning Points of the US IPO Activity Using the Bry and Boschan 
Method 
Peak Trough 
Number of IPOs (NOIPO) 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Mar 78 
Apr 81 May 82 
Dec 83 Feb 85 
Oct 86 Mar 89 
Apr 90 Oct 90 
Mar 92 Sep 92 
Dec 93 Jan 95 
May 96 
Jul 77 
Apr 81 Jun 82 
Oct 83 Feb 85 
Nov 86 Mar 89 
Mar 90 Nov 90 
Mar 92 Nov 92 
June 93 Jul 94 
Apr 96 Jan 97 
Value- Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Jul 78 Mar 79 
Oct 80 Apr 82 
Nov 82 Feb 84 
Jan 85 Apr 92 
Nov 92 June 94 
May 96 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Oct 80 Aug 82 
Jun 83 Feb 84 
Jun 86 Nov 88 
Jun 93 Jul 94 
May 96 Apr 97 
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6.4.3 Evidence of Structural Breaks in Measures of IPO Activity 
Before we fit a Markov regime switching method into the data, CUSUM 
and CUSUMSQ tests are first conducted on the four IPO activity measures to 
ascertain the existence of structural breaks in each series. Figures 6.5 to 6.8 show 
the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests. The results of these tests provide strong 
evidence that structural breaks exist in all series. For instance, Figure 6.5a shows 
that the CUSUM for NOIPO strays outside the boundary from June 1983, which 
suggests that the parameters are not constant across the period. The CUSUMSQ 
result for NOIPO reported in Figure 6.5b also casts doubt on the parameter stability 
as the parameters stray outside the confidence bounds on several occasions. 
In summary, the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests provide evidence of the 
existence of structural breaks in all four series. However, as mentioned previously, 
the CUSUM and CUSUMSQ tests cannot clearly determine the switching points 
between regimes. 
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6.4.4 Markov Regime Switching Method 
The parameter estimates of the Markov regime -switching model for each of 
the four series are provided in Table 6.3. A common characteristic across all of the 
IPO activity measures is the observation of higher means and standard deviations 
in hot periods than in cold periods. For instance, the average proportion of the 
number of issues per month ( NOTPO) in hot periods is 0.59% of the sample with a 
standard deviation of 0.25 %. In comparison, the average proportion of the number 
of issues is almost five times lower in cold periods (0.13 %) with a much lower 
standard deviation (0.10 %). Such results clearly indicate the difference in the two 
regimes. 
Similarly, differences between the regimes are obtained for GP where the 
average proportion of gross proceeds per month in hot periods is 0.69% of the 
sample compared to only 0.09% in cold periods. Again, the standard deviation is 
much higher in hot periods than cold periods (0.37% vs. 0.09 %). 
The two underpricing measures also exhibit substantially different 
parameters between regimes. VWUP is 14.09% in hot periods on average and only 
3.33% in cold periods. Similarly, VUP is 0.69% in hot periods compared to only 
0.03% in cold periods. The associated standard deviations reflect similar patterns. 
In summary, hot periods are characterised by substantially higher means and 
standard deviations than cold periods for all IPO volume and underpricing 
measures. 
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Table 6.3: Maximum Likelihood Estimates from the Markov Regime Switching Model on the US IPO Activity Measures 
Y = aot(1- Sr) +a02S, +[01(1- Sr) +cT2Sr)Er 
where S, denotes the state of the world for hot (S, = 0) and cold (Sr = 1) markets 
Parameter 
(1) 
NOIPO GP VUP VUP 
Estimate 
(2) 
Standard Error 
(3) 
Estimate 
(4) 
Standard Error 
(5) 
Estimate 
(6) 
Standard Error 
(7) 
Estimate 
(8) 
Standard Error 
(9) 
1 -q 
1 -p 
aot 
a02 
6 t 
6 z 
0.0219* 
0.0319* 
0.5929* 
0.1274* 
0.2457* 
0.0956* 
0.0099 
0.0149 
0.0235 
0.0109 
0.0135 
0.0077 
0.0290 
0.0325* 
0.6927* 
0.0879* 
0.3730* 
0.0897* 
0.0161 
0.0160 
0.0332 
0.0082 
0.0230 
0.0068 
0.1032* 
0.1052* 
14.0887* 
3.3250* 
10.2330* 
3.7170* 
0.0335 
0.0318 
1.1992 
0.4329 
0.7070 
0.4272 
0.0407* 
0.0509* 
0.6912* 
0.0301* 
0.7101* 
0.0380* 
0.0157 
0.0202 
0.0619 
0.0035 
0.0441 
0.0029 
* denotes significance at 5% 
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The estimated regime probabilities for each data point are reported in 
Figures 6.9 to 6.12. These probabilities are used to determine the timing of regime 
shifts in each of the activity measures. A problem with the probability plots is 
determining the state when the probabilities are distant from either zero or unity. In 
the absence of any prior information, we set the transition level rule at a probability 
of 50 %. Hence an observation is determined to be in a state (S5) if the probability of 
being in that state exceeds 0.5. 
A further issue arises, as the switching model can be quite sensitive and at 
times provides transition reversals across consecutive months.75 To overcome this 
problem, we define a state as one where at Ieast six consecutive probabilities are 
greater than 0.5. The rationale is that hot periods are likely to be driven by 
fundamental shifts in economic factors or investor sentiment. Such shifts are likely 
to have a temporal effect of greater than one month. Moreover, institutional and 
regulatory features induce lags between the corporate manager's decision to issue 
and the listing date. These lags have been estimated to be somewhere between 
three to six months (Lipman 1997). Given that market conditions are likely to 
influence the manager's decision, temporal swings of one month are not especially 
relevant and hence we argue that six consecutive months is more realistic with 
market practice 7e A similar widely- accepted `six month' rule is used by the 
National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) to determine the minimum length 
of a phase of the business cycle. 
75 Note that this is a similar rule to the NBER and Bry and Boschan rules designed to avoid false 
turning points. 
76 Alternative state definitions were employed including consecutive probabilities of greater than 
0.5 for at least three consecutive observations and generally the conclusions remain unchanged. 
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Figure 6.9: Regime Probability of Being in Hot Periods using NOIPO in the 
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Figure 6.10: Regime Probability of Being in Hot Periods using GP in the USA 
1.00 
075 - 
0.50 - 
0.25 - 
0.00 
1976 1978 1980 1982 1984 1986 
147 
1988 990 1992 1994 1996 1998 
Figure 6.11: Regime Probability of Being in Hot Periods using VWUP in the 
USA 
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Figure 6.12: Regime Probability of Being in Hot Periods using VUP in the 
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Using the regime probabilities and transition rules, hot and cold issue 
periods are identified and reported in Table 6.4. The two volume measures, NOIPO 
and GP, exhibit similar hot issue periods. The hot periods are almost identical 
between these measures, except for the period of April to December 1981, where 
NOIPO is in a hot state and GP is in a cold state. Of note, the crash of October 
1987 has a strong influence with both volume measures shifting from a hot state to 
a cold state in November 1987 lasting until May 1991. Interestingly, the regime - 
switching model does not identify the hot issue period of 1980 observed by Ritter 
(1984b). However, as noted earlier, the large number of IPOs in the 1990s reduces 
the relative influence of the 1980 period when the sample is extended into the 
I990s. The expected duration of a hot issue period is 46 months using NOIPO and 
35 months using GP .77 
In contrast, the two underpricing measures give different signals. VWUP 
provides a greater frequency of transition wherein hot periods appear more volatile 
and less persistent compared to VUP. The expected duration of a hot period using 
VWUP is only 10 months compared to 24 months using VUP. The hot period 
identified by VWUP for August 1980 to July 1981 is consistent with the hot issue 
period observed by Ritter (I 984b) 78 The finding of a hot state in this period using 
VWUP, but not in the other three measures that scale by proportional size across 
the sample, is further support for Ritter's (1984h) argument that high IPO 
underpricing in 1980 was driven by small issues. Of note, VWUP is the only 
measure that does not identify a hot period immediately prior to the crash of 
October 1987. 
77 Recall that the expected duration of each hot issue cycle can be calculated using (1 -q) -` and 
conversely for cold issue cycles is calculated as (I -p) 1. (Refer to Hamilton 1989 for details) 
78 The hot issue period observed by Ritter (1984b) was January 1980 to March 1981. 
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Table 6.4: Chronology of US IPO Activity Based on Transition Probabilities 
From the Regime- Switching Model 
January 1976 to June 1998 
Hot Periods Cold Periods 
Number of IPOs (NOIPO) 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Apr 81 - Dec 81 
Mar 83 - Sep 84 
Jul 85 - Nov 87 
May 91 - Jun 98 
Mar 83 - Feb 84 
Oct 85 - Nov 87 
May 91 - Jun 98 
Value- Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Sep 77 - Oct 78 
Aug 80 - Jul 81 
Nov 82 -Jul83 
Dec 90 - Mar 92 
Nov 92 -Jim 98 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Nov 82 -Dec 83 
Oct 85 - Sep 87 
Feb 90 -Jul 90 
Mar 91 -Jun 98 
Jan 76 - Mar 81 
Jan 82 -Feb 83 
Oct 84 - Jun 85 
Dec 87 - Apr 91 
Jan 76 - Feb 83 
Mar 84 - Sep 85 
Dec 87 - Apr 91 
Jan 76 - Aug 77 
Nov 78 - Jul 80 
Aug 81 - Oct 82 
Aug 83 -Nov 90 
Apr 92 - Oct 92 
Jan 76 - Oct 82 
Jan 84 - Sep 85 
Oct 87 -Jan 90 
Aug 90 - Feb 91 
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In comparison, VUP identifies a hot period between October 1985 and 
September 1987 ending one month before the crash. Of note, the hot period in the 
volume measures persisted until November 1987. This difference may be 
explained due to the difficulty in recalling an issue once it has commenced. Hence, 
the volume measures are not as dynamic in their response to changes in market 
conditions as price based measures such as VUP. The persistence in the volume 
measures during adverse market conditions supports the argument that even if 
issuers respond to market conditions when making timing decisions, the lag 
induced by institutional and regulatory requirements exposes issuers to the risk of 
making an issue during market downturns. 
The most common hot issue period observed across all measures of IPO 
activity is May 1991 to June 1998. As with the transition to the cold period 
associated with the crash of October 1987, there appears to be a strong correlation 
between IPO activity, business and stock market conditions 79 For instance, from 
the early 1990s it is widely recognised that the stock market has been experiencing 
a sustained bull run with market indicators and price -earnings ratios reaching 
record highs and dividend -to -price ratios reaching historical lows.80 Further, NBER 
reported that the US economy is experiencing a bull run since March 1991. 
Similarly, all the IPO activity measures indicate a sustained hot issue period from 
1991. This period is the longest of all hot periods documented over the sample. 
Except for this latter hot period, the duration of hot periods is shorter than cold 
79 Of note, Choe et al. (1993) document that the frequency of seasoned offerings also rises in 
economic upturns using US data from 1971 to 1991. They identify a positive relationship between 
equity issue volume and economic activity arguing that firms will issue equity when the effects of 
adverse selection, as a proportion of investment returns, are less important in the presence of 
improved business conditions. 
8° From 1990 through June 1998, the S &P 500 index increased more than 245% from a level of 329 
in January 1990 to 1133 by June 1998 and the price -earnings ratios were more than 28.65 with 
dividend -to -price ratios at historical lows (less than 2 %) in June 1998. Edwards and Zhang (1998) 
also document some of the statistics concerning market conditions experienced during the 1990s. 
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periods. This finding is inconsistent with evidence from the business cycle where 
expansionary swings are longer than contractions (Hamilton 1989; Layton 1996). 
However, the sample period is too short to make sustained judgments. 
Of note, most peaks selected prior to 1990 using both visual analysis and 
the Bry and Boschan methods fall into the corresponding hot issue periods 
identified by the Markov regime switching technique. This provides further 
support for the results. While the whole period of May 1991 to June 1998 is 
regarded as a common hot issue period in all measures using the Markov regime 
switching method, the visual analysis and the algorithm of the Bry and Boschan 
method identify more cycles in all measures during this period. This difference can 
be explained by the different criteria imposed on the methods. While the regime 
switching model identifies regime shifts using data up to the specific month to 
form a judgement, the visual analysis and the Bry and Boschan method limit their 
selection of a turning point to a period of ± 5 months. Further, a hot or cold period 
in the regime switching method is defined as one lasting at least six months. 
Nevertheless, in general, the various methods all provide consistent results. 
6.4.5 Explanatory Relationships 
The identified periods in Tables 6.2 and 6.4 indicate some lead -lag features 
between the volume and underpricing measures. Specifically, the hot periods in the 
underpricing measures appear to lead the hot periods in the volume measures. For 
instance in Table 6.4, a hot period in VWUP commenced in August 1980 and is 
followed by a hot period in NOIPO in April 1981, a hot period commenced in 
VWUP in November 1982 and is followed by a hot period in NOIPO in March 
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1983, and a hot period commenced in December 1990 in VWUP and is followed 
by a hot period in NOIPO in May 1991. These are casual observations and we now 
turn to statistical analysis of the relationships between the measures. In this case, 
the power of conventional tests (such as OLS based tests) is limited by the nature 
of the probability distributions, as by definition, the probabilities lie between zero 
and one. Therefore, Spearman correlation tests are used to estimate the relationship 
between the estimated probabilities. 
Table 6.5 reports the Spearman Rank correlation coefficients between 
current and lagged estimated regime switching probabilities of NOIPO and 
VWUP. There is a contemporaneous correlation between the two series. Further, 
while the estimated probabilities of VWUP show no correlation with lagged 
probabilities of NOIPO up to 6 months, the probabilities of NOIPO show strong 
correlation with lagged probabilities of VWUP up to six months. This evidence 
supports a lead -lag relationship between IPO volume and underpricing. 
Specifically, underpricing leads WO volume by up to six months. 
This evidence supports the argument that the management decision to issue 
is a function of current observed underpricing (Rock 1986; Firth 1997), Moreover, 
WO issuers cannot respond instantaneously to market conditions due to a three to 
six month lag during which various activities are undertaken to fulfil the legal 
requirements and promote the issue (Lipman 1997).81 
61 This issue and the relationship between underpricing and volume are explored in detail in Chapter 
eight. 
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Table 6.5: Spearman Rank Correlation Coefficients of Estimated Probabilities between NOIPO and VWUP 
NOIPO NOIPO_1 NO1PO_2 NOIPO_3 NOIPO_4 NOIPO_5 NOIPO 6 
VWUP 0.1678* 0.1122 0.0690 0.0338 -0.0079 
-0.0299 
-0.0473 
VWUP_I 0.2346* 0.1660* 0.1104 0.0673 0.0321 
-0.0098 
-0.0317 
VWUP_2 0.2665* 0.2321* 0.1636* 0.1085 0.0655 0.0300 -0.0111 
VWUP_3 0.3039* 0.2613* 0.2270* 0.1607* 0.1050 0.0615 0.0290 
VWUP_4 0.3536* 0.2989* 0.2564* 0.2243* 0.1575* 0.1010 0.0605 
VWUP_5 0.3735* 0.3493* 0.2946* 0.2543* 0.2216* 0.1542* 0.1001 
VWUP_6 0.3855* 0.3704* 0.3461* 0.2929* 0.2526* 0.2191* 0.1537* 
Notes: 
1. * denotes significant at 5% 
2. NOIPO_m denotes the lagged terms for NOIPO, where m= 1,2,...,6 
3. VWUP_m denotes the lagged terms for VWUP, where m= 1,2,...,6 
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In summary, while hot periods are characterised initially by a large degree of 
underpricing followed by unusually high volume of new issues, the periods are not 
completely homogeneous. The activity measures studied here indicate that 
different periods can be characterized by differences in the type of issues. While 
the number of issues and total size of issues in each month are generally correlated, 
the measures of underpricing yield at times quite different results. Hence we argue 
that hot issue periods are not homogeneous. 
6.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed the behavior of the US IPO market. Our aim 
was to formally document the existence of hot and cold issue periods that have 
previously been claimed to exist, but prior evidence has been superficial. 
Moreover, through the development of a series of activity variables, I examined 
different characteristics of the market focussing on volume and underpricing 
measures of new issues. 
Through the application of different dating techniques, a number of regime 
switches between hot and cold issue markets have been documented over the 
period 1976 to 1998. In so doing, previously observed hot periods were highlighted 
and explanations offered as to their existence (e.g. Ritter's 1980 hot market). Hot 
periods can be described by both volume and underpricing measures although the 
characteristics of hot periods vary. Hot periods appear related to general stock 
market conditions, which supports the hypothesis that managers time their issues in 
an attempt to take advantage of favorable market conditions. However, this timing 
comes at a risk as the volume measures are relatively slow to respond to downturns 
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in the market. Importantly, a Iead -lag relationship is identified, such that 
underpricing measures lead volume by up to six months. These results provide 
insights into the IPO market, not previously documented. The following analysis 
involves a closer examination of the factors associated with the hot and cold 
periods. However, this task is now possible given the identification of hot and cold 
periods provided in this chapter. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN82 
HOT AND COLD IPO MARKETS: AUSTRALIAN EVIDENCE 
7.1 Introduction 
The aggregate US IPO market was examined in the previous chapter and 
the results confirm the existence of hot and cold issue periods in the USA. In this 
chapter, we focus on the aggregate IPO market in Australia. 
The chapter's aim is to examine the existence of hot and cold markets in 
Australia using a long time -series and to analyse the relationships between various 
indicator variables. A time series of Australian IPO issues from 1976 to June 1997 
is constructed for analysis. Four measures of IPO activity that capture both volume 
and underpricing aspects of the market are developed and examined. Given 
arguments concerning the potential differential behaviour and nature of the 
resource sector, the analysis involves separate considerations of the industrial and 
resource sectors of the market.83 In brief, the results support the existence of hot 
issue periods across all measures of IPO activity. These measures capture different 
characteristics of the IPO market and we document that hot issue periods can he 
differentiated. Further, the relationship between the measures is examined and a 
82 The material in this chapter has been condensed into a paper, titled The Cyclical Behaviour of 
the IPO Market in Australia ", and has been accepted for publication in the Accounting Research 
Journal. In addition to my supervisors, Tim Braìlsford and Richard Heaney, I would like to 
acknowledge the helpful comments of Liliana Gonzalez, Adrian Pagan and John Powell on earlier 
versions of the chapter. I also thank Dave Allen and Frank Finn for providing some data and 
information on the Australian market. 
83 Refer to Chapters four and five for a detailed discussion. 
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lead in underpricing is revealed, such that underpricing leads the number of IPO 
issues by around six months which is consistent with the relationship observed in 
the US IPO market (see Chapter six). We offer explanations for this result that 
yield insight into the market dynamics. Finally, resource sector IPOs are found to 
exhibit a substantial influence on the pricing measures of WO activity and are 
generally not as dynamic in response to adverse market conditions as their 
industrial counterparts. This latter result has implications for further work and an 
understanding of the Australian market. 
7.2 Data and Research Method 
A sample of 766 IPOs is drawn from all new (listed) equity issues made on 
the Australian Stock Exchange during the period January 1976 to June 1997.54 
Following the extant literature (see Chapter three), the level of WO activity is 
examined through two broad measures being volume and underpricing. Consistent 
with these measures, four variables are developed that measure WO activity. 
While NOIPO and GP concern volume, VWUP and V UP concern underpricing. 
Each variable is measured on a monthly basis.85 
As discussed in Chapters four and five, the Australian stock exchange 
traditionally has contained a relatively large proportion of resource sector stocks 
compared to other national exchanges. Given the arguments concerning the 
potential differential behaviour and nature of the resource sector (e.g. How 1996; 
Ritter 1984b), the analysis of the cyclical behaviour of the Australian WO market 
84 Refer to Chapter four for a description and sources of Australian IPO data. 
85 Refer to Chapter five for details. 
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involves separate consideration of the industrial and resource sectors of the 
market. 
A brief comparison of resource and industrial sector ]POs in Australia is 
presented in Table 7.1. There are a total of 244 new issues in the resource sector 
over the sample (or 32% of all IPOs). These IPOs have an average offer size of 
A$19 million compared to A$44 million for industrial sector IPOs. Further, the 
average offer price for natural resource IPOs in the sample is A$0.41 which is 
considerably lower than the average offer price of A$1.00 for industrial sector 
IPOs. In relation to underpricing, resource sector IPOs experience an average level 
of underpricing of 46.5% compared to 23.3% for their industrial sector 
counterparts. Hence, resource sector IPOs tend to be smaller, lower priced and 
experience greater underpricing. 
Table 7.1: Comparison of Resource and Industrial Sector IPOs in Australia 
January 1976 - June 1997 
Resource Sector Industrial Sector 
Number of 1POs 244 522 
Average Offer Size (A$ mil.) 19 44 
Average Offer Price per IPO A$0.41 A$1.00 
Average Underpricing per IPO 46.46% 23.33% 
Support for the variation is provided by Michaely and Shaw (1994) who 
report that small IPOs experience more underpricing than large IPOs.86 Jain (1995) 
suggests that this difference may be explained by the information asymmetry 
86 Further evidence is reported by Ibbotson et al. (1994) and Chalk and Peavy (1987). For instance, 
Ibbotson et al. (1994) report that for 2,439 US IPOs issued between 1975 and 1984, the average 
initial return on IPOs with an offer price of less than US$3 is 42.8 %, whereas it is only 8.6% for 
IPOs with an offer price higher than US$3. 
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surrounding an issue wherein information asymmetry is more apparent for small 
IPOs than for large IPOs. Therefore, the difference in underpricing between the 
two sectors may be explained by the information asymmetry where information 
asymmetry is more apparent for small, high risk IPOs than for large IPOs. The 
implication is that the valuation of resource sector IPOs is more difficult than their 
industrial counterparts due to a higher degree of information asymmetry. 
7.3 Empirical Results of Full Sample 
Following Chapter six, the research method initially involves a visual 
analysis, followed by the Bry and Boschan method and then application of a 
Markov regime -switching model that allows for the identification of the turning 
points and hot and cold periods in the Australian IPO market. The CUSUM and 
CUSUMSQ tests are conducted on all Australian WO series and the results 
confirm the existence of structural breaks in all series. Although the results of 
these tests are not reported here, they are available on request. 
7.3.1 Visual Analysis 
The turning points in the series identified through visual analysis are 
labeled with corresponding dates and are reported in Figures 7.1 to 7.4. In Figure 
7.1, the pattern of NOTPO shows two clear upward cycles in the periods of 
1988 -1987 and 1993 -1995. Between 1988 and March 1993, two peaks may be 
visually identified (December 1988 and July 1992) though their amplitudes are not 
as strong as those in 1987 and 1993. 
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The turning points identified for GP are presented in Figure 7.2. Generally, 
the pattern of GP is quite flat before July 1991 with relatively minor fluctuations. 
The pattern becomes more volatile after July 1991 with an extreme peak in July 
1993. The months, September 1991 and July 1992, can be identified as two peaks 
during the period but are eliminated as they fail to meet the criteria of a minimum 
duration of a cycle lasts for at least 15 months (see * symbols). From April 1995 
(see # symbol), there seems to be a peak in July 1995 (see + symbol). However, 
the duration of this phase is less than six months and is thus also eliminated. Most 
upward movements appear to be volatile and short -lived between July 1993 and 
June 1997, although the whole period appears to be in a hot issue state. 
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Figure 7.2: Visually Identified Turning Points of GP in Australian IPO 
Sample 
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The identification of peaks and troughs in VWUP is somewhat difficult 
since VWUP shows quite a volatile pattern over the period (see Figure 7.3). 
Following a trough in June 1979, there appears to be a peak in July 1979 (see * 
symbol) but this point is eliminated since duration of this phase is less than six 
months. A peak in October 1988 seems to be followed by another peak in July 
1989 (see + symbols) but the cycle duration is less than 15 months. In addition, it 
appears that there is a peak in June 1993 followed by a trough in August 1994 (see 
# symbol). However, the trough in August 1994 is too close to the next peak in 
September 1994. It appears that almost all the peaks identified represent 
abnormally large values in their specific cycles and are short- lived. 
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Figure 7.3: Visually Identified Turning Points of VWL'P in Australian IPO 
Sample 
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Peaks and troughs for VUP are reported in Figure 7.4. The pattern of VUP 
appears to be relatively flat with only a few extreme fluctuations. Three peaks are 
eliminated (see * symbols) in the pattern as they are either less than six months for 
a phase or less than 15 months for a cycle. Although there are five peaks identified 
over the period, four of them (except October 1995) seem to be temporary 
movements in VUP. 
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Figure 7.4: Visually Identified Turning Points of VUP in Australian IPO 
Sample 
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Summarised results on turning points identified through visual analysis are 
reported in Table 7.2. For the two volume measures, seven peaks are observed in 
NOIPO and four are observed in GP. It appears that there is a linkage in peaks 
between the two volume measures. For instance, an identical peak in June 1981 is 
observed in both measures. Also, a peak observed in NOTPO in July 1987 is 
followed by a peak in October 1987 of GP; a peak observed in GP in July 1993 is 
followed by a peak in NOIPO in December 1993. This suggests a general 
consistency in pattern between the volume measures. 
Comparison of the two underpricing measures shows that peaks identified 
in the two underpricing measures are somewhat correlated, especially after 1988. 
For instance, a peak for VUP in August 1994 is followed by a one -month delay in 
VWUP in addition to two identical peaks in November 1980 and October 1988. 
164 
This finding is in contradiction with the US results as the two underpricing 
measures for the US sample exhibited quite different patterns. 
Ritter (1984b) studies IPOs in the USA and suggests that there is a hot 
issue market in 1980. The result above indicates that a hot issue period for 1980 is 
also observed in Australia which implies a potential linkage between the US and 
Australian IPO markets.87 
Table 7.2: Turning Points of Australian IPO Sample Based on Visual 
Analysis 
Peak 
Number of IPOs (NOIPO) 
Nov 76 
Jun 81 
Aug 84 
Jul 87 
Dec 88 
Jul 92 
Dec 93 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Jun 81 
Sep 82 
Oct 87 
Jul93 
Value - Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Nov 76 
Nov 80 
Mar 84 
Aug 85 
Oct 88 
Sep 94 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Nov 76 
Nov 80 
Aug 86 
Oct 88 
Aug 94 
Oct 95 
Trough 
Aug 78 
Apr 83 
Apr 85 
Jan 88 
Jul 91 
Mar 93 
Apr 95 
Feb 82 
Apr 85 
Jul. 91 
Jun 79 
Aug 81 
Dec 84 
Dec 87 
Nov 90 
Jun 79 
Dec 84 
Dec 87 
Apr 92 
Jan 95 
87 This issue of linkages across international WO markets is explored in Chapter nine of this thesis. 
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7.3.2 The Bry and Boschan Method 
Turning points selected by the Bry and Boschan method for the Australian 
sample are reported in Table 7.3. While five peaks are observed for NOIPO, there 
are only three peaks in GP. The decreased number of turning points identified in 
both volume measures (relative to visual analysis) might be caused by the 
smoothing process imposed by the Bry and Boschan method. 
Table 7.3: Turning Points Identified in the Australian IPO Sample using the 
Bry and Boschan Method 
Peaks 
Number of IPOs (NOIPO) 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Jun 81 
July 87 
Mar 89 
Jul 92 
Dec 93 
Oct 87 
Jul 93 
Nov 95 
Value- Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Aug 80 
Mar 84 
Aug 85 
Mar 87 
Oct 88 
May 91 
Sep 94 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Nov 80 
Sep 82 
Jun 85 
Jun 87 
Oct 88 
Sep 91 
Nov 94 
Troughs 
Jul 80 
Nov 82 
Jan 88 
Jan 91 
Mar 93 
Mar 95 
Jan 77 
Feb 93 
Mar 95 
Mar 80 
Aug 81 
Dec 84 
Mar 86 
Nov 87 
Nov 90 
Jun 92 
Jan 95 
Feb 79 
Oct 81 
Feb 83 
Apr 86 
Nov 87 
Nov 90 
Nov 92 
Jan 95 
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For the two underpricing measures, seven peaks are reported under the Bry 
and Boschan method. These turning points exhibit some similarities to those 
identified under visual analysis. For instance, a peak in VWUP in August 1980 is 
followed by a peak in VUP in November 1980, a peak in VWUP in March 1987 is 
followed by a peak in VUP in June 1987, a peak in VWUP in May 1991 is 
followed by a peak in VUP in September 1991, and a peak in VWUP in 
September 1994 is followed by a peak in VUP in November 1994. 
7.3.3 Markov Regime Switching Method 
The parameter estimates of the Markov regime- switching model for each 
of the four series across the full sample are reported in Table 7.4. A common 
characteristic across all activity measures is the observation of higher means and 
standard deviations in hot periods than in cold periods which is consistent with the 
US results. For instance, the average proportion of the number of issues per 
month (NOIPO) in hot periods is 0.81% of the sample with a standard deviation of 
0.07 %. In comparison, the average proportion of the number of issues is six times 
lower in cold periods (0.14 %) with a much lower standard deviation (0.02 %). 
Such results clearly indicate the difference in regimes. 
Similar differences between the regimes are obtained for GP where the 
average proportion of gross proceeds per month in hot periods is 0.99% of the 
sample compared to only 0.04% in cold periods. Again, the standard deviation is 
much higher in hot periods than cold periods (0.13% vs. 0.01 %). 
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Table 7.4: Maximum Likelihood Estimates from the Markov Regime Switching Model for Australian IPO Sample 
January 1976 - June 1997 
Y = a01 (1- S,) +a0,S, +[a1(1- St) +62St]s, 
where S, denotes the state of the world for hot (S, = 0) and cold (S, = 1) markets 
Parameter 
NOIPO GP VWUP VUP 
Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error Estimate Standard Error 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
1-q 0.0724* 0.0316 0.2840* 0.0547 0.7234* 0.1036 0.3577* 0.0724 
1-p 0.0490* 0.0208 0.1736* 0.0343 0.2320* 0.0431 0.1245* 0.0221 
a0i 0.8109* 0.0728 0.9850* 0.1273 64.9301* 12.8491 1.26748 0.0511 
a, 0.1374* 0.0177 0.0368* 0.0052 8.0900* 1.1001 0.0239* 0.0020 
0.6038* 0.0435 1.2153* 0.0876 87.9562* 8.1965 0.8536* 0.0042 
6 z 0.1395* 0.0157 0.0481* 0.0050 12.3097* 1.3266 0.0467* 0.0001 
*denotes significance at 5% level. 
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The two underpricing measures also exhibit substantially different 
parameters between regimes. VWUP is 64.93% in hot periods on average and only 
8.09% in cold periods. Similarly, VUP is 1.27% in hot periods compared to only 
0.02% in cold periods. The associated standard deviations reflect similar patterns. 
In summary, hot periods are characterised by substantially higher means 
and standard deviations than cold periods in all volume and underpricing measures. 
Consistent with the research method used in Chapter six, transition rules are 
applied to the regime switching probabilities, such that a hot issue period is defined 
when there are at least six consecutive probabilities greater than 0.5. Using the 
regime probabilities and transition rules, hot and cold issue periods are identified 
and reported in Table 7.5. Although there are common hot periods in the two 
volume measures ( NOIPO and GP), the starting and ending dates of hot periods in 
the two measures are slightly different. The expected duration of a hot issue period 
is 14 months using NOIPO and 4 months using GP.88 
While four hot periods are observed for VUP, there are only two hot 
periods for VWUP. Hot periods appear less persistent in the VWUP measure. The 
expected duration of a hot period is only one month using VWUP but three months 
using VUP. Of note, the hot period identified by VWUP for November 1980 to 
May 1981 is consistent with the hot issue period observed by Ritter (1984b) using 
US data. This finding further supports the argument above that there exists a 
correlation between US and Australian WO markets. 
ss Recall that the expected duration of each hot issue period can be calculated using (1 -q)"' and 
conversely for cold issue cycles can be calculated as (I-pr'. 
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Table 7.5: Chronology of IPO Activity Based on Transition Probabilities from 
the Regime -Switching Model for Australian IPO Sample 
January 1976 
- June 1997 
Hot Periods Cold Periods 
Number of IPOs (MOIPO) 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Feb 84 -Dec 87 
Jul 92 -Feb 95 
Aug 96 - Jun 97 
Jan 76 - Jan 84 
Jan 88 - Jun 92 
Mar 95 -Jul 96 
Jan 76 - May 85 
Jun 85 -Nov 87 Dec 87 - Jul 91 
Aug 91 - Sep 92 Oct 92 -Jun 93 
Jul 93 - Jan 95 Feb 95 - May 96 
Jun 96 - Jun 97 
Value- Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Jan 76 - Oct 80 
Nov 80 - May 81 Jun 81 - Jan 87 
Feb 87 - Nov 87 Dec 87 - Jun 97 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
May 85 - Nov 87 
Jan 92 - Jul 92 
Jul 93 -Nov 94 
Aug 96 -Jun 97 
Jan 76 - Apr 85 
Dec 87 - Dec 91 
Aug 92 - Jun 93 
Dec 94 - Jul 96 
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Compared with the 7 peaks in VWUP selected by the Bry and Boschan 
method, the regime switching method only identified two hot issue periods in 
VWUP. The difference can be explained by the different criteria imposed by the 
methods. While the regime switching method identifies regime shifts using the full 
data set to form a judgement, the Bry and Boschan method selects the peaks based 
on a period of ±5 months. Figure 7.3 reveals that some short-lived upward 
movements in VWUP are not identified as hot issue periods by the regime 
switching method. For instance, temporary upward movements in 1988 and 1994 
are not recognised as hot periods under the regime switching method. It also 
appears that in periods of high volatility where no clear cyclical patterns can be 
identified visually, the regime switching method tends to not identify these periods 
as hot issue periods - for instance, the period of August 1981 to December 1986 in 
VWUP, the periods August 1978 -April 1983 and January 1988 -July 1991 in 
NOIPO. 
Of note, the crash of October 1987 again exhibits a strong influence with 
both volume and underpricing measures shifting from a hot state to a cold state 
during the period. 
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7.4 Empirical Results from the Industrial Sector IPOs 
As discussed earlier, there are differences in features between resource and 
industrial sector IPOs. For instance, as indicated in Table 7.1, resource sector IPOs 
tend to be smaller, lower priced and experience greater underpricing in 
comparision to their industrial counterparts. Hence, a separate analysis is first 
conducted on industrial sector IPOs. 
7.4.1 Visual Analysis 
Figure 7.5 reports visually identified turning points for NOIPO for 
industrial IPOs. It is noted that the pattern of NOIPO for industrial sector IPOs is 
highly consistent with the full sample in Australia. The turning points of NOIPO 
identified in the industrial sector IPOs are almost identical to those identified in the 
full sample. 
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The visually identified turning points for GP are presented in Figure 7.6. 
Compared with GP in the full sample, the pattern of GP in industrial sector IPOs 
exhibits a strong similarity. The peaks identified are almost identical for the period 
1976 to 1990. The main difference is observed in 1987 with a peak for industrial 
sector IPOs ending two months before the crash while a peak in the full sample 
ends in October 1987. This suggests that the majority of new issues during the 
period of the stock market crash were natural resource sector issues. 
Figure 7.6: Visually Identified Turning Points of GP in Australian Industrial 
Sector IPOs 
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Figure 7.7 displays the visually identified turning points for VWUP. Three 
phases are eliminated due to their short durations (see *, # and + symbols). 
Comparing VWUP in the full sample with industrial sector IPOs, VWUP is 
generally less volatile after 1990 though there are a few large spikes. Most peaks 
fall within the period 1979 to 1985. 
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Figure 7.7: Visually Identified Turning Points of VWUP in Australian 
Industrial Sector IPOs 
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The turning points for VUP during the period are presented in Figure 7.8. 
An extreme peak is identified in July 1993 following a relative small peak in 
September 1991. This is due to the big floats of Commonwealth Bank and 
Woolworths Limited during that period. Before 1990, all peaks have smaller 
amplitudes relative to the peaks after 1990. 
Figure 7.8: Visually Identified Turning Points of VUP in Australian Industrial 
Sector IPOs 
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Table 7.6 reports summarized results on turning points identified by visual 
analysis. With six peaks identified for NOIPO, there are only four peaks identified 
for GP. For the two underpricing measures, there appears to be little linkage in 
turning points between each other. 
Table 7.6: Turning Points of Australian Industrial Sector IPOs Based on 
Visual Analysis 
Peak 
Number of IPOs (NOIPO) 
Feb 80 
Aug 84 
Jul 87 
Dec 88 
Jul 92 
Dec 93 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Jun 81 
Sep 82 
Aug 87 
Jul 93 
Trough 
May 83 
Apr 85 
Jun 88 
Jul 91 
May 93 
May 95 
Feb 82 
Jan 84 
Jul 91 
Value -Weighted !PO Underpricing (VWUP) 
May 77 Aug 79 
Jan 80 Nov 80 
May 81 Oct 81 
Mar 84 Oct 84 
Aug 85 Feb 89 
Jul 89 Dec 90 
Sep 94 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Jun 81 Feb 82 
Sep 82 May 83 
Jun 85 Apr 86 
Feb 87 Dec 87 
Jul 88 Dec 90 
Sep 91 Apr 92 
Jul93 Jan 95 
Feb 96 Jul 96 
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Comparing Tables 7.2 and 7.6, the results of visual analysis suggest that the 
two volume measures for industrial sector IPOs are consistent in their peaks with 
that of the full sample. For instance, both select peaks in 1984, 1987, 1988, 1992 
and 1993. 
7.4.2 The Bry and Boschan Method 
The turning points selected by the algorithm of the Bry and Boschan 
method are reported in Table 7.7. Although the turning points selected by the Bry 
and Boschan method are fewer than those identified by visual analysis, they exhibit 
a high degree of consistency when compared with those identified by visual 
analysis. For instance, both methods identify three identical peaks in NOIPO (July 
1987, July 1992 and December 1993) and four in VUP (May 1981, August 1985, 
July 1989 and September 1994). 
The peaks selected for the two volume measures exhibit a strong similarity 
with those peaks identified for the volume measures in the full sample. For 
instance, four identical peaks in NOIPO are noted in both industrial sector IPOs 
and the full sample (June 1981, July 1987, July 1992 and December 1993). 
In conjunction with the results of visual analysis, the above suggests that 
the volume patterns of industrial sector IPOs generally reflect the volume pattern 
observed in the full sample. The implication is that Australian industrial sector 
IPOs dominate the aggregate Australian new issues market. 
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Table 7.7: Turning Points in Australian Industrial Sector IPOs using the Bry 
and Boschan Method 
Peaks Troughs 
Number of IPOs (NOIPO) 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Feb 78 
Jun 81 Nov 82 
Jul 87 Nov 90 
Jul 92 Mar 93 
Dec 93 Mar 95 
Nov 78 
Jun 80 Jan 83 
Aug 87 Jan 88 
Aug 89 Aug 90 
Jul 93 Mar 95 
Jul 95 
Value -Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Feb 78 
May 81 Nov 82 
Nov 83 Oct 84 
Aug 85 Mar 86 
Feb 87 Dec 87 
Jul 89 Dec 90 
Mar 92 Sep 92 
Sep 94 Jan 95 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Dec 77 
Jun 81 Nov 82 
Jun 85 Mar 86 
Feb 87 Dec 90 
May 92 Sep 92 
Jul 93 Jan 95 
Feb 96 Jul 96 
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Consistent with the US results, Australian industrial sector IPOs suggest a 
lead -lag relationship in the turning points between the underpricing and volume 
measures. For instance, a peak in February 1987 in VUP is followed by a peak in 
July 1987 in NOIPO, a peak in May 1992 in VUP is followed by a peak in July 
1992 in NOIPO, and a peak in July 1993 in VUP is followed by a peak in 
December 1993 in NOIPO. Although the two volume measures show a 
consistency in the turning points, the results for the underpricing measures are 
somewhat different and no clear linkage in the turning points between VWL'P and 
VUP is observed. 
7.4.3 Markov Regime Switching Method 
Table 7.8 reports the parameter estimates of the Markov regime- switching 
model for each of the four series in the industrial sample. Consistent with Table 7.4 
for the full sample, the results clearly indicate the difference in regimes where 
means and standard deviations of the IPO activity measures are much higher in hot 
periods than in cold periods. Again, the lower underpricing (VWUP) for industrial 
sector IPOs is apparent. 
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Table 7.8: Maximum Likelihood Estimates from the Markov Regime Switching Model 
for Australian Industrial IPOs 
January 1976 - June 1997 
P, = ao,(1- S,) +aO2S, +[a1(1- S,) +6,S,]e, 
where S, denotes the state of the world for hot (S, = 0) and cold (S, = I) markets 
Parameter 
(I) 
NOIPO GP VWUP VUP 
Estimate 
(2) 
Standard Error 
(3) 
Estimate 
(4) 
Standard Error 
(5) 
Estimate 
(6) 
Standard Error 
(7) 
Estimate 
(8) 
Standard Error 
(9) 
1 -q 
1 -p 
aot 
a na 
6 
t 
rT 
z 
0.0622* 
0.0503* 
0.7992* 
0.0977* 
0.6307* 
0.1345* 
0.0295 
0.0220 
0.0639 
0.0126 
0.0437 
0.0106 
0.6234* 
0.1640* 
1.2562* 
0.0274* 
1.3055* 
0.0484* 
0.0240 
0.0113 
0.0720 
0.0041 
0.0199 
0.0026 
0.4596* 
0.2752* 
42.5124* 
1.8805* 
41.7006* 
4.2267* 
0.1399 
0.0285 
5.6755 
0.9835 
9.6312 
1.8468 
0.9835* 
0.2751* 
1.2916* 
0.0208* 
1.6095* 
0.0516* 
0.0018 
0.0244 
0.2606 
0.0071 
0.1089 
0.0096 
*denotes significance at 5% level. 
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Hot and cold issue periods for industrial IPOs are identified and reported in 
Table 7.9 using the regime probabilities and transition rules following the earlier 
procedure.ß9 The two volume measures, NOIPO and GP, exhibit similar hot issue 
periods to those identified in the full sample and are generally consistent with each 
other. One difference between the two measures is the period from August 1988 to 
April 1989, where NOIPO is in a hot state and GP is in a cold state. 
The transition probability of moving from hot to cold periods for VWUP 
has decreased whereas for GP and VUP the transition probabilities of moving from 
hot to cold periods have increased. In other words, hot periods identified in VWUP 
are more persistent while hot periods identified in VUP and GP are less persistent 
for the industrial sector than for the IPO market as a whole. This feature is also 
reflected in estimates of a, and aZ which have decreased, compared to the full 
sample, implying a decrease in the variability of VWUP in hot and cold periods. 
The implication again is that resource sector IPOs are relatively more underpriced 
and smaller in size compared to industrial IPOs. Hence, after removing the 
resource sector IPOs, VWUP becomes more stable. Of note, the hot and cold 
periods for NOIPO remain almost the same. 
89 Graphs of the estimated regime probabilities for the measures are not reported here but are 
available on request. 
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Table 7.9: Chronology of IPO Activity Based on Transition Probabilities from 
the Regime -Switching Model for Australian Industrial IPOs 
January 1976 - June 1997 
Hot Periods Cold Periods 
Number of IPOs (NOIPO) 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Jan 76 - Jan 84 
Feb 84 - Jan 88 Feb 88 - Jul 88 
Aug 88 - Apr 89 May 90 - Oct 91 
Nov 91- Jun 97 
Feb 14 - Aug 84 
Jun 85 - Oct 87 
Aug 91 - Sep 92 
Jul 93 - Jun 97 
Value - Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Apr 76 - Jan 78 
Sep 79 - Sep 82 
Jun 83 - Dec 87 
Jul 88 - May 90 
Aug 91 - Jun 97 
Value of Underpricine (VUP) 
Nov 83 - Dec 87 
Aug 91 - Nov 94 
Jun 95 - Jun 97 
Jan 76 - Jan 84 
Sep 84 - May 85 
Nov 87 - Jul 91 
Oct 92 - Jun 93 
Feb 78 -Aug79 
Oct 82 - May 83 
Jan 88 - Jun 88 
Jun 90 - Jul 91 
Jan 76 - Oct 83 
Jan 88 - Jul 91 
Dec 94 - May 95 
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The results again show the influence of the crash of October 1987, with all 
measures shifting from a hot state to a cold state soon thereafter. The two pricing 
measures, VWUP and VUP, identify a hot period between late 1983 and December 
1987, ending two months after the crash. However, the ending months for the two 
volume measures vary. The hot period for NOIPO ends in January 1988 which is 
one month later than the pricing measures while GP ends in October 1987 which is 
two months earlier than the pricing measures. There are some implications that 
follow. 
First, the number of IPOs measure (NOIPO) is not as dynamic in its 
response to the crash compared to the price based measure (GP). The persistence in 
NOIPO during adverse market conditions supports the argument that even if 
issuers respond to market conditions when timing decisions, the lag induced by 
institutional and regulatory requirements exposes issuers to the risk of making an 
issue during market downturns. 
Second, the lagged response to the crash can also be explained by the 
Australian regulatory environment where there is a significant difference in elapsed 
times between the closing date of offer and actual date of listing on the ASX. 
Based on a survey of 243 IPOs listed on the ASX between 1993 and 1997, the 
average number of days elapsed between the closing date of offer and the first day 
of market trading is 25 days with a minimum of 3 days and a maximum of 133 
days.90 With the existence of significant elapsed times between the offer close and 
the subsequent listing date in Australia, a market downturn exposes an issuer to a 
greater risk of an 'unsuccessful' offer. Moreover, if the close of an offer is followed 
90 Data are obtained from SDC IPO database. 
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by a market downturn, the time before listing exposes investors to the risk where 
potential returns from the issue are less than their expected value. 
Third, as indicated in Table 7.9, the response of GP to the crash in 1987 is 
quicker than NOIPO which suggests that IPOs issued immediately following the 
crash were mainly small issues. Indeed, the average size of issues following the 
crash through to January 1988 was A$8.7 million compared to an average across 
the sample period of A$44 million. Moreover, these issues were overpriced by an 
average of 13.0 %. In a market downturn, large companies may have a greater 
capacity and incentive to withdraw their offers or indeed may be bound by stricter 
underwriting clauses which require withdrawal because of their size. The relative 
costs to small firms from withdrawal may necessitate the offer proceeding despite 
adverse market conditions. 
Again, Table 7.9 reveals a possible lead -lag feature between the volume 
and underpricing measures where the hot issue period in the underpricing measures 
appear to lead the hot issue period in the volume measures. For instance, a hot 
period in VWUP commenced in June 1983 and is followed by a hot period in 
NOIPO in February 1984, a hot period commenced in VWUP in July 1988 and is 
followed by a hot period in NOIPO in August 1988, and a hot period in VWUP 
commenced in August 1991 and is followed by a hot period in NOIPO in 
November 1991. 
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73 Empirical Results from the Resource Sector IPOs 
The analysis is now repeated on the sample of resource sector IPOs to shed 
light on the behaviour of resource sector IPOs. The aim is to explore the difference 
in behaviour between industrial and resource sector IPOs. 
7.5.1 Visual Analysis 
The visually identified turning points for NOIPO are exhibited in Figure 
7.9. Compared to the industrial sector IPOs in Figure 7.5, the issuing pattern of 
resource issues is generally consistent with that of their industrial counterparts, 
except in the period 1978 to 1982. During this period, there are a relatively large 
proportion of resource issues with a peak observed in November 1980. A large 
peak is observed in September 1987 and is followed by a similar value in October 
1987. In contrast with NOIPO in their industrial counterparts, this suggests that the 
majority of new issues around the period of the 1987 stock market crash were 
resource sector IPOs. 
Figure 7.9: Visually Identified Turning Points of NOIPO in Australian 
Resource Sector IPOs 
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Figure 7.10 presents visually identified turning points for GP. Two peaks 
(March 1989 and November 1994) are eliminated as they fail to meet either the 
criteria of a minimum duration of six months for a phase or a minimum duration of 
15 months for a cycle (see * and + symbols). Following a peak in June 1987, GP 
exhibits a decreasing trend. This suggests that resource sector IPOs generally have 
relatively smaller offer sizes after the 1987 market crash.91 While the turning 
points of GP identified in industrial sector IPOs are highly consistent with those 
identified in the full sample, the turning points of GP in resource sector IPOs 
present little consistency compared to the full sample and the industrial sector. This 
suggests that the issuing size of the Australian IPO market is dominated by 
industrial sector IPOs while resource sector IPOs generally have smaller offer 
sizes. 
Figure 7.10: Visually Identified Turning Points of GP in Australian Resource 
Sector IPOs 
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91 This may be explained by the downside impact of the stock market crash of October 1987. 
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Figure 7.11 presents turning points for VWUP in resource sector IPOs. A 
phase in VWUP between March and November 1980 is eliminated due to its short 
duration in cycle (see * symbols).92 The turning points identified reveal neither a 
close relationship with those identified in the full sample or to those identified in 
the industrial sector. Generally, most turning points identified for VWUP in the 
resource sector fall between 1979 and 1988. 
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Figure 7.11: Visually Identified Turning Points of VWUP in Australian 
Resource Sector IPOs 
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Visually identified turning points for VUP are displayed in Figure 7.12. 
The figure suggests that VUP is more stable than its underpricing counterpart, 
VWUP. Within the five peak points identified, an extreme point is observed in 
November 1976. It also appears that all peaks are short- lived. 
92 Following a trough in March 1980, the next trough in April 1981 has a duration of only 13 
months. 
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Figure 7.12: Visually Identified Turning Points of VUP in Australian 
Resource Sector IPOs 
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Table 7.10 reports summarised results for visually identified turn ing points 
in the resource sector. Upon the finding of five identical peaks selected for the two 
underpricing measures, it suggests a possible linkage between the underpricing 
measures in resource sector IPOs. For instance, both measures are observed with 
peaks in August 1986 and October 1988. Contrary to the lead -Iag relationship 
between the underpricing and volume measures observed in both the full sample 
and industrial sector IPOs, such a relationship appears to be mixed for resource 
sector IPOs. For instance, a peak in August 1983 in VWUP is followed by a peak 
in December 1983 in NOIPO, but a peak in October 1988 in VWUP follows a peak 
in September 1987 in NOIPO. 
Comparing Tables 7.2 and 7.10, peaks in VUP selected for the resource 
sector are almost identical to those selected for the fulI sample. With six peaks 
selected for VUP of the full sample, five of them appear to be associated with 
peaks in VUP of the resource sector (i.e. November 1976, November 1980, August 
1986, October 1988 and October 1995). 
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Table 7.10: Turning Points of Australian Resource Sector IPOs Based on 
Visual Analysis 
Peak Trough 
Number of 1POs ( NOTPO) 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Oct 78 
Nov 80 May 82 
Dec 83 June 85 
Nov 85 Sep 86 
Sep 87 May 93 
Oct 93 Sep 95 
Sep 96 
Nov 80 May 82 
Oct 82 Oct 83 
Sep 84 Jun 85 
Aug 86 Feb 87 
Jun 87 May 93 
Oct 95 May 96 
Value-Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Jul79 Apr 81 
Aug 83 Mar 85 
Aug 86 Nov 87 
Oct 88 Jun 92 
Jun 93 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Nov 76 Jun 79 
Nov 80 Apr 81 
Aug 86 Oct 87 
Oct 88 Jun 92 
Oct 95 
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7.5.2 The Bry and Boschan Method 
Tuning points selected by the algorithm of the Bry and Boschan method are 
reported in Table 7.11. Only two peaks are selected in NOIPO under this method 
compared to six peaks identified under visual analysis (see Table 7.10). This may 
be explained by the smoothing process in the Bry and Boschan method. With a 
majority of the sample months experiencing no issue (138 out of 258 months), the 
amplitudes of extreme values are decreased through the smoothing process. 
Turning points in GP selected by the Bry and Boschan method are highly 
consistent to those identified by visual analysis. However, the linkage of turning 
points in GP is somewhat weak between industrial and resource sector IPOs. 
The two underpricing measures give different results to each other. The 
dates of the peaks are different between the measures. It is also noted that the 
results of the underpricing measures are quite different to those in the full sample 
and industrial sector. 
In summary, the results of each IPO activity measure in resource sector 
IPOs show little consistency to those of full sample and industrial sector IPOs. 
Further, there is little evidence of a lead -lag relationship between the underpricing 
and volume measures. 
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Table 7.11: Turning Points of Australian Resource Sector IPOs using the Bry 
and Boschan Method 
Peaks Troughs 
Number of IPOs (NOIPO) 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Oct 76 
Aug 87 Dec 89 
Oct 93 Apr 95 
Oct 76 
Jun 79 Feb 80 
Nov 80 Dec 81 
Oct 82 Apr 83 
Sep 84 Apr 85 
Jun 87 Jul 88 
Oct 95 
Value- Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Oct 76 
Jul 79 Apr 81 
Aug 83 Mar 85 
May 87 Nov 87 
Oct 88 Jun 92 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Jun 79 
Nov 80 Apr 81 
May 83 Dec 84 
Jun 87 Jun 92 
Sep 92 Jul 94 
Oct 95 Feb 96 
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7.5.3 Markov Regime Switching Method 
The parameter estimates of the Markov regime- switching model for each of 
the four resource sector series are reported in Table 7.12. Consistent with Tables 
7.4 and 7.8, the results clearly indicate the difference in regimes where hot issue 
periods are characterised by substantially higher means and standard deviations in 
all measures. 
Table 7.12: Maximum Likelihood Estimates from the Markov Regime 
Switching Model for Australian Resource IPOs 
January 1976 - June 1997 
1 = a01(1- S,) +a02S, 
+[01(1- St) +cr2StIe1 
where S, denotes the state of the world for hot (S, = 0) and cold (S, = 1) markets 
Parameter 
(1) 
NOIPO GP VWUP VUP 
Estimate Std. Error 
(2) (3) 
Estimate Std. Error 
(4) (5) 
Estimate Std. Error 
(6) (7) 
Estimate Std. Error 
(8) (9) 
1 -q 
I -p 
a01 
a52 
6 z 
0.3363* 
0.í413* 
1.0439* 
0.1192* 
0.7459* 
0.1885* 
0.0969 
0.0331 
0.1212 
0.0165 
0.0631 
0.0119 
0.7614* 
0.1164* 
1.3327* 
0.0136* 
1.5620* 
0.0457* 
0.0880 
0.0407 
0.1388 
0.0067 
0.0353 
0.0153 
0.5908* 
0.1879* 
35.1973* 
3.3225* 
60.7196* 
5.6330* 
0.0862 
0.0430 
4.2992 
0.0367 
0.4889 
0.4456 
0.5098* 
0.4873* 
2.0090* 
0.0306 
3.6022* 
0.1170* 
0.1052 
0.0864 
0.4252 
0.0180 
0.0849 
0.0278 
*denotes significance at 5% level. 
191 
Hot and cold periods for resource IPOs are identified from estimated 
regime probabilities and are reported in Table 7.13 93 Hot periods identified in 
NOIPO are not as persistent as those identified in the full sample and industrial 
sector IPOs. Consistent with Tables 7.5 and 7.9, the two volume measures, NOIPO 
and GP, are somewhat consistent with each other. However, while the volume 
measures show some common hot issue periods to those identified in both the full 
sample and the industrial sector, the degree of the consistency is somewhat weak. 
The results imply that the number of issues in the resource sector is not as strongly 
correlated with the overall market as the industrial sector. In addition, the hot issue 
periods in the resource sector do not last as long as hot periods in the industrial 
sector. 
The underpricing measures exhibit few hot issue periods common to those 
identified in the full sample or industrial sector, especially in VWUP. The 
inconsistency of hot issue periods in VWUP between industrial and resource sector 
IPOs may explain why there are only two hot issue periods in VWUP identified for 
full sample. This also supports the argument that resource sector IPOs have an 
influence on the pricing measures of 1PO activity. 
Most surprisingly, the market crash of October 1987 has little (or no) 
impact on resource sector IPOs. The earlier response to the 1987 market crash is in 
NOIPO where a hot period ends six months after the crash. For the rest of the 
measures, the influence of the crash is minimal. The hot issue periods for GP, 
VWUP and VUP end in March 1989 which exhibits a fifteen -month delay in 
response to the crash. The finding has two implications. 
93 Graphs of estimated regime probabilities are not reported here but are available on request. 
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Table 7.13: Chronology of IPO Activity Based on Transition Probabilities 
from the Regime -Switching Model for Australian Resource IPOs 
January 1976 
- June 1997 
Hot Periods Cold Periods 
Number of ¡POs ( NOIPO) 
Gross Proceeds (GP) 
Nov 80 - Aug 81 
Dec 83 - Feb 85 
Nov 85 - Apr 88 
Jul 93 - Nov 94 
Sep 96 - June 97 
Nov 78 - Oct 81 
Dec 83 - Jan 85 
Aug 86 - Mar 89 
Jul 93 -June 97 
Value - Weighted IPO Underpricing (VWUP) 
Nov 78 - Aug 81 
Jun 82 - Nov 83 
Aug 84 - Mar 85 
Nov 85 - Mar 89 
Sep 96 - Jun 97 
Value of Underpricing (VUP) 
Aug 80 - Apr 81 
Mar 87 - Mar 89 
Sep 96 - June 97 
Jan 76 - Oct 80 
Sep 81 - Nov 83 
Mar 85 - Oct 85 
May 88 - Jun 93 
Dec 94 - Aug 96 
Jan 76 - Oct 78 
Nov 81 - Nov 83 
Feb 85 -Jul 86 
Apr 89 - Jun 93 
Jan 76 - Oct 78 
Sep 81 - May 82 
Dec 83 - Jul 84 
Apr 85 - Oct 85 
Apr 89 - Aug 96 
Jan 76 - Jul 80 
May 81 - Feb 87 
Apr 89 - Aug 96 
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First, it supports the argument that the valuation of resource sector IPOs is 
more difficult than their industrial counterparts due to a higher degree of 
information asymmetry and uncertainty. A market downturn further increases the 
degree of information asymmetry and uncertainty in the valuation of resource 
sector IPOs. As a result, the issuers of resource companies may gamble on the 
possible gains arising from higher information asymmetry and uncertainty by 
risking a public float in periods of market downturns. 
Second, as shown in Table 7.1, resource sector 1POs are generally smaller 
in size. The relative costs of withdrawal to small resource IPOs may force the 
issuers of resource companies to accept the risk of adverse market conditions. A 
similar point has also been argued earlier in Section 7.4. 
7.6 Explanatory Relationships 
The above results suggest a casual observation that there are some possible 
lead -lag features between volume and underpricing measures (e.g. Tables 7.7 and 
7.9). Specifically, hot periods in the underpricing measures appear to lead hot 
periods in the volume measures. For instance, in Table 7.9 a hot period in VWUP 
commenced in June 1983 and is followed by a hot period in the volume measures 
in February 1984, a hot period commenced in VWUP in July 1988 and is followed 
by a hot period in NOIPO in August 1988, and a hot period commenced in August 
1991 in the underpricing measures and is followed by a hot period in NOIPO in 
November 1991. These are just casual observations and we now turn to statistical 
analysis of the relationships between the measures. 
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To examine the relationship between the IPO activity measures, a standard 
OLS approach is used: 
Where 
NOIPO, = C1 + EaiVWUP_i +e, 
j=-6 
GP, = C2+ EbiVWUP_i +w, 
Ci and C2 are the constant; 
n is the number of leads and lags; 
Er and w, are the normally distributed error terms. 
Table 7.14 reports the regression results between current, lead and lagged 
series of VWUP against the volume measures for the full sample. There is some 
evidence that underpricing leads IPO volume as evidenced by the significant lags 
of VWUP on NOIPO (at lags 2 and 5). In relation to GP, there is a significant 
negative correlation at VWUP lead of 2 and lag of 6 but we do not place much 
emphasis on these results as suggested by the insignificant F- statistic. 
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Table 7.14: Regression Results of Lead -lag Relationship between 
VWUP, NOIPO and GP for Australian IPO Sample 
Variables 
NOIPO GP 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 0.2822* 0.0844 0.5203* 0.1402 
VWUP Lead 1 -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0008 0.0006 
VWUP Lead 2 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0011* 0.0005 
VWUP Lead 3 -0.0004 0.0006 -0.0003 0.0006 
VWUP Lead 4 -0.0003 0.0006 -0.0009 0.0006 
VWUP Lead 5 0.0003 0.0007 -0.0007 0.0008 
VWUP Lead 6 0.0003 0.0005 0.0004 0.0009 
VWUP 0.0005 0.0004 -0.0002 0.0005 
VWUP Lag 1 0.0005 0.0007 0.0010 0.0014 
VWUP Lag 2 0.0014* 0.0006 0.0004 0.0006 
VWUP Lag 3 0.0008 0.0008 -0.0004 0.0006 
VWUP Lag 4 0.0011 0.0007 -0.0006 0.0006 
VWUP Lag 5 0.0013* 0.0006 -0.0002 0.0008 
VWUP Lag 6 0.0005 0.0006 -0.0012* 0.0006 
F- statistic 1.0925 0.3246 
R-square 0.0609 0.0189 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey -West 
correction. 
2. * denotes significance at 5% level 
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The evidence is stronger for the industrial sector as presented in Table 7.15. 
From this table there is a contemporaneous correlation between the VWUP and 
NOIPO. While the leads of VWUP show no correlation with NOIPO up to six 
months, the lags of VWUP are correlated with NOIPO up to six months although 
the first two lags of VWUP are not significant. Hence, underpricing appears to lead 
IPO volume by up to six months. This finding supports the argument that the 
decision to issue is a function of current observed underpricing (Rock 1986; Firth, 
1997). 
Table 7.15: Regression Results of Lead -lag Relationship between VWUP, 
NOIPO and GP for Australian Industrial Sector IPOs 
Variables 
NOIPO GP 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 0.1250 0.0760 0.3645* 0.1426 
VWUP Lead 1 -0.0001 0.0007 -0.0018* 0.0009 
VWUP Lead 2 0.0007 0.0009 -0.0020 0.0011 
VWUP Lead 3 0.0005 0.0008 -0.0002 0.0012 
VWUP Lead 4 0.0002 0.0011 -0.0021 0.0011 
VWUP Lead 5 0.0009 0.0010 0.0008 0.0019 
VWUP Lead 6 -0.0009 0.0009 0.0025 0.0022 
VWUP 0.0019* 0.0008 -0.0001 0.0007 
VWUP Lag 1 0.0004 0.0007 0.0004 0.0012 
VWUP Lag 2 0.0020 0.0011 0.0019 0.0014 
VWUP Lag 3 0.0023* 0.0009 -0.0008 0.0010 
VWUP Lag 4 0.0027* 0.0013 -0.0001 0.0012 
VWUP Lag 5 0.0043* 0.0016 0.0007 0.0013 
VWUP Lag 6 0.0032* 0.0016 -0.0013 0.0011 
F- statistic 3.3220* 0.6020 
R- square 0.1754 0.0371 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey -West 
correction. 
2. * denotes significance at 5% level. 
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Although this lead -Iag relationship between VWUP, GP and NOTPO is less 
apparent for resource sector IPOs, the analysis still follows and the results are 
reported in Table 7.16. There is little evidence that underpricing leads IPO volume 
in the resource sector as evidenced by only one significant lag of VWUP on 
NOIPO (at lag 4). In relation to GP, there is a significant negative correlation at 
VWUP lead of 4 and significant positive correlation at current VWUP and lag of 5. 
Again, these results are not statistically important as suggested by the F- statistics. 
Table 7.16: Regression Results of Lead -lag Relationship between VWLT, 
NOIPO and GP for Australian Resource Sector IPOs 
Variables 
NOIPO GP 
Coefficient Standard Error Coefficient Standard Error 
Constant 0.2634* 0.0535 0.2845* 0.0844 
VWUP Lead 1 0.0003 0.0003 -0.0001 0.0011 
VWUP Lead 2 0.0007 0.0005 -0.0009 0.0008 
VWUP Lead 3 0.0001 0.0005 -0.0014 0.0008 
VWUP Lead 4 -0.0002 0.0006 0.0007 0.0013 
VWUP Lead 5 0.0002 0.0005 0.0000 0.0006 
VWUP Lead 6 0.0002 0.0005 -0.0005 0.0005 
VWUP 0.0017 0.0012 0.0040 0.0022 
VWUP Lag 1 0.0010 0.0011 0.0011 0.0015 
VWUP Lag 2 0.0010 0.0009 0.0009 0.0013 
VWUP Lag 3 0.0007 0.0009 0.0003 0.0010 
VWUP Lag 4 0.0023* 0.0012 0.0002 0.0005 
VWUP Lag 5 0.0014 0.00I0 0.0039* 0.0012 
VWUP Lag 6 0.0004 0.0007 0.0000 0.0005 
F- statistic 2.6514 1.8278 
R- square 0.1294 0.0929 
Notes: 
1. Standard errors are adjusted for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey -West 
correction. 
2. * denotes significance at 5% level. 
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The most common hot issue period observed across all measures of IPO 
activity is around mid 1991 to June 1997. This period is the longest of all hot 
periods documented over the sample. As with the transition to the cold period 
associated with the crash of October 1987, there appears to be a correlation 
between IPO activity and stock market conditions.94 For instance, from the early 
1990s it is widely recognised that the stock market has been experiencing a 
sustained bull run during which market indicators and price -earnings ratios have 
risen substantially and dividend -to -price ratios have fallen.95 Other factors which 
may also be relevant include investor sentiment, the regulatory environment, the 
economic climate, interest rates, managed fund flows and the level of stock market 
volatility. The importance of these variables on the cycles in the IPO activity will 
be examined in the next chapter. 
7.7 Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have analysed the aggregate behaviour of the Australian 
IPO market. The aim is to analyse the existence of hot and cold issue periods in the 
Australian market. Through the development of a series of activity variables, 
different characteristics of the market are examined, focussing on volume and 
underpricing of new issues. More importantly, the influence of the resource sector 
is demonstrated and explored. 
94 Of note, Choe et al. (1993) document that the frequency of seasoned offerings also rises in 
economic upturns using US data from 1971 to 1991. They identify a positive relationship between 
equity issue volume and economic activity arguing that firms will issue equity when the effects of 
adverse selection, as a proportion of investment returns, are less important in the situation of 
improved business conditions. 
95 During the period 1991 to 1999, the All Ordinaries index increased from 1279.82 to 3152.50 and 
the price -earnings ratio increased from 11 to 26.76. Over the same period, the market dividend yield 
decreased from 7.0% to 3.18 %. 
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Generally, the patterns of the volume measures are found to be consistent to 
each other for both the full sample and industrial sector IPOs albeit with some 
slight differences. This suggests that industrial sector IPOs dominate Australian 
new issues in terms of both number of issues and values. 
Resource sector issues are found to be relatively small in size and price, and 
exhibit greater underpricing. Generally, each of the four measures in the resource 
sector exhibit different hot issue periods and turning points when compared with 
those in the full sample and industrial sector. Although there appears a weak 
linkage between the two volume measures, a Iead -lag relationship between 
underpricing and volume measures is not observed. Moreover, the 1987 market 
crash is found to have little impact on the four measures of IPO activity for 
resource sector IPOs. Further, it appears that resource sector IPOs exhibit a 
substantial influence on the pricing measures of overall WO market activity. 
Through the application of a number of methods, regime switches are 
documented between hot and cold issue markets over the period 1976 to 1997. In 
summary, hot issue periods appear to exist in the Australian IPO market and are 
characterised initially by a large degree of underpricing followed by unusually high 
new issue volume. The activity measures studied here indicate that different 
periods may be characterised by differences in the types of issues. While the 
number of issues and total size of issues in each month are generally correlated, at 
times the measures of underpricing yield different results. Hot issue periods appear 
related to the general stock market conditions, which supports the hypothesis that 
managers time their issues to attempt to take advantage of favourable market 
conditions. However, this timing comes at a risk for both issuers and investors due 
to the institutional and regulatory requirements in Australia. Importantly, a lead -lag 
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relationship is identified, particularly for the industrial sector, such that 
underpricing measures lead volume by up to six months. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT96 
EXPLANATIONS ASSOCIATED WITH CYCLES 
IN THE IPO MARKET 
8.1 Introduction 
The extant literature has generally documented the existence of hot and 
cold WO markets but offered little explanation for them. More recently, some 
economic variables have been suggested as possible explanations for the cyclical 
behaviour. For instance, Ljungqvist (1995) provides evidence that the number of 
IPOs changes over time in line with the business cycle and stock market 
conditions in Germany. Choe et al. (1993) find that, in the USA, periods of 
economic growth are associated with greater volume of seasoned equity issues. 
Rees (1997) provides evidence that the stock market condition predicts both the 
value and the volume of IPOs in the UK market. In addition, studies into seasoned 
equity offerings by Lucas and McDonald (1990), Taggart (1977), Marsh (1982) 
and Smith (1977) provide theoretical and empirical support for the argument that 
equity issues tend to follow stock market rises. 
In this chapter, these explanations are discussed and subsequent hypotheses 
relating to the cyclical nature of IPO activity are developed. These hypotheses are 
96 In addition to my supervisors, Tim Brailsford and Richard Heaney, I would like to thank Simon 
Wheatley and Vincent Warther for providing their investor sentiment data, John Powell for his 
valuable advice on the development of hypotheses and Adrian Pagan for his constructive 
comments on research techniques in this chapter. 
202 
tested using both OLS and probit analysis. Chapter five has developed four 
measures of IPO activity. NOIPO and GP measure IPO Volume, VWUP and VUP 
measure IPO underpricing. Due to the similarity of the measures in IPO volume 
and in underpricing, the analysis conducted in this chapter concentrates on one 
measure of volume (NOIPO) and one measure of underpricing (VWUP). 
8.2 Development of Hypotheses 
The existence of hot and cold IPO markets implies variation, or expected 
variation, in market conditions. Further, evidence from Chapters six and seven 
suggests that IPO activity may be correlated with economic and stock market 
conditions. Thus, hypotheses are developed with consideration of relevant 
economic and stock market variables. 
8.2.1 Hypotheses Related to Economic Activity 
Empirical evidence also shows a strong link between the stock market and 
economic activity. For instance, Samuelson (1966) claims that the stock market is 
a reliable forecaster of the business cycle in the USA. In the following sub- 
sections, business cycle indicators that measure economic conditions are suggested 
as possible explanations of hot issue markets. 
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8.2.1,1 Business Cycle97 
The business cycle reflects movements in economic activity as a whole and 
consists of many diverse parts. The relationship between the equity market and the 
business cycle is well documented in the literature (e.g. Moore 1961; Samuelson 
1966; Fama 1981; Siegel 1991). 
Bulmash and Trivoli (1991) suggest that economic expansions are 
associated with increased use of productive capacity and increased employment 
which eventually brings wage increases. Based on the theory of Cost -Push 
inflation, rising wages in turn increase consumer spending (see Lipsey et al. 1986, 
Wachter 1974; Seelig 1974). The implication is that demand for equity increases 
as a result of increased spending and this in turn drives up stock prices, in general. 
Assuming a primary goal of issuers is to maximise the proceeds from IPOs, 
rational issuers would take advantage of the opportunity of increased demand for 
equity by timing their issues. If enough firms follow this strategy, an increased 
number of offerings are expected during economic expansions. 
Choe et al. (1993) develop a model where firms choose between issuing 
equity and debt across business cycle expansions and contractions. They observe 
that, in general, the frequency of seasoned offerings is positively associated with 
business cycle variables (see also Myers and Majluf 1984).98 
An improvement in economic conditions signals good prospects of future 
business conditions with greater growth opportunities, and firms are Iess likely to 
97 Industrial production is generally used as an alternative proxy for long -term growth trends in the 
economy (Elton and Gruber 1995). During the period of January 1976 -June 1998, the correlation 
between industrial production and business cycle index is 0.897. Due to this high correlation 
between the two indices, we focus on the broader business cycle index. 
9s Several business cycle variables are used in Choe et al. (1993), such as business cycle leading 
indicator and the growth rate of industrial production. 
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forego these growth opportunities (Choe et al. 1993). Subsequently, companies 
alter their business strategies and investment decisions to optimise growth 
opportunities. For instance, companies increase production and improve 
productivity. As a result, expected future cash flows increase. Since the theoretical 
stock price of a company is equal to the discounted sum of expected future cash 
flows and in turn, the magnitude of cash flows is dependent on the strength of the 
economy, equity prices should reflect expectations of future economic activity. In 
other words, an upward revision in expectations of future economic conditions 
should result in higher equity prices. Therefore, we posit that 
HI a: Changes in economic condition (as measured by the business cycle 
index) are positively related to, and lead, the level of NOIPO. 
In the IPO process, IPO issuers cannot act instantaneously since there is 
generally a three- to six -month period between commencing the IPO process and 
consequently going public (Lipman 1997). When the decision is made to issue an 
IPO, the issuer needs to forecast the future condition of the IPO market at the 
expected listing date based on the current information set. This information set 
includes current stock market and economic conditions. After the offer price is set, 
it becomes difficult to change. In other words, the offer price is set based on the 
current and expected economic and stock market conditions at the date of price 
setting. As discussed above, an upward revision in the expectations of future 
economic conditions after the initial IPO price setting should lead to a higher stock 
price. Hence, an unexpected increase in economic conditions, after the date of 
setting the initial offer price, should result in a higher aftermarket price for the 
IPO. As a result, higher IPO underpricing is expected on listing. Therefore, we 
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posit that there is a positive relation between changes in economic conditions and 
IPO underpricing. 
H1 b: Changes in economic condition (as measured by the business cycle 
index) are positively related to, and lead, the degree of VWUP. 
8.2.2 Hypotheses Related to Stock Market Conditions 
It is argued that the first response to a change in business conditions occurs 
in the capital market, especially in the stock market where investors evaluate the 
impact of the change on their wealth. The change in business conditions should 
result in a revision of investor expectations and consequently alter the prices of 
bonds and stocks. Thus, a capital market signal occurs. Managers in turn react to 
the capital market signal by altering their investment decisions, strategies and 
production (Krainer 1992). 
8.2.2.1 Changes in the Stock Market Level 
There are a variety of circumstances which can Iead to a decision to go 
public. Loughran et al. (1994) examine IPO underpricing and the long run 
performance of IPOs in 15 international markets and argue that IPOs are timed to 
take advantage of windows of opportunity. Since there are periods when investors 
place high valuations on the future growth opportunities of companies, companies 
are more likely to go public during these periods. Loughran et al. (1994) provide 
evidence of a correlation between the level of the stock market and the number of 
IPOs in 14 out of 15 countries. Rees (1997) also provides empirical evidence of 
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the stock market effects on both the number and the value of IPOs 99 However, 
both Loughran et al. (1994) and Rees (1997) fail to explain why a relation should 
exist between the IPO activity and stock market conditions. 
In this study, we provide two alternative hypotheses on the relationship 
between IPO activity and changes in the stock market. The first hypothesis is 
associated with the empirical finding of the importance of underwriter reputation 
in the process of an IPO, and the second hypothesis is based on the existence of 
information asymmetry in the IPO market. While the first hypothesis addresses the 
relationship between the number of IPOs and changes in the stock market level, 
the second hypothesis discusses the relationship between IPO underpricing and 
changes in the stock market level. 
It is evident that underwriters with a good reputation generally have little 
incentive to underwrite small, speculative and start-up firms (Booth and Smith 
1986; Beatty and Ritter 1986; Tinic 1988; Wolfe et al. 1994). The phenomenon 
can be explained by the potential for undersubscribed offerings due to the impact 
of adverse price movements. A downward change in market conditions will create 
adverse price movements on or after the offer date. This may lead the market 
value of an IPO to fall below the offer price and result in an undersubscribed 
offering (Wolfe et al. 1994). In a rising stock market, however, the probability of 
an adverse price movement on or after the offering date is lower. Hence, 
prestigious underwriters will be more receptive to expanding their participation in 
the new issue market during such periods (Wolfe et al. 1994). This should 
encourage more small and speculative start -up firms to go public during a bullish 
99 Loughran et aI. (1994) use annual IPO volume to measure IPO activity while Rees (1997) uses 
quarterly data. In this thesis, IPO activity is measured on a monthly basis. 
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market. As a result, an increase in IPO volume is expected in periods when the 
stock market is rising. 
H2a: Changes in the stock market level are positively related to, and lead, 
the level of NOIPO. 
Rock (1986) has developed a model to explain IPO underpricing that relies 
on information asymmetry between informed and uninformed investors. He argues 
that an adverse selection problem arises when a purchase order is submitted. Only 
uninformed investors will submit a purchase order in the event of an overpriced 
issue (offer price greater than true value of an issue), while both informed and 
uninformed investors will submit purchase orders in the event of an underpriced 
issue. Although Rock's model does not consider the impact of the stock market 
conditions on new issues, his theory has empirical implications. Informed 
investors can obtain the true value of an issue by conducting costly security 
analysis which involves estimation of the IPO value (Ritter 1984b). However, 
such value estimates are obtained with error. 
To explain, assume management in an issuing company has an information 
advantage (e.g. Baron 1982; Rock 1986). They know the true value of their IPO 
(p l) and subsequently set an offer price for their IPO at p2. Hence the expected 
underpricing of the WO is [(pI p2)/p2] by the issuing company.100 It is well 
documented in the literature that in a rising stock market, investors are over- 
optimistic about the future growth of the company and place a higher valuation on 
the company's stock (e.g. Siegel 1992; Loughran et al. 1994). Hence, the valuation 
of the company's shares to investors is p3 (where p3 > pi). In the aftermarket, 
10° Note that this argument assumes that management in the issuing company is uncertain about the 
future level of the stock market. 
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investors who could not obtain their desired allocations of the issue in the primary 
market will bid up the price of the share to a price close to or higher than p3. As a 
result, underpricing is approximately [(p3 p2) / p21 in the aftermarket which is 
higher than the issuer's expected degree of underpricing, [(p1 p2) l 1221 because p3 
> pi. Therefore, we posit that there is a positive relationship between IPO 
underpricing and changes in the stock market level. 
H2b: Changes in the stock market level are positively related to, and lead, 
the degree of VWUP. 
8.2.2.2 Stock Market Volatility 
The impact of stock market volatility on IPO activity can be explained by 
exploring the relationship between underwriting fees and IPO activity using an 
option pricing model. Smith (1977, 1986) points out that in a firm commitment 
contract,101 the offering of new shares at a fixed price is analogous to the sale of a 
call option to investors. Investors have the right but not the obligation to purchase 
the shares from the underwriter at the offer price. Since the underwriter takes 
ownership of the shares before the offer to the public and is obligated to hold any 
unsold shares in the case of an unsuccessful issue, it represents a covered call 
position for the underwriter and can be modeled as a put option (Barry et al. 
1991). 
101 Another type of contract available in the USA is best efforts contract. The best efforts contract 
is normally used by small and speculative firms and accounts for only a small portion of total funds 
raised in the US market (Loughran et al. 1994). This type of contracts has become less frequently 
used over the 1990s. 
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The owner of a put option benefits from price decreases but has limited 
downside risk in the event of price increases. This implies that an increase in stock 
market volatility would lead underwriters to charge higher underwriting fees to 
compensate for taking higher risks. 
Since underwriters may charge higher fees for IPOs in periods of high 
stock market volatility, the incentives of companies going public during these 
periods decreases due to relatively higher costs of the offering. Consequently, the 
incidence of new issues will fall when stock market volatility is high (and 
underwriting fees are greater). Hence, we expect a negative relation between stock 
market volatility and IPO volume. 
H3a: Stock market volatility is negatively related to, and leads, the level of 
NOIPO. 
The effect of stock market volatility on IPO underpricing is less clear -cut. 
First, according to Rock (1986) and Ritter (1984b), the greater the fundamental 
uncertainty of an issue, the greater the required compensation (in the form of IPO 
underpricing) to uninformed investors for becoming informed (Ritter 1984b, 
p. 220).102 The source of the uncertainty that uninformed investors face is the 
uncertainty regarding the aftermarket price of an IPO (Ritter 1984b). In other 
words, an increase in stock market volatility increases uncertainty of the price in 
the aftermarket. Therefore the costs for uninformed investors to become informed 
rise. To compensate for these additional costs, investors require a higher expected 
return and hence more underpricing is observed. Therefore, a positive relationship 
is expected between stock market volatility and IPO underpricing. 
102 An uninformed investor can become informed by incurring a cost. The advantage of becoming 
an informed investor is the ability to more accurately assess the true value of a share. 
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An increase in stock market volatility, however, may also have a negative 
effect on IPO underpricing. As argued above, investors require a higher expected 
return in the presence of higher stock market volatility. As a result, the cost of 
capital also increases. Based on standard finance theory, the share price of a 
company is equal to the discounted stream of its expected future cash flows. With 
the increase in the cost of capital, the present value of any future cash flows 
decreases, and consequently, the share price of the company also decreases, with 
the effect of lower underpricing. 
While the first effect implies an increase in IPO underpricing, the second 
effect implies a decrease in IPO underpricing. At this stage, it is unclear which 
effect will apply, if any. Hence, the hypothesis developed below on the relation 
between IPO underpricing and stock market volatility is expressed in the null 
form. 
H3b: Stock market volatility leads the degree of IPO underpricing. 
8.2.2.3 Investor Sentiment 
The involvement of individual investors in the IPO market suggests that 
some behavioural factors may also play a role in explaining IPO underpricing.1o3 
Welch (1992) suggests that the IPO market is subject to `cascades' where potential 
investors pay attention to the purchases of prior IPO investors and place less 
weight on their own information (i.e. as opposed to becoming informed at a cost). 
Ritter (1991) documents that IPOs issued in hot periods exhibit poor 
subsequent long run performance. He reports that an investor who buys an IPO in 
103 There is evidence that the extent of the involvement of small individual investors in the stock 
market has changed over time (e.g. Edwards and Zhang 1998; Warther 1995). 
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the first day of trading would have only 83 cents for each dollar left after three 
years, on average (see also Menyah et al. 1995, Loughran et al. 1994, Lee et al. 
I996a). Although IPOs appear to be underpriced on average, the issues seem to be 
overpriced from a long run perspective. An implication is that investors are 
consistently overoptimistic about the growth potential of companies. Krigman et 
al. (1999) also provide evidence that extra -hot IPOs ekperience the worst long -run 
performance compared to other IPOs.1 °4 
Rajan and Servaes (1995) develop a theoretical model analysing the effect 
of investor sentiment on the number of IPOs. They predict that companies will go 
public in periods when investor sentiment is high if their intent is to maximize 
proceeds from the issue. The empirical test of their model suggests that an increase 
in investor sentiment significantly increases the number of IPOs coming to 
market.105 Ibbotson and Ritter (1995) also suggest that the large cycles in IPO 
volume represent a response by firms who time their IPOs to take advantage of 
swings in investor sentiment, though they do not specifically test this proposition. 
Studies suggest three measures of investor sentiment, mutual fund net 
flows, dollar value of odd -lot purchases and sales, and discounts /premiums on 
closed -end funds (e.g. Neal and Wheatley 1998).106 While Malkiel (1977) suggests 
that mutual fund flows reflect general investor sentiment, the results of Warther 
(1995) confirm this and document strong correlations between monthly stock 
market returns and monthly aggregate mutual fund net flows. Zweig (1973) 
104 In Krigman et al. (1999), extra -hot IPOs are regarded as those IPOs whose first -day returns are 
greater than 60 percent. 
05 Note that the measures of investor sentiment used in Rajan and Servaes (1995) are questionable. 
Investor sentiment is measured using historical and relative market to book ratios. However, this 
ratio traditionally proxies for many things, such as a risk factor in the common stock returns (e.g. 
Lewellen 1999; Chan and Chen 1991; Fama and French 1993). 
[06 Other potential investor sentiment measures include prime and score premium (see Barber 
1994). However, these measures are not used here because they are available only over a short 
time- series. 
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indicates that the discount on closed -end funds is a good measure of investor 
sentiment and finds that changes in fund discounts predict changes in the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average index over the period 1966 -1970. Swaminathan (1996) 
further examines the relationship between fund discounts and stock return using 
data between 1965 and 1990. He observes that discounts on closed -end funds are a 
good predictor of expected returns on small firms. Using data from 1928 -1938, 
Hardy (1939) reports that the odd -lot ratio predicts movements in prices for stocks 
traded in the New York Stock Exchange. Neal and Wheatley (1998) test the 
predictive power of these measures on stock return and find that the measure of 
odd -lot purchases and sales provides little indication of future stock returns. As a 
result, we consider the measures of mutual fund net flows and discounts on closed - 
end funds here. 
Mutual Fund Net Flows 
Mutual funds operate as tax -exempt financial institutions that pool funds 
from many investors into a diversified asset portfolio (Remolona et al. 1997). 
Closed -end funds issue a fixed number of shares compared to open -end mutual 
funds which are obligated to redeem shares at their net asset values upon the 
request of investors. 
The relationship between net flows of mutual funds and stock returns is 
well documented (e.g. Keim and Stambaugh 1986; Neal and Wheatley 1998). For 
instance, Warther (1995) observes that there is a correlation between mutual fund 
flows and market returns. Neal and Wheatley (1998) find that the ratio of net 
redemption to assets of mutual funds predicts stock returns, where the ratio is 
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positively related to small firms' returns and is negatively related to large firms' 
returns. 
Practitioners consider mutual fund flows to be a measure of investor 
sentiment. For instance, Malkiel (1977) suggests that mutual fund net flows reflect 
general investor sentiment. Remolona et al. (1997) argue that an increase in 
investor sentiment encourages investment in mutual funds which are reflected in 
net flows of mutual funds. 
Based on the reports of financial analysts, Ritter (1998) suggests that there 
might be a positive relationship between IPO volume and net flows of mutual 
funds.107 He argues that mutual funds are more willing to be involved in IPOs in 
periods when they have a net cash inflow. If enough fund managers are in this 
position in the same period, this leads to a rise in demand for IPOs due to the 
injection of funds into the IPO market by fund mangers. The increase in demand 
for IPOs might lead to over -valuations of IPOs and underpricing may 
consequently increase. 
On the supply side, firms observe the over -valuation in the IPO market and 
take advantage of the over -valuation by timing their issues during these periods. 
Thus, the fourth hypothesis is: 
H4a: Mutual fund net flows are positively related to, and lead, the level of 
NOIPO. 
H4b: Mutual fund net flows are positively related to, and lead, the degree 
of VWUP. 
107 Of note, Ritter (1998) did not test this relationship. 
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Discounts on Closed -end Funds 
Closed -end funds are publicly traded firms which earn their income from 
owning and managing a portfolio of financial securities issued by other 
corporations and entities such as the government (Thompson 1978, p. 151). 
Closed -end funds are so- called because their capitalisation is fixed, or `closed', 
which implies an inelastic supply of closed -end fund shares (Dimson and Kozerski 
1999). 
Discounts on closed -end funds are defined as the relative difference 
between the market value of net assets and the market value of outstanding stocks. 
In the case of closed -end funds, changes in investor sentiment can lead to changes 
in demand for closed -end fund shares that should be reflected in changes in 
discounts. 
As discussed previously, Zweig (1973) observes that changes in fund 
discounts predict changes in the Dow Jones Industrial Average index over the 
period 1966 -1970 and suggests that discounts on closed -end funds reflect the 
expectation of individual investors. When investor sentiment is high, investors are 
more willing to pay relatively more for closed -end funds leading to smaller 
discounts. In other words, a decrease in discounts on closed -end funds indicates an 
increase in investor sentiment.108 A number of studies confirm the relationship 
between discounts on closed -end funds and stock returns and suggest that this 
relationship is more apparent for small stocks (e.g. Keim and Stambaugh 1986; 
Lee et al. 1991; Neal and Wheatley 1998). Moreover, Swaminathan (1996) 
recognises that discounts on closed -end funds can also predict future stock returns. 
108 Recall that discounts are measured as the relative difference between net asset value per share 
and market price of the funds. 
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Swaminathan (1996) also shows that high discounts predict higher than 
average future inflation. This suggests that the information about future expected 
inflation contained in the fund discounts may be indirectly related to expectations 
of future economic growth (p. 873). This further implies that expectations of 
improved economic conditions are associated with higher small firm and closed - 
end fund prices, and lower discounts. Issuers might want to time their issues by 
taking advantage of favorable economic conditions. As a result, a negative 
relationship is expected between discounts on closed -end funds and the number of 
new issues. 
H5a: Discounts on closed -end funds are negatively related to, and lead, the 
level ofNOIPO. 
Firms going public, especially young and small companies, face a market 
that is subject to sharp swings in share valuations (Ritter 1998). In fact, many IPOs 
are young growth firms in specific industries, such as the high technology 
industries, The valuation of these new issues relies heavily on how the market 
values their rivals because historical accounting information of IPO firms is of 
limited use in forecasting future fmancial performance (Ritter 1998). It is 
suggested that discounts on closed -end funds are a predictor of the future return of 
small companies' shares (e.g. Swaminathan 1996). Hence, a decrease in fund 
discounts implies a potential upward adjustment in the valuation of small firms, 
including those small firms that are rivals of the [PO firms. As a result, the market 
valuation of IPOs will also increase Ieading to higher underpricing. 
H5b: Discounts on closed -end funds are negatively related to, and lead, 
the degree of VWUP. 
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8.2.3 Issues Related to Lead -Lag Relationships 
A weakness in previous studies of hot issue IPO markets is that they 
consider only the impact of current economic and stock market conditions on IPO 
activity. However, as discussed previously, IPO issuers cannot generally respond 
instantaneously to economic and market conditions since there is generally a 3 -6 
month period required to allow the issuers to undertake the various activities 
required to fulfil the legal requirements and promote the issue (Welch 1996; 
Lipman 1997). Therefore, firms need to generally forecast market conditions 3 -6 
months ahead. 
This requirement increases the difficulty in identifying the appropriate 
length of leads and lags to examine between explanatory variables and IPO 
activity. The hypotheses developed above indicate the signs of the relationship 
between factors and IPO activities only and the direction of any lead -lag 
relationship. In the empirical tests that follow, up to six monthly lags (or leads) of 
economic and stock market variables are used to capture the delay. However, 
investors are expected to be able to response more quickly to the changes in 
economic and business conditions in their investment decisions while issuers act 
with a time lag during which various activities are undertaken to fulfil the legal 
requirements as well as the promotion of new issues. Therefore, we expect that 
NOIPO is explained by economic and stock market conditions with relatively 
longer lags, while VWUP is likely to be explained by shorter lags of economic and 
stock market conditions. 
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8.3 Data 
This chapter examines the relationship between IPO activity and economic 
and stock market conditions in the USA. The analysis concentrates on the US 
sample because of the unavailability of some Australian economic data (i.e. 
business cycle leading indicator and industrial production). For instance, industrial 
production is reported quarterly rather than monthly in Australia while the analysis 
in this chapter requires monthly data. 
Due to the similarity of the measures of US IPO volume and also in 
underpricing, the analysis conducted in this chapter concentrates on two IPO 
activity measures, NOIPO and VWUP. These series are constructed from a sample 
of 6,632 US IPOs listed in the USA during the period of January 1976 and June 
1998. 109 The two measures are expressed on a monthly basis. 
The tests of the hypotheses also require the use of economic and stock 
market variables, such as a business cycle indicator, a stock market index, stock 
market volatility and measures of investor sentiment. The section describes the 
collection procedure and the sources of these data. The descriptive statistics for the 
data are also briefly presented. 
8.3.1 Business Cycle 
The business cycle reflects movements in economic activity as a whole. 
Given the cyclical nature of the business cycle, an appropriate business cycle 
indicator is important in the analysis. Three business cycle indices currently 
popular in the USA have been developed by the National Bureau of Economic 
109 Refer to Chapter five for details. 
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Research. They are the leading, the coincident and the lagging composite 
indictors. The leading indicator (consisting of 11 variables) represents the best 
combination of desirable characteristics of general business activity with a 
forward -looking focus while the coincident and Iagging indicators serve to 
confirm the indication of the leading indicator (Jones 1996). 
It is argued above that the number of firms going public is positively 
associated with changes in business conditions. Further, an unexpected 
improvement in business conditions results in higher IPO underpricing. With 
consideration to the scale effect, changes in business conditions are measured as 
the monthly relative change in the business cycle leading indicator (BO) and is 
calculated as: 
(business cycle index), - (business cycle index) t_, *100 (business cycle index),_, 
8.3.2 Stock Market Level 
As noted above, the stock market condition is posited to have an effect on 
the new issue market (e.g. Rees 1997; Loughran et al. 1994). To examine the 
effect of stock market conditions, a stock market index is required. Several stock 
market indicators are available in the USA and the most popular is the S &P 500 
index. We use monthly observations of the S &P 500 index between 1976 and June 
199g that are collected from Datastream International. The monthly relative 
change in stock market level (SP) is calculated as follows:11° 
11° Continuously compounded returns could be used, however, they would make no difference to 
the results. 
2I9 
SP (S & P 500 index), - (S & P 500 index),_ *100 
(S & P 500 index)r_t 
8.33 Stock Market Volatility 
Choe et al. (1993) examine the relation between stock market volatility and 
common stock offerings across the business cycle and measure stock market 
volatility by calculating it as the daily variance of stock market index returns over 
the 60 trading days prior to the beginning of the month of the stock offering. 
However, this measure may not be appropriate in this study due to the problem of 
overlapping periods since we use monthly data and include up to six monthly lags 
(or leads) of economic and stock market variables in the analysis. Instead, monthly 
stock market volatility (VOL) is used and is computed as the annualized standard 
deviation of daily S &P 500 index returns over the month prior to the beginning of 
the month of the stock offerings (expressed as a percentage). The daily S &P 500 
index data is obtained from Datastream International.tlt 
8.3.4 Investor Sentiment 
Two measures of investor sentiment are used in the study. They are mutual 
fund net flows and the discount on closed -end funds. 
ni Implied volatility of options on the S &P 500 index is an alternative measure. However, these 
data are not available over the full sample period. 
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8.3.4.1 Mutual Fund Net Flows 
The Investment Company Institute in the USA supplied mutual fund flow 
data over the period January 1984 -June 1998. The mutual fund flow data between 
September 1975 and December 1983 was obtained from Simon Wheatley.112 
There are two empirical issues related to the measure of mutual fund net 
flows. First, it is evident that there is strong growth in mutual funds over time (e.g. 
Remolona et al. 1997). For instance, the net assets of mutual funds in 1995 were 
equivalent to 60% of the assets held by commercial banks in the USA compared 
with only 27% in 1986. To adjust for this growth in mutual funds over time, the 
monthly measure of mutual fund net flows is first normalised by dividing the 
mutual fund net flows by the funds' net asset values for the month, following Neal 
and Wheatley (1998) and Remolona et al. (1997). 
Second, Edelen (1999) argues that the ability of redemption by mutual 
fund investors forces the fund mangers to engage in liquidity- motivated trading. 
The decision to invest cash inflows by fund mangers (at least partly) depends on 
the magnitude of the cash inflows. If cash inflows in a specific month vary slightly 
from the expected level of inflows for the month, then fund managers may not act 
immediately. However, a large variation in the funds' cash position may lead fund 
managers to trade (Edelen 1999). This argument is empirically supported by the 
study of Remolona et al. (1997). In the examination of the relationship between 
US mutual fund flows and stock market returns, Remolona et al. (1997) find that 
the correlation between mutual fund net inflows and market returns can be 
attributed almost entirely to the unexpected component of mutual fund net inflows. 
112 The data was used in Neal, R. and S.M. Wheatley, Do Measures of Investor Sentiment Predict 
Returns ?, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 33, December 1998, pp 523 -547. 
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The implication is that an appropriate measure of mutual fund net flows is the 
unexpected component of mutual fund flows. 
Remolona et al. (1997) calculate unexpected net flows of mutual funds by 
regressing mutual fund flows on three months of lags and a time trend. The 
residuals from the regressions serve as a measure of the unexpected mutual fund 
net flows. A similar approach is followed in this study. I first regress mutual fund 
net flows on its lags up to twelve months. Schwarz's Bayesian criterion (SBC) is 
used to choose the best Iag model. The results favour three lags.113 The residuals 
from the regression (with three months of lags) thus serve as the innovations or 
unexpected mutual fund net flows (FLOW). 
8.3.4.2 Discount on Closed -end Funds 
The discount on a closed -end fund is defined as the relative difference 
between the market value of its net assets and its outstanding stocks. 
Data between 1976 and June 1998 was purchased from Wiesenberger in 
the USA. The series represents the monthly average percentage discount on the 50 
largest US stock funds that have a trading history back to 1976. The discount on a 
specific closed end fund i at month t is calculated as follows: 
(market value of outstanding stocks) 
Discount,,, = [1 ] * 100 (market value of net assets);, 
u3 Regressions with a time trend are also examined. However, the time trend is statistically 
insignificant and does not improve the SBC scores. 
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The average percentage discount per month on the 50 largest US stock 
funds (DISC) is computed as: 
so 
EDiscount,,, 
DISC, - 
8.4 Summary Statistics 
50 
Descriptive analysis of economic and stock market variables is reported in 
Table 8.1. The monthly changes in the business cycle leading indicator (BCI) 
exhibits a mean value of 0.07% with a standard deviation of 0.35 %. The monthly 
change in the S &P 500 index (SP) ranges from a low of -24.54% per month to a 
monthly high of 12.38 %. The discount on closed -end funds (DISC) shows a mean 
value of 11.11% which indicates that for the largest 50 US stock funds over the 
period, on average, the market value of stocks is lower than the market value of 
their assets which is consistent with the results of Lee et a1. (1991) and Neal and 
Wheatley (1998). 114 Although the variable of mutual fund net flows (FLOW) has 
a mean value of 0.00 and a standard deviation of 0.67, the maximum and 
minimum values are 3.32 and -4.87, respectively.) is With a mean value of 12.84% 
(p.a. measured) per month, stock market volatility (VOL) is as high as 97.49% 
(p.a. measured) in contrast to a minimum volatility of 4.89% (p.a. measured). 
114 Recall that a decrease in discount on closed -end funds indicates an increase in investor 
sentiment. 
115 Recall that this variable measures unexpected mutual fund net flows. 
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Table 8.1: Descriptive Analysis of Economic and Stock Market Variables In 
the USA 
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Dickey -Fuller Test 
BCI 0.065 0.099 1.375 -1.993 0.354 -6.928* 
SP 0.938 1.084 12.378 -24.543 4.184 -8.254* 
DISC 11.112 8.208 -1.930 39.161 9.990 -2.795^ 
FLOW 0.000 0.008 3.315 -4.869 0.674 -8.818* 
VOL 12.842 11.579 97.489 4.890 6.907 -5.844* 
I. *denotes significance at 5% level 
^ denote significance at 10% level 
2. BCI denotes monthly percentage change in the Business Cycle Leading Indicator; 
SP denotes monthly percentage change in the S &P 500 index; 
DISC denotes monthly percentage discounts on closed -end funds; 
FLOW denotes unexpected changes in monthly mutual fund net flows; 
VOL denotes annualised standard deviation of daily return of S &P 500 index over the 
month prior to the beginning of the month of stock offerings. 
In the last column of Table 8.1, test statistics for the Dickey -Fuller test for 
a unit root process are presented. The results suggest that all the variables are 
stationary (though DISC is only significant at the 10% level). 
Table 8.2 presents the monthly correlations of the economic and stock 
market variables. As expected, there is a significant correlation of 0.623 between 
SP and FLOW. This result is consistent with previous findings that there is 
correlation between mutual fund flows and stock market returns (e.g. Keim and 
Stambaugh 1986; Warther 1995; Neal and Wheatley 1998). For instance, Warther 
(1995) observes a correlation of 0.73 between common stock returns and 
unexpected mutual fund flows. 
In Table 8.2, another significant correlation is observed between BCI and 
SP. It is well documented that changes in economic variables influence expected 
stock returns (e.g. Chen et al. 1986). The correlation between BCI and SP provides 
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supportive evidence of the relationship between economic conditions and stock 
market returns (e.g. Moore 1961; Fama 1981; Siegel 1991). 
Table 8.2: Correlation Analysis of Economic and Stock Market Variables In 
the USA 
SP DISC FLOW VOL BCI 
DISC -0.067 
(0.275) 
FLOW 0.623 -0.161 
(0.000)* (0.008)* 
VOL -0.048 -0.030 0.025 
(0.435) (0.622) (0.685) 
BCI 0.196 -0.060 0.035 -0.026 
(0.001)* (0.324) (0.570) (0.674) 
I. The Pairwise Pearson correlation analysis is used 
2. Figures in parentheses are p- values for two -tailed test of the null hypothesis of zero 
correlation between the variables. 
3. * denotes significance at 5% level. 
4. BCI denotes monthly percentage change in the Business Cycle Leading Indicator; 
SP denotes monthly percentage change in the S &P 500 index; 
DISC denotes monthly percentage discounts on closed -end funds; 
FLOW denotes unexpected changes in monthly mutual fund net flows; 
VOL denotes annualised standard deviation of daily return of S &P 500 index over the 
month prior to the beginning of the month of stock offerings. 
Noting that a decrease in DISC indicates an increase in investor sentiment. 
FLOW and DISC display a correlation of -0.161 which is statistically significant 
and implies a relationship between the two investor sentiment measures.116 
116 This result is consistent with Neal and Wheatley (1998). Although the correlation is somewhat 
lower than the correlation observed in Neal and Wheatley (1998), the measure of mutual fund 
flows is defined as unexpected mutual fund net flows in this study. In addition, mutual fund net 
flows here is calculated as a ratio of fund sales less fund redemptions to fund assets, while mutual 
fund flows is computed as a ratio of mutual fund redemptions less fund sales to fund assets in Neal 
and Wheatley (1998). 
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Since these three pairs of variables exhibit statistically significant 
correlations, multicollinearity may be presented. Multicollinearity is undesirable 
and can exist when the correlations among the independent variables are strong. In 
the presence of multicollinearity, the regression coefficients possess large standard 
errors relative to the coefficients themselves. Therefore, the analysis needs to take 
the problem of multicollinearity into account. One way to solve the problem is to 
avoid using the strongly correlated independent variables in the same regression. 
8.5 Research Methods 
The hypotheses developed in Section 8.2 are first tested using an OLS 
framework. With consideration of the problem of multicollinearity, three 
alternative models are developed 
Model 1: Y = a1 + + ßj BClr_j E x jVolf_j +E Sj Disc_ 
j=0 1=0 j=0 
m m 
Model 2: Y= a2 +BCI1_f +E,jVolf_j +E yjFlow,_j +122 L 
j=o j=o j=0 
m m 
Model 3: Y = a, +IrljVoll_J +EcjDisc_j +ExjSP1_j +1431 
J=0 j=0 j=0 
Where 
Y1 denotes the respective measures of IPO activity at month t, i.e. NOIPO 
and VWUP; 
BCIL denotes monthly percentage change in the business cycle indicator at 
time t; 
SPI denotes monthly percentage change in the S &P 500 index at time t, 
VOL 1 denotes annualised standard deviation of stock market returns over the 
month prior to the month of stock offerings (in percentage); 
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DISC, denotes average percentage discount on the 50 largest US stock funds 
at month t; 
FLOW, denotes unexpected mutual fund net flow at month t; 
mis the number of lags, m = 0, 1, 2, ...,6; 
,u1 t , 12,t and '13,, are the error terms. 
The above OLS regressions examine the effects of concurrent and lagged 
economic and stock market variables on the level of IPO activity. However, it is 
also interesting to explore whether these economic and stock market variables 
influence the probability of hot and cold issue periods. Hence, a probit analysis is 
also applied 117 
The probit model is a statistical model relating the probability of the 
occurrence of discrete random events that take the value of 0 or 1 (e.g. cold and 
hot issue periods) to some set of explanatory variables (e.g. economic and stock 
market variables). It yields probability estimates that the event will occur if the 
explanatory variables have specific values (Boulier et al. 1999). The model uses 
maximum likelihood and assumes that the mean of the response variable is 
linearly related to the explanatory variables. In our context of hot and cold issue 
periods, the probit model can indicate which explanatory variables influence the 
probability of a hot issue period. 
The probit model has been used extensively in modeling dichotomous 
outcomes of financial data. For instance, Brailsford et al. (1995) use a probit 
model to test the efficiency of the Australian football betting markets, Berg et al. 
117 An alternative to the probit model is a logit model. Amemiya (1981, p. 187) suggests that `in 
the univariate dichotomous model, it does not matter much whether one uses a probit or logit 
model, except in cases where data are heavily concentrated in the tails... ". Judge et al. (1985, 
p. 761) also provide a theoretical argument for the use of the probit model in preference to the logit 
model. 
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(1999) and Vanova (1994) examine the predictability of financial and currency 
crises by applying a probit model. 
For the probit model used in this study, the dependent variable is a discrete - 
choice variable and is defined as follows: 
¡1 if an IPO activity measure suggests a hot issue period P = 
0 if an IPO activity measure suggests a cold issue period 
where hot issue periods obtained for a specific IPO activity measure are based on 
the transition probabilities from the regime - switching model obtained in Chapter 
six (see Table 6.4).118 The transition probabilities are used to determine the timing 
of regime shifts in the IPO activity measures. Recall that a hot issue period in an 
IPO activity measure is defined as one where at least six consecutive probabilities 
are greater than 0.5. 
With the consideration of the problem of multicollinearity '19, three probit 
models are specified: 
m m 
Model 4: P = b, + +EBJVoIr_J +E9JDiscr_, +s,, 
J=o J=o J=o 
m m 
Model 5: Pr =b2+ZçBCIr_J+zVol+EroJFlow,_J+e2, 
J=o J=o J=o 
m m 
Model 6: P, = b3 +VoI +JDiscr_J +EJSPr_J +s3t 
J=o =o =o 
Where 
s,,, , 63,, and e, , are random disturbances. 
118 Recall that the analysis concentrates on two IPO activity measures, NOTPO and V WUP. 
119 Refer to the discussion on the problem of multicollinearity in Section 8.4. 
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8.6 OLS Results 
8.6.1 Regression Results for NOIPO 
Table 8.3 reports OLS regression results on NOIPO, including R- squares 
and F- statistics. Reported t- statistics utilize the Newey -West correction for both 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity. The first hypothesis is that BCI is 
positively related to, and leads, NOIPO. This hypothesis is supported by the 
results obtained in Models 1 and 2. They show that there is a positive relation 
between NOIPO and BCI with lags up to six months. The third lag of BCI is 
significant in Model 1 and the concurrent and the sixth lagged coefficients of BCI 
are statistically significant in both models. Compared with concurrent and other 
lagged BCI variables, the sixth lag appears to be relatively more important given 
its relatively larger coefficient in both models. This suggests that improvements in 
the expected economic conditions precede increases in the number of new issues 
with a lead of up to six months. 
The discount on closed -end funds (DISC) is one of the measures of investor 
sentiment and is defined as the percentage average difference between net asset 
value per share and market price of the largest 50 US stock funds. Increased 
investor sentiment implies lower DISC. We posit that discounts on closed -end 
funds are negatively related to and lead the number of IPOs. Although there are 
mixed signs for the concurrent and lagged coefficients of DISC, the sixth lag DISC 
is consistently negative and statistically significant in Models 1 and 3. This 
implies that the effect of an increase in investor sentiment up to six months prior 
to the stock offering leads to an increase in number of new issues. 
229 
Table 8.3: Multivariate Regression Results for Explaining IPO Volume in the 
USA 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef t -stat Coef. t -stat Coef. t-stat 
Constant 0.670 12.433* 0.378 5.530* 0.623 10.869* 
BCI 0.110 2.203* 0.072 1.659^ 
BCI Lag 1 0.036 0.865 0.019 0.470 
BCI Lag 2 0.038 0.930 0.030 0.717 
BCI Lag 3 0.104 2.821* 0064 1.608 
BCI Lag 4 0.043 1.200 0.043 0.978 
BCI Lag 5 0.054 1.478 0.045 1.064 
BCI Lag 6 0.117 2.950* 0.131 2.997* 
VOL -0.002 -1.017 -0.000 -0.091 -0.004 -2.070* 
VOL Lag! -0.003 -2.602* -0.001 -0.340 -0.004 -2.931* 
VOL Lag2 -0.003 -1.638 -0.002 -0.878 -0.003 -1.579 
VOLLag3 -0.001 -0.691 0.001 0.604 0.003 1.499 
VOLLag4 -0.001 -0.632 0.001 0.508 0.003 1,514 
VOLLag5 -0.000 -0.051 0.001 0.658 0.001 0.311 
VOL Lag6 -0.002 -1.050 -0.003 -1.610 -0.003 -1.751^ 
DISC -0.000 -0.038 0.001 0.147 
DISC Lag 1 0.002 0.196 0.003 0.315 
DISC Lag 2 0.005 0.663 -0.002 -0.301 
DISC Lag 3 -0.003 -0.399 0.001 0.138 
DISC Lag 4 -0.013 -1.566 -0.010 -1.361 
DISC Lag 5 0.008 1.053 0.004 0.639 
DISC Lag 6 -0.014 -1.842^ -0.012 -1.979* 
SP -0.001 -0219 
SP Lag 1 0.002 0.418 
SP Lag 2 0.001 0.288 
SP Lag 3 0.002 0.372 
SP Lag 4 0.010 2.842* 
SP Lag 5 0.014 3.598* 
SP Lag 6 0.012 3.595* 
FLOW 0.019 0.943 
FLOW Lag 1 0.036 1.441 
FLOW Lag 2 0.067 2.732* 
FLOW Lag 3 0.051 1.803^ 
FLOW Lag 4 0.095 3.231* 
FLOW Lag 5 0.079 2.874* 
FLOW Lag 6 0.089 3.628* 
F Statistic 8.11* 451* 13.70* 
R -Square 0.432 0.263 0.415 
1. *denotes significance at 5% level and ^ denotes significance at 10% level, 
2. t- statistics have been adjusted for both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity using Newey- 
West correction. 
3. BCI denotes monthly percentage change in the Business Cycle Leading Indicator; 
SP denotes monthly percentage change in the S &P 500 index; 
DISC denotes monthly percentage discounts on closed -end funds; 
FLOW denotes unexpected changes in monthly mutual fund net flows; 
VOL denotes annualised standard deviation of daily return of the S &P 500 index over the month 
prior to the beginning of the month of stock offerings. 
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As predicted, the concurrent and lagged coefficients of mutual fund net flow 
(FLOW) are all positive. Lagged coefficients are almost all statistically significant 
(except the first lag) and thus indicate that the effect of mutual fund flows on 
NOIPO is most apparent from two to six months ahead. In other words, 
unexpected mutual fund net flows exhibit significant predictive ability over the 
current number of IPOs. The result supports our hypothesis that mutual fund net 
flows are positively related to and lead NOIPO. 
Together with current and lagged values of stock market volatility and 
discounts, the effect of changes in the S &P 500 index (SP) on the NOIPO is 
examined in Model 3. Except for the coefficient on concurrent SP, all lagged 
coefficients of SP indicate a positive relationship with NOIPO with the last three 
lagged coefficients statistically significant. This supports our hypothesis. 
Although Model 2 does not show any significant stock market volatility 
effect, the first lagged volatility parameter shows a consistently significant 
negative effect on NOIPO in both Models 1 and 3. This suggests that decreased 
stock market volatility encourages more firms to go public. 
Comparing Model 3 with Model 1, where the only difference between the 
two models is the use of the BCI variable rather than the SP variable, Model 1 
exhibits somewhat more explanatory power in terms of R- square than Model 3 
though the difference in R- squares is marginal. 
Of note, the F- statistics for all three models are statistically significant at the 
5% level which indicates the importance of explanatory variables. 
In general, the lagged effect of the explanatory variables on the NOIPO is 
more apparent at longer lags (e.g. Iag 6). For instance, the last three lags of SP and 
the sixth Iags for both DISC and BCI appear to be important in explaining NOIPO. 
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This result supports our argument that the various activities required to fulfill legal 
requirements and promote new issues forces issuers to act on forecast market 
conditions 3 -6 months ahead. 
8.6.2 Regression Results for VWUP 
Regression results for VWUP are presented in Table 8.4. Contrary to the 
results for NOIPO, where we expect the economic and stock market variables to 
exhibit predictive power over NOIPO with lags up to 6 months, it is argued that 
VWUP is influenced by more recent economic and stock market conditions (see 
Sub -section 8.2.3). 
In the first hypothesis, we posit that BCI is positively related to and leads 
IPO underpricing. For BCI, five out of seven coefficients are statistically 
significant in Model 1, while three are statistically significant in Model 2. In 
addition, BCI shows a positive relationship with VWUP up to 4 lags in both 
Models l and 2. These results support the first hypothesis that VWUP is positively 
related to recent economic conditions. Of note, the fifth and sixth lagged 
coefficients for BCI display a significantly negative relationship with VWUP. This 
result is, perhaps, a result of the cyclical nature of the variable. 
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Table 8.4: Multivariate Regression Results for Explaining IPO Underpricing 
in the USA 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Variable Coef. t -stat Coef. t -stat Coef. 1 -star 
Constant 9.951 3.040* 8.785 2.862* 5.080 1 -946^ 
BCI 2.698 2.002* 1.599 1.188 
BCI Lag 1 3.106 1.981* 3.031 1.561 
BCILag2 3.635 2.329* 2.790 1.838^ 
BC! Lag 3 1.459 1.153 1.202 0.758 
BCI Lag 4 1.945 0.930 1.519 0.683 
BCI Lag 5 -2.788 -2.301* -2550 -2.090* 
BCI Lag 6 -6.163 -2.529* -5.942 -2.359* 
VOL -0.001 -0.008 0.051 0.887 0.174 2.235* 
VOL Lagl -0.043 -1.011 -0.039 -0757 -0.014 -0.192 
VOL Lag2 0.057 0.838 0.055 0.868 0.092 1.253 
VOL Lag3 0.076 1.066 0.100 1.490 0.022 0.311 
VOL Lag4 0.002 0.043 0.031 0.448 -0.020 -0.353 
VOL Lag5 -0.112 -1.575 -0.117 -1.628 -0.107 -1.433 
VOL Lag6 -0.077 -1.695^ -0.095 2.280* -0.104 -1.898^ 
DISC 0.335 0.786 0.244 0.711 
DISC Lag I -0.310 -0.514 -0.543 -0.913 
DISC Lag 2 0.194 0.383 0.471 0.841 
DISC Lag 3 -0.278 -0.459 -0.265 -0.517 
DISC Lag 4 0.342 0.904 0.286 0.758 
DISC Lag 5 -0.339 -0.920 -0.264 -0.752 
DISC Lag 6 0.046 0.135 0.133 0.431 
SP 0.453 3.775* 
SP Lag I 0.764 5.016* 
SP Lag 2 0.431 3.294* 
SP Lag 3 0.631 3.783* 
SP Lag 4 0.321 2.542* 
SP Lag 5 0.222 1.776^ 
SP Lag 6 -0.189 -1.637 
FLOW 0.593 0.965 
FLOW Lag 1 1.407 2.041* 
FLOW Lag 2 0.403 0.446 
FLOW Lag 3 1.260 1.633 
FLOW Lag 4 0.680 0 -813 
FLOW Lag 5 1.241 1.567 
FLOW Lag 6 -0206 -0.280 
F Statistic 5.11* 6.80* 3.24* 
R- Square 0.143 0.159 0.234 
1. * denotes significance at 5% level and ^ denotes significance at 10% level. 
2. t- statistics have been adjusted for both serial correlation and heteroscedasticity using Newey- 
west correction. 
3. BCI denotes monthly percentage change in the Business Cycle Leading Indicator; SP denotes 
monthly percentage change in the S &P 500 index; DISC denotes monthly percentage discounts on 
closed -end funds; FLOW denotes unexpected changes in monthly mutual fund net flows; VOL 
denotes annualised standard deviation of daily return of the S &P 500 index over the month prior to 
the beginning of the month of stock offerings. 
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We posit that investor sentiment is positively related to and leads VWUP, 
but there is a lack of statistical significance of DISC in the models. This variable 
provides no statistically significant explanatory power over VWUP. However, the 
other investor sentiment variable, FLOW, does show a positive effect on VWUP 
with a statistically significant first lagged coefficient. In general, there appears to 
be a weak relation between VWUP and investor sentiment which is somewhat 
contradictory with regard to the results of Rajan and Servaes (1995).120 
In the third hypothesis, we argue that there are two potential effects of 
different signs of stock market volatility on VWUP. The first effect, built on Rock 
(1986), argues that with an increase in stock market volatility, investors require a 
higher expected return due to the increased costs of uninformed investors 
becoming informed. Thus higher underpricing is required to compensate investors 
for higher costs. In the second effect, we argue that an increase in stock market 
volatility leads to an increase in the cost of capital. As a result, the discounted 
value of company's future cash flows decreases leading to a lower current market 
price. Hence, lower underpricing is expected. 
The results in Table 8.4 show that the sixth lag of stock market volatility is 
consistently significant in all three models and displays a negative sign. Thus, it 
seems that there is a negative relationship between VWUP and stock market 
volatility. However, as discussed earlier, investors are expected to be able to 
respond quickly to the changes in stock market and business conditions in their 
investment decisions. As a result, we expect VWUP is influenced by more recent 
changes in the economic and stock market conditions. The significance of the 
sixth lagged coefficient but not at shorter lags of stock market volatility provides 
120 However, recall that investor sentiment is measured using historical and relative market to book 
ratios in Rajan and Servaes (1995). 
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only weak evidence of a relationship between VWUP and stock market volatility. 
However, it is noted that with the inclusion of SP, concurrent stock market 
volatility is positively related to VWUP and is statistically significant in Model 3. 
However, due to the insignificance of concurrent stock market volatility in both 
Models 1 and 2, no strong conclusion can be made. 
The results obtained in Model 3 indicate that concurrent and almost all 
lagged coefficients of SP are positive and significant. This provides strong 
evidence that changes in the stock market level up to five months prior provide 
predictive power over the degree of underpricing, which supports our hypothesis. 
The R- square in Model 3 is the highest of the three models. 
The F- statistics in all three models are significant, thus indicating the 
statistical importance of the explanatory variables included in the models. 
Comparing the R- squares obtained in Table 8.4 with those of Table 8.3, the 
highest R- square in Table 8.4 is 23.4% while the lowest R- square in Table 8.3 is 
26.3 %. The implication is that economic and stock market variables provide more 
explanatory power over NOIPO than for VWUP. In other words, NOIPO appears 
to be more sensitive to changes in economic and stock market conditions. This 
may be explained by the fact that IPO underpricing is also determined by firm 
specific characteristics and these characteristics vary from firm to firm and from 
month to month. For instance, James and Wier (1990) find that the age of the firm 
is related to the degree of IPO underpricing. David and Yeomans (1976) observe a 
relationship between net assets of firms and IPO underpricing. In addition, Alli et 
al. (1994) show that IPOs issued by financial institutions exhibit less underpricing 
than IPOs of non -financial institutions. 
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In summary, our hypotheses are largely supported. All economic and stock 
market variables exhibit explanatory power over NOIPO. The lagged effect of the 
explanatory variables on NOIPO is more apparent at longer lags, which supports 
our argument that the various activities required to fulfil the legal requirements 
and promote new issues forces issuers to act on forecast market conditions several 
months ahead. 
The concurrent and lagged BCI, SP and FLOW appear to explain the 
degree of VWUP. The insignificance of concurrent and lagged DISC rejects our 
hypothesis that DISC is negatively related to and leads the degree of VWUP. 
Although the sixth lag of stock market volatility is statistically significant in all 
models, there is no strong conclusion can be made regarding the relationship 
between stock market volatility and VWUP because we expect VWUP to be 
affected by more recent lags of stock market volatility. Compared to Table 8.3, the 
relatively lower R- squares in all models in Table 8.4 suggest that VWUP is also 
related to other factors, such as firm specific characteristics. 
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8.7 Results of Probit Analysis 
This section explores the influence of the economic and stock market 
variables on the probability of a hot issue period occuring using probit analysis. 121 
8.7.1 Probit Analysis for NOIPO 
The estimation of the probit analysis on NOIPO are presented in Table 8.5, 
including likelihood ratio statistics and McFadden R- squares.122 For all models in 
Table 8.5, the likelihood ratio statistics strongly reject the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are zero. Similar to the OLS results in Table 8.3, Model 4 consisting 
of concurrent and lagged values of BCI, VOL and DISC is superior to the other 
models (see McFadden R- squares). 
Model 4 of Table 8.5 shows that the probability of a hot issue period in 
NOIPO increases when there is increase in BCI three and six months prior, a 
decrease in stock market volatility two months prior, and an decrease in DISC (or 
an increase in investor sentiment) six months prior. 
121 Recall that hot issue periods in NOIPO are based on the transition probabilities from the regime - 
switching model. 
122 The likelihood ratio statistic tests the joint null hypothesis that all coefficients except the 
constant are zero and is the analog of the F- statistic in the OLS regression models that test the 
overall significance of the model. The McFadden R- square is the likelihood ratio index and is an 
analog to the R- square reported in the OLS regression models. It is bounded between zero and one. 
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Table 8.5: Probit Results for Testing Hot Issue Periods in IPO Volume in the 
USA 
Variable 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Coef. t-stat Coef. t-stat Coef t-stat 
Constant 2.745 3.998* 1.052 1.450 2.741 3.977* 
BCI 0.123 0.286 -0.095 -0.338 
BCI Lag 1 0.207 0.535 0.130 0.538 
BCI Lag 2 0.309 0.871 0.013 0.053 
BCI Lag 3 0.608 2.224* 0.351 1.391 
BCI Lag 4 0.317 1.015 0.336 1.286 
BCI Lag 5 0.173 0.579 0.200 0.816 
BCI Lag 0.648 2.211* 0.666 2.845* 
VOL 0.001 0.104 0.026 1.355 -0.004 -0.282 
VOL l.agl -0.034 -2.082* -0.046 -I.612 -0.040 -2.402* 
VOL Lag2 -0.030 -1.413 -0.035 -1.406 -0.039 -1.726^ 
VOL Lag3 -0.014 -0.917 -0.012 -0.572 -0.005 -0.432 
VOL Lag4 -0.017 -0.940 -0.005 -0.261 0.006 0.422 
VOL Lag5 -0.010 -0.652 -0.001 -0.036 -0.007 -0.369 
VOL Lag6 -0,012 -0.881 -0.012 -0.816 -0.012 -0.951 
DISC 0,020 0.330 0.027 0.371 
DISC Lag 1 0.021 0.418 0.029 0.551 
DISC Lag 2 0.062 1.087 0.028 0,521 
DISC Lag 3 -0.003 -0.058 -0.019 -0.443 
DISC Lag 4 -0.070 -1.086 -0.054 -0.835 
DISC Lag 5 0.017 0.318 0.048 0.861 
DISC Lag 6 -0.166 -2.565* -0.189 -2.855* 
SP -0.013 -0.533 
SP Lag 1 -0.017 -0.634 
SP Lag 2 - -0.009 -0.317 
SP Lag 3 -0.024 -0,876 
SP Lag 4 -0.012 -0.453 
SP Lag 5 0.040 1.396 
SP Lag 6 0.063 2.485* 
FLOW 0.212 1.246 
FLOW Lag 1 0.333 2.163* 
FLOW Lag 2 0.397 2.499* 
FLOW Lag 3 0.471 3.038* 
FLOW Lag 4 0.344 2.103* 
FLOW Lag 5 0.382 2.240* 
FLOW Lag 6 0.513 3.366* 
Likelihood Ratio Statistics 170.297* 75.872* 162.168* 
McFadden R- Square 0.468 0.208 0.445 
% Correct Predictions 
Cold Issue Periods 78.51 63.64 74.38 
Hot Issue Periods 90.21 79.02 90.91 
Total 04,85 71.97 83.33 
1. * denotes significance at 5% level and ^ denotes significance at 10% level. 
2. t- statistics have been adjusted for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using Newey- 
West correction. 
3. Likelihood ratio statistic tests the null hypothesis that all the coefficients except the constant are 
zero. This is the analog of the F- statistic in linear regression models. 
4. McFadden R- square is the likelihood ratio index and is an analog to the R- square reported in 
linear regression models. 
5. % correct predictions are based on the cutoff probability of 0.5. Observations are classified as 
having predicted probabilities that are above of below the cutoff value. For instance, `correct' 
classifications for cold issue periods are obtained when the predicted probability is less than or 
equal to 0.5. 
6. BCI denotes monthly percentage change in the Business Cycle Leading Indicator; SP denotes 
monthly percentage change in the S &P 500 index; DISC denotes monthly percentage discounts on 
closed -end funds; FLOW denotes unexpected changes in monthly mutual fund net flows; VOL 
denotes annualised standard deviation of daily return of the S &P 500 index over the month prior to 
the beginning of the month of stock offerings. 
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Replacing DISC with FLOW in Model 5, all lagged coefficients of FLOW 
exhibit statistical significance. This indicates that rises in unexpected mutual fund 
net flow in the previous six months increase the probability of NOIPO in hot issue 
periods. The implication is that investment from mutual funds is an important 
driving force for hot issue periods in NOIPO. However, it is noted that the 
McFadden R- square for this model is relatively low when compared with Models 
4 and 6. 
Model 6 in Table 8.5 estimates the influence of concurrent and lagged 
changes in the S &P 500 on the probability of hot issue periods in NOIPO as well 
the influence of BCI and stock market volatility. The results suggest that an 
increase in the stock market level six months prior, decreased stock market 
volatility in the previous two months, as well as decreased discounts six months 
prior, have explanatory power over the probability of a hot period in NOIPO. 
The probit results presented in Table 8.5 indicate that all economic and 
stock market variables, as well as the measures of investor sentiment, exhibit 
explanatory power for the probability of hot issue periods in NOIPO. Hence, all 
our hypotheses regarding the influence of the economic and stock market 
conditions, as well as investor sentiment, on IPO volume are supported. 
Comparing the size of the coefficients on the lags, again, the sixth lagged 
coefficient of all variables (except stock market volatility) is the largest. This 
implies that an improvement in economic and stock market conditions six months 
prior has an important influence on the probability of a hot issue period in NOIPO, 
which is consistent with the OLS results obtained in Table 8.3. Both OLS and 
probit analysis present similar results for all economic and stock market variables. 
239 
The last three rows in Table 8.5 report the percentage of correct predictions 
for the three probit models over whether the NOIPO will be in hot and cold issue 
periods. The cutoff probability is specified as 0.5.123 Observations are classified as 
having predicted probabilities that are above or below the cutoff value of 0.5. That 
is, `correct' classifications for hot issue periods are obtained when the predicted 
probability is more than 0.5, while `correct' classifications for cold issue periods 
are obtained when the predicted probability is less than 0.5. The results reveal that 
the three probit models are more accurate than a naïve model in their prediction of 
the hot and cold states for the NOIPO. Moreover, the models predict hot issue 
periods more correctly than they predict cold issue periods. The correct prediction 
for hot periods ranges from 79.02% to 90.91% while the correct prediction for 
cold periods is between 63.64% and 78.51%. Overall, Model 4 generates the 
highest average correct prediction (84.85 %) for both hot and cold periods. 
8.7.2 Probit Analysis for VWUP 
The results of the probit analysis on underpricing are reported in Table 8.6. 
The likelihood ratio statistics in all models reject the null hypothesis that all 
coefficients are jointly zero. While the probit estimation on NOIPO exhibited 
relatively higher McFadden R- squares than the equivalent OLS results, the three 
probit models for VWUP exhibit McFadden R- squares of around 11 %. 
123 Note that the specified cutoff probability of 0.5 is consistent with the rules I used in the regime 
switching estimations. 
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Table 8.6: Probit Results for Testing Hot Issue Periods in IPO Underpricing 
in the USA 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Variable Coef. t -stat Coef t -stat Coef t -stat 
Constant 0.838 1.427 0.635 0.806 0.525 1.033 
BCI 0.519 2.404* 0.358 1.608 
BCI Lag 1 0.463 2.115* 0.313 1.441 
BCI Lag 2 0.550 2.417* 0.466 2.274* 
BCILag3 0.523 2.411* 0.495 2.251* 
BCI Lag 4 0.315 1.658^ 0.329 1.730^ 
BCI Lag 5 -0.044 -0.201 -0.054 -0.338 
BCI Lag 6 0.007 0.023 0.032 0.137 
VOL -0.021 -1.201 -0.022 -0.979 -0.027 -1.111 
VOLLagt -0.009 -0.973 -0.007 -0.501 -0.010 -0.494 
VOLLag2 -0.005 -0.547 0.002 0,156 0.002 0.135 
VOL Lag3 0.006 0.671 0.005 0.541 0.011 0.766 
VOL Lag4 -0.008 -0.897 -0.008 -0.900 -0.006 -0.452 
VOLLag5 -0.016 -1.214 -0.016 -1.382 -0.016 -1.366 
VOLLag6 -0.027 -1.323 -0.025 -1.004 -0.024 -1.398 
DISC 0.007 0.125 -0.014 -0.259 
DISC Lag I 0.059 1.491 0.057 1.274 
DISC Lag 2 -0.007 -0.178 -0.007 -0.149 
DISC Lag 3 -0008 -0.213 -0.000 -0.003 
DISC Lag 4 -0033 -0.853 -0.035 -0.876 
DISC Lag 5 0.017 0.509 0.010 0.260 
DISC Lag 6 -0.044 -0.894 -0.015 -0.316 
SP 0.027 1.438 
SP Lag 1 0.045 1.952^ 
SP Lag 2 0.053 2.336* 
SP Lag 3 0.065 2.743* 
SP Lag 4 0.049 1.948^ 
SP Lag 5 0.029 1.186 
SP Lag 6 0.007 0.304 
FLOW 0.168 1.483 
FLOW Lag 1 0.195 1.339 
FLOW Lag 2 0.198 1.275 
FLOW Lag 3 0.199 1.340 
FLOW Lag 4 0.120 0.852 
FLOW Lag 5 0.043 0.327 
FLOW Lag 6 0.025 0.191 
Likelihood Ratio Statistics 40.980* 42.447* 37.089* 
McFadden R -Square 0.113 0.117 0.102 
% Correct Predictions 
Cold Issue Periods 63.45 71.72 69.66 
Hot Issue Periods 58.82 53.78 59.66 
Total 61.36 63.64 65.15 
I. * denotes significance at 5% level and ^ denotes significance at 10% level. 
2. t- statistics have been adjusted for both serial correlation and heteroskedasticity using Newey- 
West correction. 
3. Likelihood ratio statistic tests the null hypothesis that all the coefficients except the constant are 
zero. This is the analog of the F- statistic in linear regression models. 
4. McFadden R- square is the likelihood ratio index and is an analog to the R- square reported in 
linear regression models. 
5. % correct predictions are based on the cutoff probability of 0.5. Observations are classified as 
having predicted probabilities that are above of below the cutoff value. For instance, `correct' 
classifications for cold issue periods are obtained when the predicted probability is less than or 
equal to 0.5. 
6. BCI denotes monthly percentage change in the Business Cycle Leading Indicator; SP denotes 
monthly percentage change in the S &P 500 index; DISC denotes monthly percentage discounts on 
closed -end funds; FLOW denotes unexpected changes in monthly mutual fund net flows; VOL 
denotes annualised standard deviation of daily return of the S &P 500 index over the month prior to 
the beginning of the month of stock offerings. 
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We expect concurrent and lagged BCI to positively influence the 
probability of hot issue periods in VWUP, and the results provide strong support 
with the second, third, and fourth lagged coefficients for BCI consistently positive 
and significant. 
The first five lags of SP are positive and significant in Model 6. This 
indicates that the higher the stock market level in the last five months, the higher 
the probability that VWUP will enter a hot issue period. This is consistent with our 
earlier hypothesis. 
There is a lack of significance in the concurrent and lagged values of stock 
market volatility, discounts on closed -end funds and mutual fund net flows in 
Table 8.6. While the second lagged coefficient of FLOW displays explanatory 
power over the degree of VWUP in the OLS analysis, FLOW is not significantly 
related to the probability of hot issue periods in VWUP in Table 8.6. The probit 
analysis suggests that neither investor sentiment or stock market volatility has a 
significant influence on the probability of hot issue periods in VWUP. Rather, the 
hot issue periods in VWUP appear to be driven by only upturns in the stock 
market level in the prior five months and improvement in economic conditions in 
the prior four months. 
Although only BCI and SP appear to have significantly explanatory power 
over the probability of hot issue periods in VWUP, the likelihood ratio statistics in 
all models are statistically significant and the percentage correct prediction of the 
three models on hot and cold periods of VWUP still exceeds 60 %. 
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8.8 Summary and Conclusion 
In this chapter, several hypotheses are developed by considering both 
demand and supply factors in order to explore the underlying causes of hot issue 
IPO markets. The hypotheses are tested using both OLS and probit analyses. 
In summary, our hypotheses are largely supported. Based on the OLS 
results, all economic and stock market variables exhibit explanatory power over 
the number of firms going public. For VWUP, the concurrent and lagged BCI, SP 
and FLOW exhibit statistical importance in explaining VWUP. However, two 
variables, DISC and VOL, do not appear to explain IPO underpricing. Compared 
to the regression results on NOIPO in Table 8.3, the regression analysis for 
VWUP shows relatively lower R- squares in all models (see Table 8.4). I argue that 
this may occur because IPO underpricing is also related to the firm specific 
characteristics. 
The probit analysis exhibits similar results. All economic and stock market 
variables appear to influence the probability of hot issue periods in NOIPO. Based 
on the percentage of correct predictions of whether NOIPO will be in hot or cold 
periods, all three probit models display a high level of accuracy. Although hot 
issue periods in VWUP appear to be driven only by changes in the stock market 
level and business cycle leading indicator, the correct prediction of the three probit 
models on VWUP still exceeds 60 %. 
Finally, both the OLS and probit results suggest that the effect of economic 
and stock market factors on NOIPO is more apparent at longer lags in comparison 
with the results of VWUP. This supports the argument that the various activities 
required to fulfil the legal requirements and promote new issues force issuers to 
act on expected market conditions around 3 -6 months ahead. 
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CHAPTER NINE 
THE INTERRELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE US AND 
AUSTRALIAN IPO MARKETS 
9.1 Introduction 
There has been considerable growth in the flow of international investment 
across markets in recent years. For instance, equity investment flows across 
markets increased from US$2.86 billion in 1990 to US$15.51 billion in 1998.124 
This is in part due to the change in global political and economic dynamics which 
occurred during the 1980s. For instance, the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the 
resurrection of a social market economy for some Eastern European countries and 
China. Further, many South American governments privatised state -owned 
enterprises following the practice of the United Kingdom. The demand for 
international equity capital has increased and emerging markets now represent a 
feasible investment alternative for international investors (Bilson, Brailsford and 
Hooper 1999). In addition, the relaxation of controls on capital movements, 
globalisation and improvements in technology have also stimulated international 
fund flows. For instance, improved telecommunication technology allows 
information and capital to flow relatively unimpeded across international 
boundaries, enhancing market efficiency (Arshanapalli and Doukas 1993). The 
growth in international flow of capital, in turn, has motivated interaction between 
124 Source: Table 7.6: Global Financial Flow, World Development Indicator 2000, World Bank. 
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stock markets. In other words, existing linkages between world equity markets 
have been improved and a significant market disturbance in one country can be 
more easily transmitted to other stock exchanges (Jeon and Furstenberg 1990). 
The increasing interaction among national stock markets should, in turn, 
lead to an increasing correlation among IPO activity across markets. The results 
obtained in Chapters six and seven confirm the existence of hot issue periods in 
both the Australia and the USA. Moreover, IPO activity is related to economic and 
stock market activities. The US market is the most influential market in the world 
where movements in the US stock market influence the behaviour of other stock 
markets (Eun and Shim 1989; Janakiramanan and Lamba 1998; Brocato 1990). 
This suggests that, prima facie, aggregate US IPO activity should also influence 
IPO activity in other markets. 
Indeed, previous research has indirectly documented the interrelationship 
between international IPO markets. In addition to the previously documented hot 
markets in the early and mid -1980s in the USA (see Ritter 1984b; Ibbotson et al. 
1994), hot issue IPO markets have also been documented in other markets, 
including the UK and South Korea in the late 1980s and Germany during 1982- 
1983 and 1985 -1986 (Ibbotson and Ritter 1995; Ritter 1998). Moreover, Loughran 
et al. (1994) study fifteen international IPO markets and find evidence of a 
positive correlation between IPO volume and the level of the stock market in 14 
out of 15 countries. The results imply that the relationship between international 
IPO markets may exist. 
In an environment where international interaction is significant, knowledge 
of the relationship among international IPO markets is important for at least three 
reasons. First, individual investors are interested in the relationships between the 
245 
national IPO markets for diversification purposes. An analysis of the 
interrelationship between the international IPO activities may shed additional light 
on the issue of international diversification. Second, owners and financial 
managers of private companies are also interested in worldwide IPO activity as it 
may influences investment decision. For instance, if US IPO activity leads 
Australian IPO activity, Australian financial managers who observe a hot issue 
period in the USA may take this as a signal that they can bring an IPO to the 
Australian market under favourable conditions. Third, an understanding of 
financial linkages in international IPO activity can also be useful for policy 
coordination across governments and stock exchanges. 
However, there exists no in -depth analysis of the interdependence among 
national IPO markets. Loughran et al. (1994) document evidence of the short-run 
and long run performance of IPOs in fifteen countries but do not further examine 
the interrelationship between these markets. This may be due to the relatively 
short time period of their data. This chapter aims to fill this gap in the literature by 
analysing the lead -lag relationship in the IPO markets using Australian and US 
IPO data. 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide evidence of the interrelationship 
between the ITS and Australian WO markets. Specifically, this chapter addresses 
the following issues: 
a) Does the US FPO market activity influence Australian IPO market 
activity? In turn, does Australian IPO market activity influence the US 
IPO market activity? 
b) Is there one market whose movements in IPO activity lead activity in 
another country? 
246 
c) How rapidly are the movements of IPO activity in one country 
transmitted to another country, if at all? 
In attempting to answer the above questions, a Vector Autoregressive 
analysis (VAR) is applied to all monthly measures of IPO activity developed in 
Chapter four for both the USA and Australia during the period January 1976 to 
June 1997. The analysis incorporates the role of stock market conditions in the 
markets and allows for the possibility of a lead -lag interaction between the 
markets. 
9.2 Review of Stock Market Linkages 
Financial linkages among world stock markets have attracted much 
attention. The initial work of Grubel (1968) documents the benefits of 
international portfolio diversification. Using pre -1980 data, a number of studies 
examine the Iead -lag relationships in national stock market indices (e.g. Granger 
and Morgenstern 1970; Agmon 1972; Hilliard 1979; Schneeweis and Hill 1980). 
Generally, their studies find that movements of stock returns in different countries 
are unrelated to each other and hence a reduction in risk can be obtained by 
diversifying a portfolio internationally. 
In contrast, recent research using post -1980 data shows that there exists a 
substantial degree of interdependence among national stock markets (e.g. Eun and 
Shim 1989; Brocato 1990; Jeon and Furstenberg 1990). Brocato (1990) analyses 
the financial linkages among six major stock exchanges (the USA, Canada, Great 
Britain, Japan, Germany and Ilong Kong) and shows that movements in the US 
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stock market return are a major influence over the behaviour of other stock 
markets. Janakiramanan and Lamba (1998) examine the financial linkages in stock 
market indices between Pacific -Basin and the US stock markets during 1988- 
1996. Their results show that in general, the US stock market affects all 
Australasian stock markets. Using the data of nine national stock markets between 
1980 and 1985, Eun and Shim (1989) recognise that the US market is the most 
influential in the world. Innovations in the US market are rapidly transmitted to 
other markets whereas no other single market can significantly explain US market 
movements. 
The interaction among national stock markets can also be characterised by 
examining the volatilities of stock prices in different markets. Using high - 
frequency data surrounding the 1987 stock market crash, King and Wadhwani 
(1990) and Bertero and Mayer (1990) found that international correlations in price 
movements tend to increase during a stock market crisis. In other words, higher 
volatility in one market may lead to increased correlation between price 
movements in that market and other markets. Using monthly excess returns for 
seven major countries over the period 1960 -1990, Longin and Solnik (1995) 
analyse the correlation in international stock returns and find that the correlation 
rises in periods when market volatility is high. Arshanapalli and Doukas (1993) 
study the linkage between European and the US markets before and after the 1987 
stock market crash. They find that the European stock markets are strongly linked 
with the US market for the post -1987 stock market crash period while weaker 
linkages are observed for the pre -crash period. 
More recently, Hamao et al. (1990) examine the spillover of conditional 
return means and variances across the UK, the USA and Japan by applying 
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GARCH models on daily returns. They find spillover effects for the conditional 
variances from the USA and the UK to Japan, but not vice versa. In a related 
study, Brailsford (1996) finds bi- directional spillovers between the Australian and 
New Zealand stock markets. Through an investigation of volatility spillover 
between the US and various Asian markets, Ng et al. (1991) show that volatility 
spillovers exist across Asian markets but only in periods when international 
investment restrictions have been relaxed. 
Beyond measuring the extent of integration in stock exchanges, several 
studies investigate whether the financial linkages among national stock price 
indexes are stable over time. However, the results are mixed. While Philippatos et 
al. (1983) support the existence of inter- temporal stability of international stock 
market relationships using monthly returns for fourteen countries from 1959 to 
1978, Kaplanis (1988) suggests the stability in the monthly stock return 
correlations of ten markets over 1967 -1982. In contrast, Koch and Koch (1991) 
examine the correlation across national stock indices of eight markets using daily 
data for three separate years (1972, 1980 and 1987) and conclude that international 
stock markets have grown more interdependent recently. Von Furstenberg and 
Jeon (1989) reach a similar conclusion based on Vector Autoregressive results of 
four markets over 1986 -1988. Further, Longin and Solnik (1995) examine the 
monthly excess return for seven major countries over the period 1960 -1990 and 
find that the international covariance and correlation matrices of stock returns are 
unstable over time. 
Recently, research on the financial linkages between stock exchanges has 
been extended to examine national business conditions and national stock market 
returns. Erb et al. (1994) find that the correlation between the stock markets of the 
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G -7 countries is higher when both countries are in a contractionary phase. Further, 
Ragunathan, Faff and Brooks (1999) examine the correlation between Australia 
and the US national stock market returns over the business cycle and also 
conclude that the correlations between the two markets are higher when the US 
economy is in a contractionary phase. 
In summary, research suggests that international stock markets have grown 
more interdependent, especially after the 1987 stock market crash. US stock 
market returns are the major influence on the stock return movements of other 
markets. Moreover, the correlation between national stock market returns varies 
over time and appears related to economic conditions. 
9.3 Development of Hypotheses 
In the literature, there are several reasons advanced as to why stock returns 
are correlated across markets. First, Janakiramanan and Lamba (1998) suggest that 
the financial dominance of the US market is partly due to its dominant economic 
power. In the post -World War II period, the status of the most influential world 
economy shifted from Britain to the USA. Since the US dollar dominates most of 
the cross -border trading, economic factors affecting the US capital market will be 
reflected in the US currency. 
Second, Lin et al. (1994) suggest that if two economies are associated 
through international trade and investment, any news about economic 
fundamentals in one country is likely to have implications for the other country. 
Further, Janakiramanan and Lamba (1998) claim that the market that is larger in 
size is more likely to influence the smaller market. 
250 
Third, Longin and Solnik (1995) argue that the progressive removal of 
impediments to international investment, as well as the growing political and 
financial integration, lead to an increase in international correlation across 
financial markets (see also Rogers 1994). Further, Bilson, Brailsford and Hooper 
(1999) suggest that "barriers to integration are either macro -economic or stock 
market specific. Macro -economic instability can be due to poor credit rating, high 
inflation, exchange control, economic policy risk, liquidity risk and currency risk. 
Stock market specific barriers are influenced by the degree to which the market is 
developed in terms of the presence of international brokers, market size, regulation 
and accounting system" (p. 3). Removal of these barriers will lead to greater 
integration across markets. 
The Australian financial market has undergone major changes over the last 
decade and experienced significant financial deregulation. For instance, the 
floating of the Australian dollar in 1983, the admittance of full banking operations 
for foreign banks, the introduction of discount brokerage services, decreases in 
commission rates and the relaxation of foreign controls in the stockbroking 
business occurred in the 1980s (Bruce et al. 1991). Further, the Australian Stock 
Exchange Limited was amalgamated through the six stock exchanges in Australia 
in 1987. It also automated its trading system through the Stock Exchange 
Automated Trading System (SEATS). 
Traditionally, direct trading with the USA plays an important role in the 
Australian economy. Based on information from the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics, direct trading between the USA and Australia increased from A$17,266 
million in 1991 to A$28,875 million in 1999. Moreover, direct exports and 
imports between Australia and the USA account for 9.28% and 21.40% of total 
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Australian exports and imports in 1999, respectively.125 These figures reveal an 
important linkage between the two countries. Since the US market is more 
dominant and is larger in size, it is reasonable to expect that movements in the US 
stock market affect movements in the Australian stock market. In fact, Eun and 
Shim (1989) and Janakiramanan and Lamba (1998) provide empirical evidence of 
US stock market influences over the Australian stock market. Therefore, it is 
reasonable to expect that there may also be a linkage in aggregate IPO activity 
between Australia and the USA such that US IPO activity leads Australian IPO 
activity. 
In this thesis, the level of IPO activity has been examined through two 
broad activity measures being IPO volume and underpricing. I first discuss the 
relationship in IPO volume between the two markets. Since changes in the stock 
price reflect a change in investor expectations about future business conditions, a 
higher stock market return reflects an upward revision in investor expectations 
(Choe et al. 1993). It has also been argued in Chapter eight that the offer price for 
an WO is normally set based on the expected business conditions at the date of 
price setting. Subsequently, higher underpricing is expected if there is an upward 
revision in expected future business conditions. As a result, there should be a 
positive relation between stock market returns and IPO underpricing, as argued 
previously. Indeed, the results obtained in Chapter eight confirm this relationship 
(see Table 8.4). 
As described in Section 9.2, the literature suggests that US stock market 
movements are the major influence on movements of other markets (e.g. Eun and 
'25Source: Australia Now -A Statistical Profile, Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1999, Canberra, 
Australia. 
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Shim 1989; Brocato 1990). The implication is that US stock market returns lead 
Australian stock market returns. 
Combining the discussions above, an improvement in the US stock market 
condition will result in two consequences. First, an improvement in the US stock 
market will lead to higher underpricing in the local IPO market due to the 
evidence of a positive relation between stock market conditions and IPO 
underpricing (see Chapter eight). Second, an improvement in the US stock market 
will transmit to the Australian stock market, which leads to a subsequent 
improvement in the Australian stock market condition. The improvement in the 
Australian stock market should, in turn, also result in higher IPO underpricing in 
the Australian IPO market. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that US IPO 
underpricing leads IPO underpricing in Australia. 
Two critical issues need to be considered in considering the financial 
linkage in IPO underpricing between Australia and the USA. First, the industry 
concentration of the two markets differs. For instance, natural resource IPOs 
account for 31.85% of total IPOs during January 1976 -June 1997 in Australia 
while natural resource IPOs represent only 2.73% of total offerings in the USA 
between January 1976 and June 1998 (see Chapter four).126 The results obtained 
in Chapters five and seven suggest that while the volume of Australian resource 
issues follows the general trend in the market, resource sector IPOs exhibit 
different underpricing behaviour in comparison to their industrial counterparts. 
Specifically, underpricing in resource sector IPOs tends to be higher and 
unpredictable. 
126 Note that average underpricing for natural resource IPOs is generally above the average 
underpricing of all IPOs. 
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Second, the empirical results obtained in Chapter eight suggest that the 
degree of IPO underpricing may be affected by many factors. In addition to 
economic and stock market conditions, the degree of IPO underpricing may also 
be related to company specific factors, such as the size of issues (e.g. Michaely 
and Shaw 1994; Maksimovic and Unal 1993), price of issues (e.g. Jain 1995; 
Chalk and Peavy 1987), industry classification of issues (e.g. Ritter 1984b; How et 
al. 1995), underwriters (e.g. Johnson and Miller 1988; Carter et al. 1998), ages and 
sizes of the firms (e.g. James and Wier 1990; Davis and Yeomans 1976), and 
ownership structures of the firms (e.g. Leland and Pyle 1977; Dowries and Heinkel 
1992).127 Chapters five and eight show that resource sector IPOs tend to be smaller 
in size and greater in underpricing. 
Since companies going public in two different markets are unlikely to be 
identical in every respect, the degree of aggregate IPO underpricing may therefore 
differ between the two markets. Moreover, the results obtained in Chapter seven 
indicate that resource sector IPOs exhibit a substantial influence on the price 
measures of total IPO market activity in Australia. As a result, it is expected that 
the linkage in WO underpricing between the two countries will be presented but 
weaker than first expected. The first hypothesis is therefore: 
HI: there is a (weak) linkage in monthly IPO underpricing between 
Australia and the USA, whereby US IPO underpricing leads Australian IPO 
underpricing. 
127 Refer to Chapter two for full details. 
254 
In Chapters six and seven, a lead -lag relationship between IPO 
underpricing and volume was observed for both the USA and Australia, whereby 
IPO underpricing leads volume by up to six months.128 Since US IPO underpricing 
is expected to lead Australian TO underpricing, as argued above, evidence of the 
leading effect of IPO underpricing on volume in local markets suggests that there 
should be a linkage in IPO volume between the two markets, whereby US IPO 
volume leads Australian MO volume. Therefore, we posit that there is a lead -lag 
relationship between the US and Australian IPO volume. The second hypothesis is 
H2: there is a linkage in monthly IPO volume between Australia and the 
USA, whereby US IPO volume leads Australian IPO volume. 
Unlike an instantaneous lead -lag relationship in international stock market 
returns (i.e. within 24 hours, Bracker et al. 1999), the lead -lag relationship in 
monthly IPO volume between the two countries will take longer. This is because 
IPO issuers in one country cannot generally respond instantaneously to favourable 
IPO market conditions in another market since there is a 3 -6 month period needed 
to undertake the various activities required to fulfil the legal requirements and 
promote the issue (Welch 1996; Lipman 1997).129 However, investors are 
expected to be able to respond more quickly to the changes in the TO and stock 
market conditions. As a result, the Iead -lag relationship in IPO underpricing 
between Australia and the USA is expected to exhibit at a shorter lag. 
128 Note that this lead -lag relationship between TPO underpricing and volume is not evident in the 
Australian resource sector IPOs. 
129 Refer to earlier discussion. 
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9.4 Data and Research Method 
9.11 Data 
This chapter examines the interrelationship in the aggregate IPO market 
activity between Australia and the USA. The level of IPO activity between the two 
countries is examined through two broad measures being IPO volume and 
underpricing. Consistent with earlier chapters, the four variables developed in 
Chapter five that measure these aspects of IPO activity are used. While NOIPO 
and GP concern volume, VWUP and VUP concern underpricing. Each variable is 
measured on a monthly basis over the period January 1976 -June 1997.130 
The variables used in the analysis are described below: 
USNOIPO = NOIPO for the US IPO sample; 
AUSNOIPO = NOIPO for the Australian IPO sample; 
USGP= GP for the US IPO sample; 
AUSGP= GP for Australian IPO sample; 
USVWUP= VWUP for the US IPO sample; 
AUSVWUP= VWUP for the Australian IPO sample; 
USVUP= VUP for the US IPO sample; 
AUSVUP= VUP for the Australian IPO sample; 
Details of the variable construction and summary statistics for the variables 
are provided in Chapter five. 
°° Refer to Chapter five for details. 
256 
9.4.2 Research Method 
The method used to examine the interrelationship in the level of aggregate 
IPO market activity between the two countries involves the use of a Vector 
Autoregression (VAR) model. The method requires stationarity in each time 
series. Based on the results of Dickey -Fuller tests reported in Tables 5.1 and 5.4, 
the IPO activity measures used here are all stationary. 
The results obtained in Chapter eight indicate that stock market and 
business cycle variables have explanatory power in explaining both measures of 
IPO underpricing and volume. The implication is straightforward, that is, the VAR 
analysis needs to incorporate the role of economic and stock market variables as 
control variables to avoid model mis -specification. Since a business cycle leading 
indicator is not readily available in Australia, only relative changes in the stock 
market indices can be considered. Hence, relative changes in the monthly stock 
market indices for both Australia and the USA are incorporated in the VAR 
analysis. The Australian stock market index used is the All Ordinaries Price Index 
and is obtained from Datastream International. The US stock market index used is 
the S &P 500 index and has been discussed in Chapter eight.131 
The form of the VAR becomes: 
m m 
Y1,1 = ai + E /j1,iY1J- + E S1,,Yz,, r + ,Y 1 ,USSP1_1 + E 91,,AUSSP-; 
,=1 ,_ ,_ ,=1 
m m 
Y2,t = az + E ßz,,Yzr-, + E Sz,,Y21-, + E 0zrUSSPt-, + E z,,AUSSPI-, +iI z,r 
,-1 ,=1 ,=1 ,=1 
'31 Instead of the relative change in both US and Australian stock market indices, the monthly 
change in the Morgan Staney Capital International Index was also used. The results from this 
alternative index indicate that the conclusions remain unchanged. 
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where 
y,, denotes the measure of IPO activity in the USA at month t; 
y2,, denotes the measure of IPO activity in Australia at month t; 
mis the number of lags; 
USSPt is the relative changes in the S &P 500 index at month t; 
AUSSP, is the relative changes in the All Ordinaries price index at month t; 
,u,,, and /i2,1 are the error terms. 
Several critical issues are relevant in the VAR analysis. First, we need to 
decide how many lags should be included in the model. Given degrees of freedom 
considerations, as well as the regulatory and institutional features in an IPO 
market where issuers cannot respond instantaneously to market conditions (due to 
a three- to six -month lag during which time various activities are undertaken to 
fulfil the legal requirement and promotion of issues), a lag length of six months for 
the VAR analysis is chosen.132 
Second, there is evidence of heteroscedasticity in some series. For 
instance, Figures 9.1a and 9.1b provide correlograms of the residuals and squared 
residuals for the analysis on AUSNOIPO. In Figure 9.1b, the Q statistics test for 
changes in variance across time using lag windows ranging from I through 12. 
The p- values for the test statistics reported in the last column indicate 
heteroscedasticity. Therefore, a Generalised Autoregressive Conditional 
Heteroscedasticity (GARCH) model is used to model the series with 
heteroscedastic errors. 
132 The choice of lag length of six months is somewhat arbitrary. However, this lag length is logical 
and consistent with earlier arguments. 
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Figure 9.1a: An Example Correlogram of Residuals 
6 6 6 6 
AUSNOIPO ¡ = at + E ß, USNOIPO;_; + E 5; AUSNOIPO;_; +10 AUSSP; + E W, USSP;_; +¡L; 
i=i =t ;=i i=t 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q -Stat Prob 
1 -0.003 -0.003 0.0029 0.957 
2 -0.015 -0.015 0.0595 0.971 
3 -0.024 -0.024 0.2099 0.976 
4 -0.004 -0.004 0.2138 0.995 
5 -0.019 -0.020 0.3083 0.997 
6 -0.064 -0.065 1.3892 0.967 
7 -0.073 -0.075 2.7772 0.905 
8 0.023 0.019 2.9106 0.940 
9 0.032 0.027 3.1849 0.957 
10 0.016 0.013 3.2541 0.975 
11 -0.015 -0.016 3.3123 0.986 
12 0.150 0.147 9.3174 0.676 
Figure 9.Ib: An Example Correlogram of Squared Residuals 
6 6 6 6 
AUSNOIPO; =a1+Eß;USNOIPO,_;+ES;AUSNOIPO;_;+1B;AUSSP_;+ErpUSSP_ 
r=t =1 i=t ,=t 
Autocorrelation Partial Correlation AC PAC Q -Stat Prob 
1 0.318 0.318 25.77* 0.000 
2 0.325 0.250 52.89* 0.000 
3 0.389 0.275 91.76* 0.000 
4 0.297 0.108 114.56* 0.000 
5 0.150 -0.096 120.37* 0.000 
6 0.149 -0.058 126.16* 0.000 
7 0.114 -0.036 129.55* 0.000 
8 0.119 0.062 133.25* 0.000 
9 0.046 -0.012 133.81" 0.000 
10 0.014 -0.050 133.86* 0.000 
11 0.036 -0.006 134.21* 0.000 
12 0.052 0.047 134.94* 0.000 
Note: 
1. This is only an example to show the evidence of heteroscedasticity in the models (before an 
IGARCH process). The correlograms for other models are available upon request. 
2. * denotes significance at 5% level. 
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A GARCH (1,1) process was initially fitted to the data. However, the 
initial estimates indicated an explosive process in the unconditional variance with 
the GARCH parameters summing to a number slightly greater than one. 
Therefore, restrictions are imposed through an integrated GARCH process 
(IGARCH) when appropriate.133 
As a result, the final form of VAR analysis is: 
6 6 6 6 
Y1,r = at + E ß1,;Y1,r-; + E St,,Yz,r-; + E + E rot,;AUSSP,-1 +111,, 
i =1 1 =I ; =1 / =1 
6 5 6 
Yz,t = az + E ß2,1Y2,1-; + , s2,;Y2,1-, + E 02 ,USSP,-; + E Pz;AUSSP,_1 
;=1 ;=1 i=1 t=1 
, and ,u2,t N(0, h2) 
k2 z 2 
=v+ ftf[,-t +fzhr-t- 
where 
h,2 is the conditional variance and is a function of three terms: 
the mean, v; 
innovations from the previous month, measured as the lag 
of the squared residual from the VAR equation, ,c1,2,; 
- last month's forecasted variance, 1;2, . 
f+f2=1. 
133 The IGARCH process imposes constraint on the GARCH parameters where the GARCH 
parameters sum to I. 
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9.5 Empirical Results 
9.5.1 IPO Volume 
The results of the VAR analysis are reported in Table 9.1. The VAR 
models enable a test of the predictability of lagged USNOIPO on AUSNOIPO and 
vice versa. For USNOIPO, the table shows that the lagged coefficients of 
USNOIPO up to 3 months are positive and significant. This finding is consistent 
with the autocorrelation results reported in Table 5.1, and suggests that lags up to 
three months exhibit significant predictive ability over the current level of 
USNOIPO. The first three lagged coefficients of USNOIPO add up to a value of 
0.842 which indicates that over 80% of current variation of the number of US 
IPOs is explained by its first three lags. t34 
In Table 9.1, none of lagged coefficients of AUSNOIPO exhibit any 
statistically significant power over USNOIPO. Hence, influence of number of 
Australian IPOs on the number of US IPOs is not evident. Of note, three out of six 
lagged coefficients of USSP are positive and significant, which implies that an 
improvement in stock market conditions precedes increases in the number of IPOs 
in the USA. This result further confirms the incorporation of stock market 
variables in the VAR process as control variables. 
134 This result is generally consistent with the finding of Ibbotson et al. (1994) where they observe 
a first -order autocorrelation of 0.88 in US monthly IPO volume. 
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Table 9.1: VAR Results of NOIPO between US and Australian IPO Samples 
USNOIPO AUSNOIPO 
Coef T-stat Coef T-stat 
Intercept 0.008 0.66 -0.001 -0.05 
USNOIPO Lag _1 0.495 7.36* -0.078 -1.15 
USNOIPO Lag_2 0.195 2.36* 0.289 4.32* 
USNOIPO Lag_3 0.152 1.98* -0.183 -2.16* 
IJSNOIPO Lag 4 0.107 1.60 0.191 2.23* 
USNOIPO Lag_5 0.012 0.17 -0.116 -I.20 
USNOIPO Lag_6 0.007 0.11 0.128 1.42 
AUSNOIPO Lag _1 -0.059 -1.76 0.273 337* 
AUSNOIPO Lag_2 -0.062 -1.66 0.103 1.57 
AUSNOIPO Lag 3 -0.014 -0.37 0.132 2.13* 
AUSNOIPO Lag_4 0.053 1.54 0.031 0.45 
AUSNOIPO Lag_5 0.045 1.54 0.079 1.51 
AUSNOIPO Lag_6 -0.020 -0.70 0.075 1.16 
USSP Lag_I 0.006 3.88* -0.001 -0.24 
USSP Lag_2 0.000 0.23 0.005 1.43 
USSP Lag_3 0.002 1.41 -0.005 -1.46 
USSP Lag 4 0.006 2.56* -0.004 -1.21 
USSP Lag 5 0.005 2.74* 0.002 0.53 
USSP Lag 6 0.001 0.20 0.000 0.07 
AUSSP Lag_I 0.002 0.93 -0.001 -0.19 
AUSSP Lag _2 0.003 1.37 0.006 1.88 
AUSSP Lag_3 -0.001 -0.32 0.003 1.03 
AUSSPLag_4 -0.002 -0.99 0.007 2.21* 
AUSSP Lag 5 -0.001 -0.36 0.001 0.17 
AUSSP Lag 6 0.001 0.60 -0.001 -0.21 
Variance Equation: 
Constant 0.001 1.78 0.001 1.65 
ARCH(I) 0.290 4.84* 0.311 5.27* 
GARCH(1) 0.710 11.82* 0.689 11.68* 
R- Square 0.732 0.605 
F- statistic 56.50* 14.48* 
* denotes significance at 5% level. 
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For AUSNOIPO in Table 9.1, the first and third lagged coefficients of 
AUSNOIPO are statistically significant in explaining the current level of 
AUSNOIPO. This feature of persistence in Australia is consistent with the US 
results. Compared to the strong autocorrelation observed for AUSNOIPO earlier 
in Table 5.2, the persistence is somewhat weaker in Australia after controlling for 
the stock market. 
Of note, the second, third and fourth lagged coefficients of USNOIPO also 
exhibit statistical explanatory power in explaining the current level of 
ÁUSNOIPO. The implication is that an upward trend in the frequency of US IPOs 
transmits to the Australian market in around four months. Comparing sizes of the 
lagged coefficients on both USNOIPO and AUSNOIPO, the second lagged 
coefficient of USNOIPO appears to be relatively more important with a value of 
0.289. This result confirms that while there is evidence of a direct relationship 
between previous and current frequency of the number of new issues in Australia, 
the number of offerings in the Australian market also follows the trend in the US 
market. 
Table 9.2 reports the results of the VAR on GP. For USGP, the results 
show that the first two and sixth lagged coefficients of USGP are positive and 
significant in explaining current USGP. This indicates that the current level of 
USGP is explained by its own Iags. Consistent with USNOIPO, none of the lagged 
AUSGP exhibit any significantly predictive ability over USGP. Hence, there is no 
evidence of an Australian influence. Of note, the lagged coefficients of USSP are 
almost all positive (except lag 2) with lags 1, 4 and 5 statistically significant. This 
result again suggests that a bullish stock market leads to subsequent greater IPO 
proceeds in the USA. 
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Table 9.2: VAR Results of GP between US and Australian IPO Samples 
USGP AUSGP 
Coef. T-stat Coef. T-stat 
Intercept -0.003 -0.62 0.029 0.37 
USGP Lag_I 0.403 6.20* 0.700 2.98* 
USGP Lag_2 0.152 2.18* -0.230 -0.90 
USGP Lag 3 0.102 1.54 0.232 0.91 
USGP Lag 4 0.010 0.15 0.260 1.04 
USGP Lag_5 0.079 1.30 -0.239 -0.95 
USGP Lag _6 0.248 6.14* 0.132 0.57 
AUSGP Lagl -0.003 -0.30 0.118 1.78 
AUSGP Lag_2 -0.019 -1.64 0.026 0.38 
AUSGP Lag_3 0.014 1.36 0.059 0.89 
AUSGP Lag_4 0.024 1.91 0.117 1.75 
AUSGP Lag_5 -0.017 -1.61 -0.027 -0.40 
AUSGP Lag_6 0.013 1.01 -0.102 -1.55 
USSP Lag_1 0.003 2.46* 0.001 0.08 
USSP Lag_2 -0.000 -0.16 0.005 0.30 
USSP Lag_3 0.000 0.13 -0.012 -0.77 
USSP Lag_4 0.003 2,77* -0.008 -0.51 
USSP Lag_5 0.004 2.96* -0.005 -0.33 
USSP Lag_6 -0.000 -0.08 -0.022 -I.45 
AUSSP Lag_1 0.001 0.45 -0.009 -0.67 
AUSSP Lag_2 0.002 1.57 0.007 0.52 
AUSSP Lag_3 0.000 0.31 0.003 0.22 
AUSSP Lag_4 -0.001 -1.11 0.015 1.07 
AUSSP Lag_5 0.001 0.78 0.001 0.09 
AUSSP Lag_6 0.001 1.15 0.014 1.15 
Variance Equation: 
Constant 0.000 1.32 
ARCH(1) 0.327 10.38* 
GARCH(1) 0.673 21.36* 
R- Square 0.612 0.224 
F- statistic 78.73* 2.72* 
* denotes significance at 5% level. 
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For AUSGP, there is no evidence of persistence in gross proceeds in the 
Australian market. However, the first lag USGP explains AUSGP with a value as 
large as 0.7. It seems that the total proceeds raised in the US market exert an 
important influence and tend to lead the total proceeds in the Australian market by 
one month. However, it is argued that Australian issuers cannot react to favourable 
US IPO market conditions instantaneously due to the institutional features of the 
IPO process. Therefore, no strong conclusion can be made about the lead -lag 
relationship in monthly gross proceeds between the US and Australian stock 
markets. 
In summary, a strong autocorrelation in IPO volume is observed in the US 
market. Although such persistence is also observed in the monthly number of 
offerings in Australia, it is not evident in Australian gross proceeds. The VAR 
results on IPO volume suggest that the current level of IPO volume in the US 
market is mainly explained by its own lags. The number of US IPOs also has an 
important effect and leads the number of Australian IPOs by up to four months. In 
contrast, the lagged Australian IPO volume measures exhibit no significant 
influence on US IPO volume measures. Therefore, the empirical findings support 
the hypothesis that there is a uni- directional linkage in IPO volume between 
Australia and the USA, whereby US IPO volume leads Australian TPO volume. 
9.5.2 IPO Underpricing 
For USVWUP, the results presented in Table 9.3 indicate that there is a 
significant positive relationship between current USVWUP and its lags up to two 
months. This finding of persistence in VWUP in the US market is consistent with 
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the results of Ibbotson et al. (1994) and earlier evidence presented in Chapter five 
(see Table 5.1).135 Comparing the magnitude of lagged coefficients, it appears that 
almost 65% of current USVWUP is explained by its own first two lags. There is 
no evidence of AUSVWUP leading UVWUP except at the fifth lag of 
AUSVWUP. However, this lagged coefficient is only 0.023 which suggests low 
economic importance. 
The first five lags of USSP exhibit positive values. This result is consistent 
with the earlier findings in Chapter eight (see Table 8.4). That is, the influence of 
stock market conditions on the level of US IPO underpricing is further confirmed. 
Moreover, the magnitude of the first lag of USSP is the highest among all 
coefficients. 
For AUSVWUP in Table 9.3, neither lagged coefficients of USVWUP nor 
lagged coefficients of AUSVWUP are significant. Hence, there is no evidence of 
persistence of VWUP in the Australian market, which is consistent with the 
autocorrelation results reported previously in Table 5.2. Of note, the second, 
fourth and sixth lagged coefficients of AUSSP are positively significant. This 
finding indicates that the degree of IPO underpricing in Australia has an 
association with prior stock market conditions, consistent with the US evidence. 
Of note, the R- square obtained for the model on AUSVWUP is only 13.1% and 
the insignificant F- statistics fail to reject the null hypothesis that all coefficients 
are jointly zero. An implication from these results is that monthly underpricing in 
Australia generally appears to be unpredictable, given the model. 
135 A first -order autocorrelation of 0.62 in the monthly average initial return in the US market is 
observed in Ibbotson et aI. (1994). 
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Table 9.3: VAR Results of VWUP between US and Australian IPO Samples 
USVWUP AUSVWUP 
Coef T-stat Coef T-stat 
Intercept 0.430 0.50 24.917 3.51* 
USVWUP Lag_! 0.392 4.36* 0.027 0.06 
USVWUP Lag_2 0.255 4.09* -0.885 -1.91 
USVWUP Lag_3 -0.051 -0.84 0.646 1.36 
USVWUP Lag 4 0.093 1.39 -0.566 -1.20 
USVWUPLag_5 -0.008 -0.13 0.183 0.40 
USV WUP Lag_6 0.083 1.70 -0.269 -0.66 
AUSVWUP Lag _1 -0.010 -1.15 -0.036 -0.55 
AUSV WUP Lag_2 -0.005 -0.56 -0.099 -1.50 
AUSVWUP Lag_3 -0.005 -0.62 0.062 0.93 
AUSVWUP Lag _4 0.010 0.78 -0.064 -0.96 
AUSVWUP Lag_5 0.022 4.51* 0.023 0.36 
AUSVWUP Lag_6 0.008 1.39 0.049 0.76 
USSP Lag_1 0.423 4.62* 1.192 1.34 
USSP Lag_2 0.191 1.79 0.451 0.46 
USSP Lag_3 0.399 3.70* 0.783 0.79 
USSP Lag_4 0.272 2.24* -0.207 -0.21 
USSP Lag_5 0.096 0.75 0.526 0.53 
USSP Lag _6 -0.237 -2.28* -0.175 -0.19 
AUSSP Lag_1 -0.083 -0.90 -1.069 -1.27 
AUSSP Lag_2 -0.101 -0.90 1.933 2.26* 
AUSSP Lag_3 -0.178 -1.95 -0.719 -0.82 
AUSSP Lag_4 -0.167 -1.60 3.102 3.57* 
AUSSP Lag_5 0.057 0.55 -1.600 -1.83 
AUSSP Lag_6 -0.033 -0.39 2.003 2.57* 
Variance Equation: 
Constant 12.114 3.41* 
ARCH(1) 0.883 8.45* 
GARCH(1) 0.117 1.12 
R -Square 0.317 0.131 
F- statistic 19.01* 1.42 
* denotes significance at 5% level. 
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Table 9.4 reports the VAR result of VUP. For USVUP, the first two lags 
and sixth lagged coefficients of USVUP exhibit significant results. Over 54% of 
current USVUP is explained by the first two lags of itself. The insignificance of 
lagged coefficients of AUSVUP suggests that lagged AUSVUP has no influence 
on the current level of USVUP.136 Considering the results of both USVWUP and 
USVUP, it appears that the US IPO underpricing is largely explained by its own 
lags and prior US stock market conditions. 
Consistent with the VAR results of AUSVWUP, the analysis on AUSVUP 
in Table 9.4 indicates that neither lagged coefficients of AUSVUP or lagged 
coefficients of USVUP are statistically significant. The F- statistic fails to reject the 
null hypothesis that all coefficients are jointly zero. In other words, no variable in 
the model explains the monthly value of underpricing in Australia. Of note, the R- 
square obtained for this model is the lowest among all models across Tables 9.1 to 
9.4. 
'36 Although the fifth lag of AUSSP is negatively significant, no strong conclusion can be made as 
we expect a shorter Iead -lag relationship. 
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Table 9.4: VAR Results of VUP between US and Australian IPO Samples 
USVUP AUSVUP 
Coef T-stat Coef T-stat 
Intercept 0.008 1.29 0.257 2.31* 
USVUP Lag_1 0.372 5.90* -0.125 -0.53 
USVUP Lag_2 0.172 3.96* -0.001 -0.00 
USVUP Lag_3 0.021 0.34 0.069 0.25 
USVUP Lag 4 0.070 1.11 -0.021 -0.08 
USVUP Lag _5 0.068 1.13 0.003 0.01 
USVUP Lag_6 0.134 2.84* 0.198 0.86 
AUSVUP Lag_I -0.002 -0.57 0.034 0.52 
AUSVUP Lag_2 -0.004 -0.62 0.001 0.02 
AUSVUP Lag_3 0.003 0.57 0.039 0.58 
AUSVUP Lag_4 -0.005 -0.99 -0.035 -0.53 
AUSVUP Lag_5 0.001 0.06 0.084 1.26 
AUSVUP Lag_6 -0.001 -0.14 -0.030 -0.45 
USSP Lag 1 0.004 3.43* 0.027 1.27 
USSP Lag _2 -0.004 -2.61* 0.019 0.80 
USSP Lag_3 0.003 1.94 0.011 0.49 
USSP Lag_4 0.004 2.70* -0.006 -0.27 
USSP Lag_5 0.005 3.85* -0.004 -0.16 
USSP Lag_6 -0.001 -0.73 -0.020 -0.91 
AUSSP Lag_I 0.002 1.27 -0.036 -1.77 
AUSSP Lag_2 0.001 0.70 0.014 0.67 
AUSSP Lag_3 -0.001 -1.23 -0.001 -0.06 
AUSSP Lag_4 -0.003 -2.27* 0.045 2.17* 
AUSSP Lag_5 -0.000 -0.28 -0.004 -0.22 
AUSSP Lag_6 0.001 0.81 0.032 1.79 
Variance Equation: 
Constant 0.001 2.54* 
ARCH(1) 0.510 11.06* 
GARCH(1) 0.490 10.61* 
R- Square 0.569 
F- statistic 51.36* 
0.061 
0.61 
* denotes significance at 5% level. 
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In summary, the measures of FPO underpricing in the US market are 
strongly explained by its first two lags. While there is evidence of persistence in 
the US market, there is no similar evidence in the Australian IPO market. IPO 
underpricing in the USA appears to be explained by its own lags and prior stock 
market conditions. In contrast, neither lagged underpricing in the USA or lagged 
underpricing in Australia exhibit any predictive ability over the current level of 
underpricing in Australia. This implies that monthly IPO underpricing in Australia 
is largely unpredictable. While we posit that there is a (weak) linkage in monthly 
IPO underpricing between Australia and the USA, the empirical results indicate 
this linkage does not exist. This result is somewhat surprising, but may be 
explained by the fact that resource sector IPOs consist of 32% of total Australian 
new issues over the period in comparison to only 3% in the USA (see Chapter 
four). This implies that companies going public in the two markets have different 
characteristics. Since resource sector IPOs are characterised by smaller offer sizes 
and larger underpricing (see Chapters four and seven), resource IPOs are expected 
to have a substantial influence on the aggregate underpricing measures in 
Australia.137 In fact, the results obtained in Chapter seven have already confirmed 
the influence of resource sector IPOs on the aggregate underpricing measures in 
Australia. There might be other reasons for this finding, however, I leave it for 
future research. 
137 Refer to Chapter five for the construction of the IPO underpricing measures. 
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9.6 Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter has investigated the linkage between the US and Australian 
IPO markets. By incorporating stock market conditions from both countries, the 
IPO activity measures for both markets are examined through a VAR model. 
Strong autocorrelation is observed on all US IPO activity measures (both 
IPO volume and underpricing). In addition, all US IPO activity measures appear to 
be influenced by prior US stock market conditions. 
The results on the monthly number of new issues suggest that an upward 
trend in the frequency of US IPOs transmits to the Australian market in around 
four months. This result confirms the leading effect of US IPO volume on 
Australian IPO volume. However, the Iead -lag relationship is not evident in other 
measures, such as IPO underpricing. 
Although there is evidence of persistence in the monthly number of 
offerings in Australia, this feature is not evident in other Australian IPO measures 
(AUSGP, AUSVWUP and AUSVUP). while the number of IPOs in Australia 
appears to follow the general trend in the US market, and there appears evidence 
of a relationship between Australian IPO underpricing and previous local stock 
market conditions, neither lagged underpricing in the USA or Australia exhibit any 
explanatory power over the current level of underpricing in Australia. We argue 
that IPO underpricing in Australia is largely unpredictable and is more likely to be 
affected by issuer -specific features. 
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CHAPTER TEN 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
10.1 Thesis Summary 
This chapter provides a summary of the thesis and briefly comments on 
directions for future research. 
This thesis is primarily an empirical study on the behaviour of aggregate 
IPO markets using long -term US and Australian data. Following the introduction, 
Chapter two contained a literature review of theoretical and empirical issues 
related to WO underpricing. The chapter first reported international evidence on 
IPO underpricing and was followed by a discussion of financial characteristics of 
IPO underpricing. Reasons for IPO underpricing were subsequently discussed and 
classified into four categories, being information asymmetry, investors, the market 
and institutional framework, and the impact of financial intermediates. 
The literature review concerning the behaviour of IPO markets was 
presented in Chapter three. The chapter provided a definition of hot issue markets 
based on the literature and empirical evidence relating to cycles in the IPO 
activity. Section 3 of the chapter detailed the existing explanations for cycles in 
IPO activity. Of note, none of the existing explanations appear to provide a full 
explanation. Moreover, previous studies have generally concentrated on supply 
side arguments but the importance of demand for IPOs is often overlooked. 
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Several economic variables were suggested to be potentially important in 
explaining cycles in IPO activity. 
Chapter four described the data collection procedures and sources of IPO 
data. With consideration of several empirical issues, a sample of 6,632 IPOs for 
the period January 1976 to June 1998 was collected for the US market and a 
sample of 766 IPOs over the period January 1976 to June 1997 was collected for 
the Australian market. Detailed summary statistics were provided for both 
markets. The results indicate that the Australian IPOs exhibit a relatively higher 
average initial return than those of the USA. In addition, resource sector IPOs 
consist of 32% of total Australian new issues over the period in comparison to 
only 3% in the USA. Separate consideration of industrial and resource sector IPOs 
in Australia suggests that resource sector IPOs are generally smaller in size and 
exhibit greater underpricing. 
Since we focus on aggregate IPO markets and exploit the question of hot 
and cold issue periods, four measures of IPO activity were developed in Chapter 
five. While NOIPO and GP measure IPO volume, VWUP and VUP measure 
underpricing. Although NOIPO and GP follow traditional measures, VWUP is an 
improvement on existing research and VUP is a newly developed measure. For the 
US IPO sample, the two volume series exhibit a similar pattern over time. 
Although there are differences in behaviour between volume and underpricing in 
both the USA and Australia, the underpricing series appears to lead the volume 
series. Further, separate consideration of the industrial and resource sectors in 
Australia indicates that underpricing in resource sector IPOs appears to be larger 
and less persistent than their industrial counterparts. Consistent with the US 
results, the plots of Australian IPO activity measures also suggest a potential lead- 
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lag relationship between the volume and underpricing measures. Of note, there 
also appears to be a correlation in the corresponding volume measures between 
Australia and the USA 
Chapter six involved formal identification of hot and cold issue periods in 
the four IPO activity measures in the USA. The IPO activity measures were 
analysed in order to provide a multi -dimensional characterisation and 
identification of hot and cold IPO markets. Several research techniques were used, 
including visual analysis, a dating algorithm developed by Bry and Boschan 
(1971) and a Markov regime switching model. The results confirm the existence 
of hot and cold issue periods in the US market with the documentation of a 
number of hot and cold periods in the various IPO activity measures. It is evident 
that hot periods are generally characterised by a higher mean and volatility, as well 
as longer duration, when compared to cold periods. Moreover, hot issue periods 
appear to be related to general business and stock market conditions. A lead -lag 
relationship between underpricing and IPO volume is also identified, whereby 
underpricing appears to lead volume by up to six months. This relationship 
supports the contention that the decision to issue is a function of current 
underpricing. 
Chapter seven focussed on the aggregate IPO market in Australia. The 
empirical results support the existence of hot issue periods across all measures of 
IPO activity in Australia. Separate consideration of the industrial and resource 
sectors suggests that industrial sector IPOs dominate Australian IPO issuance in 
terms of both number of issues and value. Resource sector IPOs are found to be 
relatively small in size and exhibit greater underpricing. While there is evidence of 
a lead -lag relationship between underpricing and IPO volume for industrial sector 
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IPOs, such a relationship is not evident in resource sector IPOs. Consistent with 
the US results, hot issue periods appear to be associated with the general stock 
market conditions across all measures of IPO activity. 
With the evidence of hot and cold issue markets observed in Chapters six 
and seven, several hypotheses were developed by considering both demand and 
supply factors to explore the underlying causes of hot issue IPO markets in 
Chapter eight. The variables suggested are, changes in the business cycle leading 
indicators, stock market return, stock market volatility, unexpected mutual fund 
flows and discounts on closed -end funds. Applying both OLS and probit analysis, 
the hypotheses are Iargely supported. All economic and stock market variables 
exhibit explanatory power over the number of firms going public and appear to 
influence the probability of hot issue periods in IPO volume. Hot issue periods in 
IPO underpricing appear mainly explained by changes in the stock market level 
and the business cycle leading indicator. The similarity of the OLS and probit 
results confirm the accuracy of identified hot and cold periods through the prior 
application of the regime switching technique. 
Chapter nine examined the financial linkages in the IPO activity measures 
between the USA and Australia. We posited a linkage in the IPO volume measures 
between the two markets, and a (weak) relationship in the IPO underpricing 
measures. There is evidence that the frequency of Australian IPO follows the 
general trend of the frequency of US IPOs though no linkage is observed in 
underpricing between the two markets. Of note, all US IPO activity measures 
exhibit strong persistence while persistence is only observed in the number of 
offerings in Australia. Moreover, Australian IPO underpricing appears to be more 
unpredictable. 
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10.2 Future Research 
This thesis has provided evidence of hot and cold new issue markets in the 
USA and Australia by examining IPO activity measures over the period January 
1976 to June 1998. Some of the evidence was confirmatory in nature, which adds 
to knowledge in this area, but most of the evidence was new. The original tests 
provide fresh insights into unresolved issues. However, despite the evidence 
presented in this thesis, there remain some unanswered questions. 
First, Chapter eight showed that aggregate IPO underpricing in the USA 
can be explained by economic and stock market variables. Underpricing appears to 
be also explained by other factors, such as firm- specific characteristics. In this 
thesis, the causes of hot issue periods in the IPO activity measures were examined 
with consideration of economic and stock market variables. However, these 
variables need not be the only variables stimulating cycles in IPO underpricing 
and volume. Hence, future research can consider the effect of financial features of 
individual IPOs as well as general stock market and economic conditions. Second, 
the institutional and regulatory features of the IPO process appear to be important 
in the study of the aggregate IPO activity and this is often overlooked. Third, the 
results indicate that the feature of persistence is generally not evident in the 
Australian IPO market while this feature is strongly evident in all US IPO activity 
measures. Further analysis of the reasons for this difference would be interesting. 
Fourth, hot issue periods identified using the Markov regime switching technique 
appear to Iargely capture the cyclical behaviour of the IPO activity. However, this 
technique can be further improved by incorporating duration and volatility features 
of hot and cold issue periods. Fifth, this thesis shows differences in the pricing 
behaviour of resource sector IPOs in Australia when compared to their industrial 
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counterparts. Resource sector IPOs exhibit a substantial influence on the 
Australian aggregate underpricing measures. Further detailed analysis on the 
different characteristics of resource and industrial sector IPOs will add to our 
understanding of IPO markets. Finally, there is still more international evidence 
required before we can fully understand, if ever, these intriguing markets. 
In summary, this thesis provides evidence on the existence of hot and cold 
issue markets in both the USA and Australia. The underlying causes of hot issue 
markets were examined and stock market and economic conditions as well as 
investor sentiment proved to be important. The evidence of the influence of the US 
IPO activity on the Australian IPO market was also reported. While it is not 
possible to answer all questions, the insights gained in the thesis have provided a 
launching pad and a framework for future research. 
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